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> MARCAS QUE VIVEM JUNTAS
Para conseguir um equilíbrio entre os 3 logotipos, foram definidas regras, de forma
a que hierarquicamente estejam todos equilibrados.
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Focusing on the 1851 International Sanitary Conference, this dissertation analyses an 
important episode in the international regulation of health, trade, passengers, and 
cargo in a period of epidemic crisis. It argues that a group of diplomats and 
physicians appointed to represent 12 European nations instituted a new international 
forum that extended – and occasionally rivalled – national and local agencies for 
epidemic governance. Together, delegates endeavoured to establish a common 
sanitary policy in Europe and in the Orient. By creating shared surveillance and 
judicial mechanisms – while standardising definitions and practices – delegates 
aimed to engineer the flow of people, vessels, cargo, and diseases in the 
Mediterranean region. As a transnational forum, the Conference was a platform 
where doctors and diplomats reinterpreted models of public health and sanitary 
administration while creating institutions that challenged conventional concepts of 
borders, national policy, and state sovereignty. As a multinational event, the 
Conference marked the unprecedented transition from local, national and, bilateral 
public health policies into a coherent transnational project for the governance of 
epidemics.  
 
The dissertation is based on extensive research conducted in hitherto largely 
unexplored medical, diplomatic, and national collections in Britain, France, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, and the United States of America. Sources ranging from diplomatic 
correspondence to medical publications and personal diaries, tie together multiple 
national and professional perspectives while untangling a diversity of personal and 
state agendas that fundamentally shaped the foundation of international public health 
mechanisms and contributed towards the crystallisation of medical concepts. 
 
Chapter one demonstrates how economic and political concerns about the impact of 
quarantine on international trade led to calls for international regulation and the 
standardization of quarantine practices in the Mediterranean region. Drawing on 
medical reports, pamphlets and diplomatic correspondence, the chapter exposes the 
multitude of quarantine practices in the Mediterranean region and a growing 
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international demand for prophylactic reform. These exchanges, it is shown, 
culminated with the organization of the 1851 International Sanitary Conference in 
Paris. 
 
Chapter two argues that the Conference challenged previous diplomatic and medical 
protocols by including two professional groups in the process of regulating 
international public health. The lack of precedent allowed diplomatic and medical 
delegates to establish new rules for the conduct of the conference, which gave them a 
relatively high level of autonomy from the states they represented.  
 
Chapter three focuses on the problems of constructing a shared aetiological 
classification and regulating quarantine practices. It shows that, although doctors 
gained progressive control over the Conference, ultimately diplomatic agendas 
shaped the final outcome. In addition, it demonstrates that, rather than defending the 
elimination of quarantines, liberal states supported the continuation of quarantine 
practice in the Mediterranean; albeit that they managed to severely limit its operation 
in practice.  
 
Finally, chapter four examines how European and Oriental sanitary institutions were 
uniformly redesigned and new international judicial mechanisms created. These 
measures variously affected the sovereignty of the participating states by limiting 
their independent capacity to set national epidemic policies. However, the chapter 
argues that these negotiations took the shape of sovereignty bargains: by loosening 
control over specific elements of their sovereignty, states managed to advance their 
political, economic and sanitary agendas. 
 
By looking at the International Sanitary Conference of 1851, this dissertation shows 
how the foundations of international public health had consequences not only for the 
control of epidemic diseases and the circulation of goods and people in the 
Mediterranean region, but also for the authority and status of the nation states. By 
doing so, it reveals that international public health governance resulted from the 
amalgamation of a particular configuration of expert and diplomatic struggles and 
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compromises. Moreover, the dissertation shifts the traditional local and national 
focus in the history of medicine to a wider and international context where local and 
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Gentlemen, (…) for too long we complained, and with good cause, of the diversity of sanitary 
regulations that in their detrimental interference with national commerce have established 
themselves to be a source of discomfort and, unfortunately, inequality. In a time when the 
industrious nations of the world seem to have forgotten their age-old rivalries and joined 
hands at the marvellous exhibition of London, we are putting an end to a state of affairs that 
was so often regrettable. (…)  
This we know, Gentlemen: we must reconcile, in wise measure, what is necessary for the 
protection of public health – even if we must make the occasional concession to ideas firmly 
rooted in peoples’ minds (for it is often the case these same ideas can be uprooted in an 
instant) – with what is necessary to afford our seafarers the maximum liberty they could 
hope. These are indeed difficult problems to solve, and it is for this reason that we have 
called this meeting of luminaries, men of science, and of practical experience whose 
collective knowledge we hope will illuminate this conference. Gentlemen, our aims are 
worthy of you and the powers that you have the honour to represent. […] [Achieving these 
goals] would, in fact, be a great fortune and innovation: the agreement between so many 
powers around a topic that for so many centuries was [the] source of profound division! 
Gentlemen, new ways of locomotion, by sea and by land, contribute to the everyday 
elimination of obstacles and to bridge distances between nations. Moreover, in order to 
complete that magnificent project of the human spirit, no other effort can be more fruitful and 
powerful than a wise regulation, which, within reasonable limits, eliminates sanitary 
obstacles. 
Let us work together in order to achieve this goal and we shall deserve the esteem of 
civilization and humanity.1 
 
On the morning of 5 August 1851, shortly after ten o’clock, Pierre Jules Baroche, the 
recently appointed French Minister of Foreign Affairs, welcomed several delegates 
to the Hôtel des Affaires Etrangères in Paris. Representing several European nations, 
these enlightened men of science and law had been summoned to Paris in order to 
negotiate a common trans-national solution to deal with the epidemics that were 
prevalent in nineteenth-century Europe. For six months, twenty-four delegates from 
twelve countries met regularly at the International Sanitary Conference (ISC).2 Each 
delegation, composed of a diplomat and a physician, put forward a particular model 
of international public health that they believed should be instituted in the 
Mediterranean region. After 48 regular sessions and several specially appointed 
commissions, the delegates produced a Draft International Sanitary Convention and 
                                                
1 Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France, Procès-Verbaux de la Conférence Sanitaire 
Internationale, vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1852). S2:2-4. 
2 Between 1851 and 1938 fourteen conferences were organised in total. Paris was the main venue for 




Regulation for their governments, which set out a common vision of the aetiological 
nature of epidemic diseases and detailed the prophylactic measures that should be 
internationally instituted in order to avoid new epidemic outbreaks. Despite the eager 
participation of governments and the promising results produced by delegates, only 
four participating states ended up ratifying the Convention; as such, historians such 
as Norman Howard-Jones have declared the Conference an utter failure.3 
 
This dissertation will not attempt to assess the ISC’s success or failure. Instead, via a 
close look at the debates, negotiations, and larger socio-economic contexts, the aim 
is to understand the state of international public health during the first half of the 
nineteenth century: What were the recognised problems and solutions? Who were the 
players? What role did science and diplomacy play in the making of the ISC? In sum, 
how did states aim for a common regulation of the increasing circulation of vessels, 
goods, and people during this period? These questions frame the 1851 International 
Sanitary Conference and the construction of an international sphere of public health.  
 
The process of creating an international approach to public health issues in Europe 
was neither straightforward nor without tension; rather, it was a source of intense 
debate and dispute. Faced with successive epidemic outbreaks of plague, yellow 
fever, and cholera, the European intelligentsia developed complex and conflicting 
visions on the nature of diseases and the mechanisms used to avoid future outbreaks. 
Moreover, Europe was marked by the emergence of modern states with antagonistic 
imperialistic ambitions both in the colonial world and within the European continent. 
In this sense, these powers struggled to dominate their neighbours politically and 
culturally.  In many regards, the ISC provided a stage for these conflicts, and the 
resolution of Europe’s epidemic issues required an adjustment of contradictory 
agendas.  
 
The dual representation system practiced at the ISC – i.e. each state’s appointment of 
a doctor and a diplomat as delegates to the conference – provides a good case study 
to help understand how knowledge claims and policy-making were negotiated and 
                                                
3 Norman Howard-Jones, The Scientific Background of the International Sanitary Conferences, 1851-
1938  (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1975). 
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produced hand in hand, given that meanings and practices debated at the ISC 
embodied two overlapping spheres: science and politics. This dissertation will show 
how international public health measures resulted from co-production exercises 
involving several states, professional groups, and vested interests. Moreover, in the 
following chapters, debates will be reconstructed and situated in order to show how 
knowledge circulated in nineteenth-century Europe while being negotiated on an 
international level. In a quasi-ethnographic historical approach, this dissertation will 
recover terminologies and practices used in the context of the ISC. However, the aim 
of 1851 International Sanitary Conference and the construction of an international 
sphere of public health is not merely to tell the story of a conference. Instead, this is 
a history of delegates and states making sense of epidemic diseases and prophylactic 
mechanisms through extensive networks that spanned from Lisbon to 
Constantinople, from Naples to London. It is a history that includes a multitude of 
actors and institutions that strived to articulate meanings and practices 
internationally. 
 
The ISC was by no means the first or the only international conference organised by 
several states. In fact, the early nineteenth century was the starting point of a new era 
of the creation and circulation of knowledge and politics in international venues. The 
new world order built upon the defeat of Napoleon in 1814 and the Congress of 
Vienna (1814-15) created the conditions for the multiplication of international 
conferences: in a context where warfare was considered second choice, ‘civilized’ 
states and individuals favoured outlets where disputes could be solved through 
negotiation.4 However, as Jeffrey A. Auerbach has shown in his work on the 1851 
Great Exhibition, these new international outlets involved much more than merely 
providing a venue for debate and circulation of ideas and objects. In fact, 
internationally organised exhibitions and conferences allowed states to exercise 
power and put forward specific expansionist agendas.5 The capacity of these 
institutions to fulfil a multitude of functions in part justifies their success.  Between 
                                                
4 F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, The great powers and the European states system 1815-1914  
(London: Longman, 1980). 




1800 and 1870, a total of 132 international conferences were organised – and while 
only six conferences were organised between 1815 and 1840, there were 23 that took 
place in 1867.6  
 
The importance and number of nineteenth-century international conferences 
contrasts with the lack of systematic studies of this modern phenomenon. In 1989, 
Jacques Julliard edited a special number of Mil neuf cent. Revue d’histoire 
intellectuelle that was exclusively dedicated to conferences. The issue presented 
conferences as places of intellectual exchange: places where ideas were presented, 
contested and negotiated.7 However, in looking at events such as at the International 
Conference of Criminal Anthropology,8 and the Conferences of International 
Feminists,9 scholars appeared more interested in summarising each event's main 
conclusions instead of focusing on the process of establishing the decisions.  
 
This descriptive approach to international conferences also moulded, to a large 
extent, the first compressive study of the ISC. In his 1975 work, The Scientific 
Background of the International Sanitary Conferences, Howard-Jones summarises 
the main achievements of fourteen International Sanitary Conferences organised 
between 1851 and 1938. In his view, the lack of knowledge about the ‘true’ nature of 
diseases compromised the success of the conferences. Howard-Jones selects what he 
believed to be state of the art knowledge about epidemic diseases and transports it to 
the space of these international events. He tells a teleological and linear history that 
follows the conferences’ aetiological and prophylactic debates and ends with the 
triumphs of medicine and medical men and the eventual establishment of the World 
Health Organisation.10 In his history of the ISCs, Howard-Jones portrays the 
conferences as places of circulation of knowledge but does not question how this 
knowledge was transported or which political agendas underpinned the organisation 
                                                
6 Union of International Associations, Les congrès internationaux de 1681 à 1899  (Brussels1960). 
7 Christophe Prochasson, "Les Congrès: lieux de l'échange intellectuel. Introduction," Mil neuf cent. 
Cahiers George Sorel, no. 7 (1989). 
8 Martine Kaluszynki, "Les Congrès internationaux d'anthropologie criminelle (1885-1914)," Mil neuf 
cent. Cahiers George Sorel, no. 7 (1989). 
9 Laurence Klejman, "Les Congrès féministes internationaux," Mil neuf cent. Cahiers George Sorel, 
no. 7 (1989). 
10 Howard-Jones, The Scientific Background of the International Sanitary Conferences, 1851-1938. 
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of these events and their conclusions. Moreover, he fails to situate the ISCs within 
larger contexts outwith the world of scientific discoveries. 
 
In contrast, in 1993 W. F. Bynum studied the ISC via a more sophisticated 
framework. Bynum was interested in teasing out the interplay between science, 
nationalism, and internationalism when applied to disease governance. As such, he 
placed the ISC within larger internationalist agendas connected with the growth of 
concerted international efforts. Bynum followed major debate shifts during 14 ISCs 
and ultimately argued that the ISC served the self-interests of powerful European and 
industrial countries.11 Bynum’s narrative is a clear step away from Howard-Jones’ 
Whiggish account of the ISC.12 However, like Howard-Jones, Bynum’s scope was 
too large to enable him to pay close attention to individual conferences and their 
unique professional dynamics. His work does not explain the mechanisms that states 
deployed in order to set agendas and protect their interests. Finally, Bynum’s 
contribution to a general understanding of the ISCs did not clearly address the 
mechanism through which science was articulated with political agendas. 
 
More recently, Valeska Huber described the ISC as a social arena where differences 
and boundaries between disciplines, nations, and cultures were defined. Huber’s 
account was built upon LeRoy Ladurie’s idea of a world unified by a common 
market of microbes that circulate through trading networks.13 She claimed that the 
nineteenth century – and the ISC in particular - marked the unification of the world 
through public health. In her account, the ISC established a prophylactic model that, 
like a membrane, allowed the flux of vessels and people while enabling the closure 
of borders if the sanitary safety of Europe were at risk.14 In her analysis, Huber 
regarded the agreed policies as consensus shaped by particular political and 
economic contexts. 
                                                
11 W. F. Bynum, "Policing Hearts of Darkness: Aspects of the International Sanitary Conferences," 
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 15(1993). 
12 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig interpretation of history  (London: G. Bell and sons, 1931). 
13 Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, "A Concept: the unification of the globe by disease (fourteenth and 
seventeenth centuries)," in The Mind and Method of the Historian, ed. Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
14 Valeska Huber, "The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary Conferences 




This dissertation will follow W. F. Bynum’s and Valeska Huber’s approaches in 
order to understand the works of the ISC through certain contexts that came together 
to build particular epistemic and practical positions. Like them, it also looks at the 
ISC as an important milestone in the history of public health. Hobsbawm classified 
the long nineteenth century as an age of revolutions, and the ISC embodied this spirit 
too.15 From an international relations perspective, the ISC marked the start of a new 
period of international coordination of public health policies. However, the 1851 ISC 
was far from the first initiative to introduce a common public health programme. As 
early as 1652, Florence, Genoa, and the Holy See had established an international 
agreement to introduce common public health measures in the three harbours of the 
west coast of Italy. By agreeing to observe and enforce common measures while 
allowing the establishment of foreign health authorities in their territories for 
surveillance proposes, these Italian states promoted, in the words of Carlo Cipolla, a 
‘revolutionary and enlightened effort which, in the interest of “the common health,” 
envisaged international controls and the voluntary relinquishment of discretionary 
powers by fully sovereign state in the matter of public health.’16 Compared to the 
1652 agreement, the ISC considerably expanded the number of participant states and 
the geographical scope designed to implement common public health instruments. In 
comparison with the three Italian ports, delegates to the ISC aimed to establish a 
common epidemic governance system for the entire Mediterranean region.17  Finally, 
instead of focusing its efforts on establishing common practices, the ISC worked as a 
venue to crystallise meanings – namely, delegates attempted to create an 
international standard for representations of the aetiological nature of diseases. 
 
These efforts were concentrated around three maladies: cholera, yellow fever, and 
plague. However, cholera was clearly the central point of dispute. Cholera had 
                                                
15 The long nineteenth century periodisation runs between 1779 (the French Revolution and the end of 
the Ancient Régime) and 1914 (the start of the First World War). See E. J. Hobsbawm, The age of 
revolutions, 1789-1848  (London: Abacus, 1962). 
16 Carlo M. Cipolla, Fighting the plague in seventeenth-century Italy  (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1981). 
17 Because this system involved a careful policing of arrivals at Mediterranean ports, in practice the 
ISC was also applied to vessels traveling from the Americas to European destinations. In this sense, 
the ISC geographical scope extended far beyond the Mediterranean Sea.  
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arrived in Western Europe for the first time in the 1820s. Newspapers and 
contemporary publications painted a picture of an anxious and scared European 
society, and cholera aetiology and prophylactic strategies were sources of intense 
disagreement and controversy within European medical and political circles.18 There 
was no consensus regarding the cause of cholera, and to the despair of many, the 
strategies for tackling the spread of this disease produced little effect.19 Numerous 
theories linked cholera outbreaks to particular sanitary conditions, meteorological 
configurations or geophysical circumstances. However, nineteenth-century 
intelligentsia agreed that strict prophylactic measures were seriously compromising 
the profitability of commercial activities.20 
 
Although cholera only made an appearance in Europe in the early nineteenth century, 
the references to this disease date back to the sixth century BC in Indian medical 
literature.21 Nevertheless, the first largely circulated European description of cholera 
was produced after the arrival of Vasco da Gama in India in 1498. Gaspar Correia, 
the Portuguese chronicler (1495-1561), reported in his 1503 publication, Lendas da 
India [Legends of India], of the existence of a local disease named moryxy 
responsible for a high rate of mortality in the army of the Calicut sovereign.22 
Between Correia’s chronicles and the arrival of cholera in Europe, Britain and 
Portugal had intensified their presence in India and consolidated their imperial rule. 
In order to manage India efficiently, these European powers had developed networks 
to circulate information between the metropolis and the dominated areas: officials 
reported regulations, specific events, and other requests from one end of the Empire 
to the other. These networks also extended into the medical field. Doctors and 
colonial officers produced, sent and received regular reports regarding the health 
                                                
18 See, for instance "Cholera Morbus: Forms Of Prayers To Be Read In All Churches," Times, 7 
November 1831; "Cholera Morbus: Opinions And Facts Respecting The Disease," Times, 12 
November 1831. 
19 Peter Baldwin, Contagion and the state in Europe, 1830-1930  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Richard J. Evans, Death in Hamburg: society and politics in the cholera years, 1830-
1910  (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990). 
20 Erwin Ackerknecht, "Anticontagionism between 1821 and 1867," Bulletin for the History of 
Medicine 48, no. 22 (1948); R. J. Evans, "Epidemics and Revolutions - Cholera in 19th-Century 
Europe," Past & Present, no. 120 (1988). 
21 Robert Pollitzer, "Cholera Studies," Bulletin of the World Health Organization 10, no. 3 (1954). 
22 Gaspar Correia, Lendas da India  (Lisboa: Edição da Academia Real das Sciencias, 1859). 
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conditions of the regions under their administration.23 This information was crucial 
not only because of its usefulness in the creation of colonial policies, but also 
because, in the case of cholera, it allowed European medical communities to 
recognise the symptoms of the disease. 
 
Cholera, endemic in India up to the 1800s, spread globally in six successive 
pandemic waves from the beginning of the nineteenth century.24 The first pandemic, 
1817-23, affected the Asian continent, the Indonesian Archipelago, the Persian Gulf 
and the oriental part of Russia. The second wave, from 1826 to 1837, arrived in the 
Western states of Europe from 1831 onwards. Subsequently, cholera appeared in 
Europe during four other major pandemic outbreaks – 1846-1862, 1864-1875, 1883-
1894 and 1899-1923.25 Other epidemic diseases were also present in nineteenth-
century Europe. However, when compared with cholera, plague and yellow fever 
were not as rampant in the continent. The impact of cholera on nineteenth-century 
societies was so profound that Charles Rosenberg and other historians claimed that 
responses to the disease came from all sectors of society; they transpired values and 
attitudes in the areas of science, religion, and governance. Epidemic diseases – and 
cholera in particular – provide a sampling device to help understand societies and 
change.26 As this dissertation will show, the ISC, as a conference composed by state 
envoys, allows us to understand how states formulated national epidemic governance 
positions while allowing space to consider how individual agency played into this 
process.  
                                                
23 The flux of communication between the two imperial poles lasted up to the last days of the empire. 
Anna Crozier explores the relations between the metropolis and the doctors working for the Colonial 
Medical Service during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Anna Crozier, Practicing Colonial 
Medicine  (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2007). 
24 Different writers defend divergent dates of onset and duration of successive pandemics. In 1882, H. 
Haneser proposes four waves: 1816-37; 1840-50; 1852-60 and 1863-73. A. Hirsh (1883) also 
describes four major outbreaks: 1817-23; 1826-37; 1846-63 and 1865-75. Pollitzer, "Cholera Studies." 
25 The last cholera outbreak in Europe was in Portugal in 1974, when a set of contaminated bottles of 
mineral water was put out on the market. R. J. Morris, Cholera, 1832: the social response to an 
epidemic  (London: Croom Helm, 1976). 
26 C. E. Rosenberg, "Cholera in Nineteenth-Century Europe - Tool for Social and Economic 
Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History 8, no. 4 (1966). Michael Durey made 
established a similar argument: Michael Durey, The return of the plague: British society and the 
cholera, 1831-2  (Dublin : [New York] :: Gill and Macmillan Humanities Press, 1979). 
Both authors based their historiographical position on Asa Briggs’ invitation to look at cholera as a 
historical object capable of unravelling multiple social dimensions. Asa Briggs, "Cholera and Society 
in the Nineteenth Century," Past and Present 19, no. April (1961); ibid.  
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Since George Rosen’s pioneering History of Public Health, historians have devoted 
considerable efforts in order to understand those which he considered the most 
important function of modern states.27 Rosen claimed that public health, as a 
conceptual umbrella that covers health governance, has changed considerably 
throughout history.28 Throughout time, public health has been increasingly 
institutionalised. The international public health agreements described by Carlo 
Cipolla were in part possible through the very process of institution and 
formalisation of public health into permanent public health organisms. In Tuscany, 
this process occurred during the 1600s. Facing a plague outbreak, the Florentine 
government formed a permanent board of health with the capacity to coordinate 
national epidemic surveillance by employing doctors and state officials. Based on the 
idea of environmental pollution, the board of health attributed epidemic outbreaks to 
malevolent odours generated by waste, filth, and stagnancy.29 By looking at the 
dynamics between physicians and state administrators, Cipolla traced the history of 
formalisation of public health institutions and practices.  
  
The institutional dimension of public health has been an important line of inquiry for 
historians. Mathew Ramsey has analysed how the unstable political climate of post-
Revolutionary France shaped the national programme of public health. Although the 
first central institution for the coordination of public health initiatives was founded in 
1776,30 the first half of the nineteenth century had been marked by stronger 
initiatives. Medical elites forged alliances with administrative machineries such as 
                                                
27 George Rosen, A History of Public Health, MD monographs on medical history ; no.1 (New York: 
MD Publications, 1958). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Carlo M. Cipolla, Miasmas and disease : public health and the environment in the pre-industrial 
age  (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 1992). 
30 Earlier, facing plague outbreaks in 1720 in Marseilles, the French government had tried to 
coordinate prophylactic measures at a national level. However, these efforts were little more than ad 
hoc responses to an epidemic crisis. For most of the Old Regime, Matthew Ramsey argued, France 
lacked a permanent institution at a national level devoted exclusively to public health. This tendency 
was reversed in 1776 when the Royal Society of Medicine was established in order to investigate and 
regulate epidemic and epizootic diseases, remedies and mineral waters. Like the Florentine Board of 
Health, the Society encouraged the elimination of environmental health hazards while compiling 
reports on the local topographical and meteorological conditions. This institutionalisation shift marked 
the emergence of a medical bureaucracy with jurisdiction over public health. The bureaucracy 
extended its control to the population of the entire kingdom, in contrast to previous initiatives, which 
were exclusively dedicated to urban centres. Matthew Ramsey, "Public Health in France," in The 
History of Public Health and the Modern State, ed. Dorothy Porter (Atlanta: Rodobi, 1994). 
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the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in order to 
establish epidemiological and demographical investigations and public health 
programmes.31  In addition to the founding of new institutions like the Royal 
Academy of Medicine and the Central Sanitary Commission to promote research, 
advise the central government, and design and implement prophylactic policies, a 
new legal framework was developed in France and in 1822 legislation granted the 
‘monarchy virtually dictatorial powers in times of epidemic emergency.’32 
 
The centralisation quest was further advanced with the Revolution of 1848 and the 
creation of a new consultative body under the Ministry of Commerce and 
Agriculture: the Consultative Committee on Public Hygiene. The new Committee 
supervised a network of advisory councils of pubic health, and by 1851 was 
entrusted to coordinate the work of epidemic doctors.33 French public health was 
increasingly centralised by the efforts of the government. In parallel, according to 
Ann La Berge, this institutionalisation movement was paired with the creation of a 
professional community of hygienists bonded by publications, training and 
ideologies.34 
 
Dorothy Porter has shown that in England, attitudes towards public health reflected 
general values of society, which tried to keep the size of the state to a minimum. 
Within this constraint, the search for solutions to the epidemic costs of nineteenth-
century economic, demographic, and urban expansion passed through the 
construction of bureaucratic structures that allowed the growth of public health 
administration. These efforts were driven by the actions of central government but 
mostly relied on local government for their practical application.35 In fact, in contrast 
to the absolutist continental states, English counties, boroughs, and parishes were 




34 Ann Elizabeth Fowler La Berge, Mission and method: the early nineteenth-century French public 
health movement, Cambridge history of medicine (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992). See also Erwin Ackerknecht, "Hygiene in France, 1815-1848," Bulletin for the History 
of Medicine 22, no. 2 (1948). 
35 Dorothy Porter, Health, civilization, and the state: a history of public health from ancient to modern 
times  (London: Routledge, 1999). 
 
 21 
responsible for their own affairs, and developed a set of traditions and institutions 
adapted from local circumstances and available resources.36 
 
Organised around the ideas of poverty and social reform, the public health movement 
in England was marked by a multitude of local approaches that often lacked a 
coherent uniformed nexus. As such, as Christopher Hamlin has demonstrated, the 
legitimacy and limits of central government intervention were persistently 
questioned during this period.37 In the wake of epidemic outbreaks like typhus and 
cholera, the central government authorised the creation of local boards of health. 
However, as Gerry Kearns clearly stated, not only did these boards have to compete 
with several other local authorities in their response to environmental problems, but 
their actions were also constrained by central boards of health, poor commissions, 
sanitary commissions, and the Privy Council, all sitting in London. From a legal 
perspective, public health – as a manifestation of the hygienist movement – involved 
laws dedicated to poverty, quarantine, trade, removal of nuisances, and others. Public 
health, therefore, was far from a uniform body in nineteenth-century England.38  
 
In their analysis, Cipolla, Ramsey, La Berge, and Hamlin interwove legal and 
medical sources while providing larger philosophical contexts in order to explain the 
distinct processes of the formalisation of public health.39 In addition, these authors 
explained the institutionalisation of public health by looking at professional 
dynamics in these countries. The analysis of professional discourse also allowed 
Charles Rosenberg and Robert Morris to show how concepts of epidemic diseases 
varied in time and from community to community. Priests, doctors, and state 
administrators produced professionally coherent discourses on the nature and cause 
of diseases while offering solutions for treating and avoiding future outbreaks.40  
                                                
36 Christopher Hamlin, "State Medicine in Great Britain," in The history of public health and the 
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37 ———, Public health and social justice in the age of Chadwick : Britain, 1800-1854  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
38 See Flinn’s detailed introduction on the roots of the sanitary movement. Edwin Chadwick and M. 
W. Flinn, Report on the sanitary condition of the labouring population of Great Britain: 1842  
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1965). 
39 See also Hamlin, Public health and social justice in the age of Chadwick : Britain, 1800-1854. 
40 Rosenberg, "Cholera in Nineteenth-Century Europe - Tool for Social and Economic Analysis."; 




Scholars have also associated specific prophylactic discourse with a multitude of 
variables. In a seminal article, Erwin Ackerknecht linked individual ideologies with 
the support of prophylactic tools that varied in the degree to which they affected 
individual liberties.41 However, in an extensive international comparative study, 
Peter Baldwin argued that the geo-position of a country influences its adopted 
prophylactic measures more than political ideologies.42 These claims tend to be 
problematic since they oversimplify arguments and do not account for the multitude 
of co-existing positions. Margaret Pelling and Vinten-Johasen et al unravelled the 
diversity of professional aetiological and prophylactic opinions through a close look 
at medical and state authority discourses.  Despite the fact that nineteenth-century 
medical positions operated in an axis that ranged between contagionism and anti-
contagionism ideas, in reality, extreme positions were rarely found.43 
 
By looking at quarantines as a specific prophylactic measure, historians have 
traditionally focused on the legal framework and the social impact of quarantine. For 
example, Charles F. Mullett claimed that through quarantine, the state progressively 
penetrated and restricted its subjects’ liberties using the justification of public 
welfare.44 J. C. McDonald argued that science was used in the interest of trade, to 
avoid the de facto use of quarantines in England.45 More recently, in Maritime 
Quarantine: The British Experience, John Booker described an extensive debate 
between supporters and opponents of the practice of quarantine based on medical, 
economic, and political arguments.46 
                                                
41 Ackerknecht, "Anticontagionism between 1821 and 1867." 
42 Baldwin, Contagion and the state in Europe, 1830-1930. 
43 Margaret Pelling, Cholera, fever and English medicine, 1825-1865  (Oxford: Oxford University 
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no. 6 (1949). 
45 J. C. McDonald, "The history of quarantine in Britain during the 19th century," Bulletin of the 
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46 See for example William Coleman, "Epidemiological methood in the 1860s: Yellow fever at Saint-
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In contrast with this nationally-bound view, historians such as Peter Baldwin have 
produced studies that either offer international comparisons of prophylactic practices, 
or elect international events as objects of research. While Baldwin’s account offers a 
bird's eye view of what happened in Europe during a set period in terms of 
prophylactic policies, Valeska Huber's approach allows us to see what happens when 
different prophylactic strands come together in the moment of determining a 
position.47  
 
Building on the extensive literature on the history of public health, international 
conferences and the social history of epidemic diseases, the aim of the dissertation is 
to contribute to the above described scholarly conversations by offering a 
comprehensive social historical account of the formation of the field of international 
public health through the lenses of medical knowledge and professional practices.  
 
A theoretical approach  
In order to understand how meanings and practices were negotiated at the ISC in 
order to create an international model of public health, this dissertation will follow a 
symbolic interactionist approach. Intellectually deriving from the Chicago School 
and created as a critical response to functionalist and quantitative sociological 
approaches, symbolic interactionist theory is based on the major premise that 
representations of reality are the result of negotiation between actors.48 Human 
beings act toward things on the basis of the meaning that they ascribe to these things. 
Understanding meanings is central for the understanding of any social action. Thus, 
meaning is not a natural property of a thing; on the contrary, meaning, according to 
Herbert Blumer, arises from a process of negotiation between people:  
                                                
47 Huber, "The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary Conferences on 
Cholera, 1851-1894." Bynum, "Policing Hearts of Darkness: Aspects of the International Sanitary 
Conferences."; Norman Howard-Jones, International public health between the two World Wars : the 
organizational problems, History of international public health ; no.3 (Geneva :: World Health 
Organization, 1978); ———, The Scientific Background of the International Sanitary Conferences, 
1851-1938.  
48 On the emergence of the Chicago School between 1915 and 1940, and its singular methodologies 
and theoretical approaches, see Martin Bulmer, The Chicago school of sociology: institutionalization, 




the meaning of a thing for a person grows out of the ways in which other persons act 
toward the person with regard to the thing. Their actions operate to define the thing 
for the person. Thus, symbolic interactionism sees meanings as social products, as 
creations that are formed in and though the defining activities of people as they 
interact.49  
 
In this sense, the process of interaction is not a ‘neutral medium in which social 
forces play out their games, but the actual stuff of social organization and social 
forces.’50 From an interactionist perspective, meaning and actions are not pre-
determined. Science and scientific claims, understood within an interactionist 
perspective, depend and change according to society itself.51 
 
In Symbolic Interactionism in Social Studies of Science, Adele Clarke and Elihu 
Gerson reviewed the impact of the interactionist perspective on the understanding of 
science and technology.52 If the work produced within the interactionist perspective 
is vast in terms of elected objects, Clarke and Gerson claim that it is possible to find 
shared characteristics within this scholarship: for instance, a constant preoccupation 
with understanding social change in science and its relations with tradition and 
established scientific representations of reality. Instead of focusing on science as 
merely ‘knowledge’, these scholars refuse to ‘divorce knowledge from interaction 
and social organization.’53 They are more interested in the activities of producing 
knowledge and its work environment than in famous scientists or heroic physicians. 
In this sense, the laboratory, the museum and other formal/informal spaces of 
circulation of knowledge are places that create disciplines and discipline scientific 
practices and representations. Moreover, these are places of translation and diffusion 
of knowledge through different social spheres and actors that contribute to a constant 
                                                
49 Herbert Blumer, Symbolic interactionism: perspective and method  (Berkeley: University of 
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50 Howard Saul Becker and Michal M. McCall, Symbolic interaction and cultural studies  (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990). p6. 
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mutability of knowledge. The symbolic interactionist tradition in Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) demonstrates the ‘inseparability of scientific knowledge 
and the work organization that produces it’.54 
 
However, social interactionists have often been accused of denying the existence of 
reality with their radical social constructivism approach.55 Trying to bring nature 
back to the STS debate, Sheila Jasanoff argued that science is the result of a process 
of co-production between the social and the natural world: ‘society cannot function 
without knowledge any more than knowledge can exist without appropriate social 
support.’56 Furthermore, Jasanoff used the term co-production to refer to processes 
that connect the production of knowledge with the organisation of policy-making. In 
her view, science and policy together define problems and create knowledge in the 
same way that they produce social problems and create solutions.57 By avoiding both 
social and natural determinisms, this perspective brings an interpretive turn into 
social studies of science: it emphasises dimensions of meaning, discourse and 
textuality in the same way that symbolic interactionists do.58 Jasanoff claims that 
nature limits social possibilities while multiple representations of reality can co-exist 
since they depend on communities of representations and practices.59  
 
By following the ISC debates, it is assumed for the purposes of this dissertation that 
medical theories emerge under specific social conditions and that they are mobilised 
in relation to specific practices. Moreover, it is accepted that the practical, 
professional and social interests of these communities ultimately shape theories and 
                                                
54 Ibid., 187. 
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concepts.60 This idea allows us to understand why several actors presented different 
aetiological ideas at the Conference and how these strands changed during the six 
months so that a common agreement was eventually created. Moreover, by following 
the aetiological and prophylactic ideas that constituted the international public health 
model, this dissertation will look at the multiple identities of diseases. In this sense, 
the approach follows Ludmilla Jordanova's vision of social constructivism. By 
bringing diplomacy and state governance to the world of history of medicine, this 
dissertation will also look at particular images of diseases, find their roots and 
establish their implications.61 By showing that diseases are not natural entities but 
social concepts deeply rooted in contexts, it will follow Charles Rosenberg’s idea 
that diseases do not exist until their existence has been agreed upon, by perceiving, 
naming, and responding to them.62  
 
Primary sources 
This research is based on two types of primary resources: first, the Proceedings of 
the 1851 International Sanitary Conference are used to illustrate the official character 
of the ISC; secondly, material produced in order to support and contextualise the 
work of the delegates will provide a different angle on the process of constructing a 
model of international public health.  
 
Printed following the end of each session in 1851-52, the proceedings offer a detailed 
image of the Conference’s debates. Written in French, the official language of the 
Conference, they represent the official and final account of the ISC, sanctioned by 
delegates. The special collections of the University of Edinburgh, the Royal College 
of Physicians of Edinburgh, the National Archives in London, the Portuguese Torre 
do Tombo and Arquivos Histórico Diplomático allowed me to collect lost copies of 
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the individual session proceedings and combine them as a unit before the Harvard 
University Library’s Open Collections Program digitised them. 
 
As will be demonstrated in the dissertation, some delegates succeeded in altering the 
content of the proceedings in order to advance specific agendas. In a letter to the 
Foreign Office, Anthony Perrier, the English diplomatic envoy complained that these 
documents were not totally accurate.63 In order to provide alternative sources to the 
Conference debates, I will combine the proceedings with the vast diplomatic 
correspondence exchanged between delegates and their home institutions. These 
documents were found at the National Archives in London, the Diplomatic Archive 
Centre of the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, the Portuguese Torre 
do Tombo and Arquivos Histórico Diplomático. Because of the nature of diplomatic 
practices, I was also able to find a selected collection of letters sent to, or by, 
Austrian, Spanish, and Russian delegates and their authorities. At the Yale Francis A. 
Countway Library of Medicine and the University of Pennsylvania, I discovered 
private letters between John Sutherland, the British Foreign Office, and Edwin 
Chadwick.  
 
In addition, medical publications on epidemic diseases were found at the special 
collections of the University of Edinburgh, the Royal College of Physicians of 
Edinburgh, the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, the British Library, the 
Wellcome Collection, the French National Academy of Medicine, the Portuguese 
Torre do Tombo, and the Lisbon Academy of Sciences. Final, additional printed 




The dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter one demonstrates how 
economic and political concerns about the impact of quarantine on international trade 
led to calls for international regulation and the standardisation of quarantine practices 
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in the Mediterranean region. Drawing on medical reports, pamphlets and diplomatic 
correspondence, the chapter exposes the multitude of quarantine practices in the 
Mediterranean region and a growing international demand for prophylactic reform. 
These exchanges, it is shown, culminated in the organisation of the 1851 
International Sanitary Conference in Paris. 
 
Chapter two argues that the Conference challenged previous diplomatic and medical 
protocols by including two professional groups in the process of regulating 
international public health. The lack of precedent allowed diplomatic and medical 
delegates to establish new rules for the conduct of the Conference, which gave them 
a relatively high level of autonomy from the states they represented.  
 
Chapter three focuses on the problems of constructing a shared aetiological 
classification and regulating quarantine practices. It shows that, although doctors 
gained progressive control over the Conference, it was ultimately diplomatic agendas 
that shaped the final outcome. In addition, it demonstrates that, rather than defending 
the elimination of quarantines, liberal states supported the continuation of quarantine 
practice in the Mediterranean; however, they did manage to place severe limits on its 
operation in practice.  
 
Finally, chapter four examines how European and Oriental sanitary institutions were 
uniformly redesigned and new international judicial mechanisms created. These 
measures variously affected the sovereignty of the participating states by limiting 
their independent capacity to set national epidemic policies. However, it is argued 
that these negotiations took the shape of sovereignty bargains: by loosening control 
over specific elements of their sovereignty, states managed to advance their political, 




CHAPTER 1: Between diseases and desires: pursuing international 
regulation of public health 
Quarantine in a stalling Mediterranean 
 
In the early 1800s, Henry Matthews decided to leave Britain and explore the south of 
Europe. Matthews (1789-1828), the fifth son of a physician and poet from 
Herefordshire, was a fellow of King’s College, Cambridge where he received a BA 
in 1812 and an MA in 1815. Like his colleagues at King’s, Matthews was educated 
at Eton College before university.64 Matthews decided to leave England not for 
sightseeing purposes, but because, being ill, he was ordered by his doctors to travel 
and ‘run away from death’.65 Although it is not clear what medical condition 
threatened his life so seriously, the rainy weather of Britain was probably considered 
responsible for the deterioration of his health. Like many of his British 
contemporaries who adventured at sea, Matthews endured the difficulties of sailing, 
but unlike others, he kept a diary where he registered the details of travelling during 
the nineteenth century and his ideas about quarantine. 
 
On 12 September 1817, Matthews boarded the Princess Charlotte, a packet ship to 
Malta. With little sea experience, Matthews spent most of his days ‘sick as a dog’ 
and decided to disembark as soon as the ship reached Lisbon. Arriving from England 
with a clean bill of health, the Princess Charlotte received free pratique66 straight 
away. Immediately, Matthews decided to explore the hilly streets of Lisbon. After a 
couple of days, he continued his journey to Italy on board the Fanny, a small trading 
vessel of about 140 tons burden. The sailing to Livorno took twelve long days, 
during which he endured the displeasures of seasickness. As soon as the Fanny 
approached Livorno, ‘a boat from the Health-Office bailed [her] immediately, and 
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[she was] ordered to perform a quarantine of ten days.’67 The Fanny and her 
passengers   
 
weighed anchor, and were permitted to go within the mole into the harbour. […] 
And as [they] had a clean bill of health and there was, in fact, no ground for putting 
[them] under quarantine at all, [they] proceeded at once to this destination. Two 
officers of the Health-Office were put on board to prevent all intercourse with 
[them]. As soon as [they] were safely moored within the harbour, a boat full of 
musicians made its appearance under the cabin-window, and [they] were serenaded 
with ‘Rule Britannia,’ and ‘God save the King.’68 
 
While a group of Livornese sang ‘Rule, Britannia! Rule the waves: Britons never will 
be slaves’, Henry Matthews thought about the very nature of quarantine. He 
recognised that, like any other laws, ‘the quarantine laws […] though originally 
intended for the general good,’ soon were ‘perverted to private purposes.’69 Like 
many other commentators of the time, he noticed that quarantine often challenged 
the conventional boundaries of public and private good – or the interest of general 
public health versus the interests of trade in a period of growing international 
commerce. To Matthews, the business of quarantine was no more than a formality. 
After all, the Fanny was moored next to a ‘multitude of vessels of all nations packed 
together higgledy-piggledy, as close as sheep in a pen.’70 Matthews wrote ironically, 
in his diary, that this strange way of governing diseases in Livorno was ‘a rare 
precaution against infection.’71 According to his account, ‘the true cause of these 
strict regulations […] [was] the emolument derived from them by the Health-
Office.’72  
 
The transport of cargo and people during the first half of the nineteenth century was 
an expensive and time-consuming affair. On the one hand, overland transportation 
was directly dependent on the quality of roads and the weather.73 On the other, sea-
shipping speed was heavily dependent on weather and sea conditions. Furthermore, 
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the imposition of up to 60 days of quarantine increased the duration of travelling, the 
escalation of costs associated with the lack of commercial activity and the 
unpredictability of the duration of the journey. Many travellers and merchants were 
unsure of the duration of quarantine to which their vessel would be subjected.74 
Travellers such as Henry Matthews complained about the enforcement of this 
strategy, and they were not alone. Ship owners, merchants and doctors voiced their 
concerns with respect to these measures. In this chapter, I survey attitudes towards 
quarantine and demonstrate how distrust and opposition to this prophylactic 
technology fed an intense diplomatic debate which eventually culminated in the 
organisation of the 1851 ISC. I argue that quarantine was far from an exclusively 
medical issue. On the contrary, it affected and resulted in responses from several 
groups, who struggled to reconcile this sanitary technique with the situation that they 
witnessed in reality.  
 
As such, this chapter will unveil national agendas and the negotiation of an 
international agenda of public health. It will contribute to a better understanding of 
the eclectic practices of quarantine within the Mediterranean Sea.  
 
Quarantine could, perhaps, have been a profitable business for some in the nineteenth 
century,75 but it was a major inconvenience for many. Furthermore, many questioned 
its efficiency as a prophylactic tool. However, there is also evidence of a large 
contingent of support for quarantine. Many doctors – and even politicians and 
travellers – believed that this measure was the only way to prevent diseases such as 
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plague, yellow fever or cholera spreading via disembarkation in healthy ports. 
Although these groups did not deny the heavy economic cost of the measure, they 
believed that this was the price that must be paid for the preservation of public 
health, and took the debate over quarantine and the enforcement of this sanitary 
practice as a serious matter. An episode from Matthews’ travelogue offers a good 
example of the extent to which public health officials were concerned with even the 
most minor details of quarantine practice. When he arrived in Livorno, a fowl flew 
from his ship into a neighbour vessel; facing an unpredictable breach of quarantine, 
health authorities debated extensively about what should be done in order to avoid 
possible contamination. Finally, ‘it was determined […] that the fowl [should] 
remain where it was, till the quarantine of [the] neighbour [vessel] had expired.’76  
 
It is possible that the Livornese authorities, like most quarantine partisans, were 
driven by contagionist ideas. According to these theories, diseases were transmitted 
to humans through contact with infected people, animals or cargo. It was also held 
that diseases could manifest either immediately or several days after contact. 
Therefore, in order to assure that there was no risk to public health, it was 
necessitated that quarantine last for the same duration as the incubation period of 
diseases. In physical terms, quarantine was designed as a barrier between vessels, 
people, cargo and local populations. Only after the required time had elapsed would 
authorities allow goods and passengers to be safely unloaded.77 In this sense, the 
whole purpose of quarantine was to control potential sources of contagion. A fowl 
flying between vessels arrested under quarantine could compromise and jeopardise 
the health security of populations. There was no way to know whether the fowl - or 
any other object or living creature – was a vector for the transmission of disease. 
Quarantine, as an urban institution, was an attempt to shut cities down and avoid the 
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spread of diseases. Closing a city down was sometimes part of a nationwide strategy: 
this way, a disease outbreak would not only be avoided in a particular city, but also 
prevented from spreading throughout the country. 
 
During the nineteenth century, quarantine transformed from a local problem into a 
national and transnational issue. It was one public health technique among many 
others;78 however, unlike others, it juggled local and national interests, local 
traditions and national directives. Often, these contradictory interests were the bases 
of struggle in the context of the emergence of modern states in Europe (for instance, 
protecting the public health could mean closing a port city to trade, thus limiting a 
nation’s access to particular goods and depriving merchants of income). Marked by 
growing and complex machineries of central administration, European states in the 
early nineteenth century tried to create national standards across their domains; this 
was usually achieved either by controlling access to certain professions or creating 
categories of citizens. Through these strategies, states managed to impose regularity 
and predictability on their territories.79 As quarantine was typically controlled by 
local authorities and regulated with vague legal frameworks, it defied the central 
imposed order.  
 
Usually, a vessel approaching a Mediterranean port would be intercepted by health 
officials and have its bill of health inspected. At the same time, local officials would 
assess onboard sanitary conditions and the type of transported cargo. After this 
information was collected and depending on the place of departure, the ship could be 
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morbidity, such as new city planning with wide streets and greater air circulation, introduction of 
sewage systems, improvement of the quality of drinking water, control of food provisioning, etc. See, 
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and germs  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 
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(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994). 
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presented with three different scenarios: (1) Free pratique; (2) quarantine of 
observation or (3) full quarantine. If a vessel were granted free pratique, she would 
be admitted to the port without delay, and her passengers and cargo would receive 
immediate authorisation to disembark. If, for whatever reason, a vessel were placed 
under observation, the ship would be escorted into an isolated spot, close to the 
harbour, and a group of quarantine guards would come aboard in order to ensure that 
no communication occurred between the vessel and the local population. Finally, if 
health authorities ordered full quarantine, the vessel would be escorted into the 
lazaretto and purified according to local practices, along with her cargo and 
passengers. During this period, communication with the outside world would not be 
allowed.  
 
In any case, quarantine was a long, tedious and expensive sanitary measure that both 
merchant and navy vessels had to endure in order to receive free pratique. In 1834, a 
vessel arriving at a French port from Constantinople would be subject to 60 days of 
quarantine. However, if the same vessel, with the same cargo, docked in Venice or 
Trieste, the quarantine imposed would be 34 days (see Table 1). The duration of the 
imposed quarantine was decided by local administrations, who not only perceived 
epidemic risk differently, but also developed individual strategies to secure the health 











Algeria Genova 33 984 
Algeria Malta 20 1017 
Algeria Marseille 25 749 
Algeria Trieste 21 1331 
Algeria (Average 22.6) Venice 14 1235 
    
Constantinople French ports 60 2594 
Constantinople Genova 50 2386 
Constantinople Livorno 47.5 2260 
Constantinople Malta 50 2260 
Constantinople Trieste 34 2183 
Constantinople (average 45.9) 
 Venice 34 2244 
    
Egypt (Port Said) French ports 44 2725 
Egypt (Port Said) Genova 46 2522 
Egypt (Port Said) Livorno 32.5 2375 
Egypt (Port Said) Malta 25 1794 
Egypt (Port Said) (average 36.8) Marseille 47 1191 
    
Ionian Islands  Genova 35 1186 
Ionian Islands  Malta 20 597 
Ionian Islands  Marseille 30 1392 
Ionian Islands  Trieste 21 999 
Ionian Islands  (average 25.4) 
 Venice 21 1047 
    
Mexico (Vera Cruz via Gibraltar) Genova 50 10368 
Mexico (Vera Cruz via Gibraltar) Malta 7 10626 
Mexico (Vera Cruz via Gibraltar) Marseille 7 10065 
Mexico (Vera Cruz via Gibraltar) Trieste 21 10770 
Mexico (Vera Cruz via Gibraltar)  
(average 21 days) Venice 21 10661 
 
    
New York (via Gibraltar) Genova 23 7388 
'New York (via Gibraltar) Livorno 20 7438 
New York (via Gibraltar) Malta 7 7636 
New York (via Gibraltar) Marseille 5 7078 
New York (via Gibraltar) Trieste 18 7791 
New York (via Gibraltar)  Venice 18 7674 
                                                
80 Based on Dupeyron’s ‘Comparative table of quarantine in several Mediterranean ports’. Dupeyron 
groups all departures into eight major groups – ‘Constantinople, North Sea, Enez and the 
Dardanelles’; ‘Egypt, Syria, Ottoman Empire (with the exception of the above places of departure)’; 
‘Ionian Islands’; ‘Northern Africa (except Algeria)’;’Algeria’; ‘Antilles and Mexico’; ‘United States 
of America’; ‘Places infected with cholera’. For the sake of the argument, I have chosen a major port 
within these categories in order to calculate approximate distances. Ségur Dupeyron, Rapport Adressé 
à Son Exc. le Ministre du Commerce  (Paris: L'Imprimerie Royale, 1834). 
81 Includes quarantine and purification process. Dupeyron’s original data offer detailed information on 
the length of quarantine according to the place of departure and the type of bill of health 
accompanying a vessel. However, these details are only available for ‘Constantinople, North Sea, 
Enez and the Dardanelles’; ‘Egypt, Syria, Ottoman Empire (with the exception of the above places of 
departure)’; ‘Ionian Islands’. In order to offer a comparative perspective, I computed the averages of 
the length of quarantine for each place of departure. For example, for departures from 
‘Constantinople, North Sea, Enez and the Dardanelles’, a ship could face 55 days of quarantine if it 
arrived in Livorno with a foul bill of health, and 44 days if it presented a suspicious bill of health. 
Hence, the average is 47.5 days. 
82 Approximate value calculated with Google Maps. By default, this number is an underestimate of the 
actual distance of travelling. Nevertheless, this data offers a clear proportional distance between a 




    
Northern Africa (Al Hoceima) Genova 33 1492 
Northern Africa (Al Hoceima) Livorno 20 10422 
Northern Africa (Al Hoceima) Malta 20 1655 
Northern Africa (Al Hoceima) Trieste 21 1887 
Northern Africa (Al Hoceima) 
(average 28.4) Venice 21 1773 
Table 1 Duration of quarantine according to place of departure 
 
Disparities in the practice of quarantine were well known throughout the nineteenth 
century. In 1839, Arthur Todd Holroyd (1806-1887), a physician, jurist and explorer, 
sent an open letter on ‘quarantine laws, their abuses and inconsistencies’ to the Board 
of Control, the cabinet responsible for overseeing the British East India Company’s 
businesses. Holroyd, who had recently returned from Egypt, Syria and the 
Mediterranean, argued that quarantine was unjust and nothing less than forced 
imprisonment.83 Born in London, with an MD from the University of Edinburgh and 
an MB from Christ's College, he was an active member of several medical 
associations and also a traveller and member of the Royal Geographical Society.84  
 
His letter on quarantine was published as a pamphlet in both London and Edinburgh 
in 1839. That year, the Dublin Journal of Medicine published a small review article 
of the letter, and in 1841 the Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal published a 
longer article about it.85 In his letter, Holroyd was determined to demonstrate that 
quarantine was ‘useless, inefficient’ and had a direct impact on people and cargo that 
proceeded from India to England by the way of the Red Sea, Egypt, and Malta86 – 
i.e. the major commercial routes that linked Europe with Asia. Furthermore, he 
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 37 
claimed that liberal legislation should be adopted without ‘endangering the public 
safety’87 and that it would only be possible if all parties involved with quarantine 
were consulted. In his view, fear should be replaced by knowledge and ideology by 
experience and observation.  
 
In order to gather and accumulate persuasive evidence relating to the issue of 
quarantine, Holroyd consulted doctors and consuls with diplomatic positions in the 
Mediterranean ports. Some, like Dr Gregson, believed that quarantine was in fact 
responsible for the propagation of diseases instead of diminishing it.88 Others, like Dr 
Clot Bey, did ‘not advocate the abolition of quarantines.’ In his opinion, ‘they are to 
a certain extent useful; but I should like to seem them freed from those thousand and 
one fiscal practices, which are antiquated and vexatious; I should like to see the 
interests most important to science, commerce, and humanity unshackled by self-
interest.’89  
 
In his open letter, Holroyd argued that quarantine, during the 1830s, was 
‘unphilosophical in theory, or pernicious in practice [and full] of contradictions, 
absurdities, and inconsistencies kept up from ignorance or interested motives.’90 
Holroyd noted, for example, that vessels were quarantined even when they departed 
from disease-free ports. Additionally, there were some cases where passengers and 
cargo received free pratique, but the ships that transported them were placed under 
quarantine. Furthermore, Holroyd claimed that, during the legislative process, 
doctors with solid knowledge about plague or cholera were not consulted. He 
concluded his letter by requiring the British Government to send a medical 
‘commission to the Levant, thoroughly to investigate the whole question.’ Such a 
measure ‘besides having the effect of placing quarantine upon a scientific and 
philosophical basis, would […] end in a material alteration and reduction of 
                                                
87 Ibid.p3 
88 Ibid.p35 Dr Gregson, like many others, argued that the sanitary conditions passengers experienced 
in quarantine stations (see note 11) were responsible for the propagation of diseases instead of 





[quarantine’s] present lengthened period.’91 Quarantine was, in the view of Holroyd, 
a paramount concern for everyone who was reliant on links between the West and 
the East. For that reason, he recommended that all those who had private and public 
interests in the Levant be consulted. 
 
Administrators of rationality 
Holroyd was not alone in highlighting the multiplicity of quarantine practices in 
Mediterranean ports. On the instructions of the French Minister of Commerce, in 
1834 Ségur Dupeyron published a report on the sanitary regimes practised along the 
Mediterranean coast.92 Dupeyron, Secretary of the Superior Health Council, received 
direct orders from the Minister to visit the ‘lazarettos of Marseille, Toulon, Genova, 
Livorno, Venice and Trieste’ in order to learn ‘all its details, the interior and 
distribution of these facilities; to observe the practice of purification of cargo (…) 
and letters, to study the organization of these institutions as an ensemble and as 
individual parts, in short, to learn the rules that constitute the system of 
quarantines.’93 
 
Like Holroyd, Dupeyron was not interested in looking at quarantine from a medical 
perspective, but instead from a historical perspective that could provide insight into 
the reality of quarantine and its effects.  In his view, history was a tool that would 
allow him to understand (1) whether the importation of plague into Europe was 
linked with the increase of commerce; (2) whether lazarettos had higher rates of 
plague than cities, and (3) whether plague was specifically linked with particular 
departure places in the Levant. Furthermore, he suggested, the use of history allowed 
him to distance himself from doctors and their approaches to make sense of reality94. 
                                                
91 Ibid.p65 
92 Dupyeron’s report is a 93 page long printed publication by the Royal Press. Dupeyron uses 
historical tools in order to offer a series of events enabling him to read and produce conclusions on the 
efficiency of quarantine practices. Furthermore, he synthesises his argument in tables, where he 
crosses variables such as place of departure, place of arrival, type of bill of health, and duration in 
order to measure the effects of quarantine. 
93 Dupeyron, Rapport Adressé à Son Exc. le Ministre du Commerce.p4 
94 Dupeyron’s use of history coincided with the growth of positivism philosophy and its appropriation 
by the political sphere. For instance, in 1827, two French administrators from the Ministry of Justice 
published the first issue of the annual publication of compte général de l'administration de a justice 
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Doctors often used historical evidence to shed light on medical issues; however, 
Dupeyron claimed, they had clear vested interests that orientated the collection and 
analysis of data. Dupeyron’s work covered a long period, between 900 and the 
1830s, whereas doctors’ studies typically only covered a few decades. He saw 
himself as the first state official – an ‘agent of administration’ – who studied sanitary 
laws, a task previously held by physicians. Dupeyron’s rational method opposed 
typical medical methods. In his opinion, it was not enough to claim whether or not a 
disease was contagious; he considered this polarised debate to be limiting. He argued 
that only if ‘scientific considerations from both sides are presented in an absolute 
way we can decide a question which touches upon political economy.’95 He believed 
that the management and treatment of diseases were, in fact, two separate spheres 
that belonged to different professions, and recommended that state officials ‘should 
study ways of applying local police and judge what can be possible to adopt in 
France in the case of invasion’ while ‘doctors should only occupy themselves with 
treatment and prophylactic methods.’96  
 
Following a detailed analysis of plague outbreaks in Europe since the tenth century, 
Dupeyron concluded that the disease had its origins in the Orient97 and that 
‘commerce facilitated the transport of plague.’98 In his view, the world faced an 
intractable problem. On the one hand, it was impossible to eliminate quarantine and 
the barriers that prevented trade from flowing freely. On the other hand, it was not 
possible to cease international trade and thus stop the transportation of diseases. 
Although trade enriched national treasures, Dupeyron warned, it was still in the 
                                                                                                                                     
criminelle en France. Like Dupeyron, they also used tabulated data – facts – which were classified by 
the Minister of Justice as 'exact knowledge.' This knowledge of facts 'is one of the first needs of our 
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Sociology 92, no. 5 (1987). 
95 Dupeyron, Rapport Adressé à Son Exc. le Ministre du Commerce.p86 
96 Ibid. p86 
97 The Orient, as a category used by Dupeyron, included the territories between the domains of the 
Saracens (from Morocco to Constantinople) and the Greek empire. After analysing the place of 
departure of vessels that transported plague into Europe, Dupeyron noted that 50% departed from 




‘interest of a country […] not to neglect preventive measures that should obey reason 
and not exaggerate fear.’99 
 
In these senses, lazarettos or quarantine stations (the physical places where 
quarantines were practised) represented a good compromise. Instituted first in 
Venice in 1423, other European harbour-cities soon followed its lead.100 Even if it 
was clear to Dupeyron that lazarettos did not offer complete protection against 
diseases, he had no doubts that their implementation added an extra barrier of 
protection to local populations. For this reason, he claimed that ‘communications 
between infected countries and healthy countries could not continue open without 
danger for the latter.’101 
 
Like many of his contemporaries, Dupeyron was fully aware of the contagionist and 
anti-contagionist debate that marked the first half of the nineteenth century.102 
However, instead of endless theoretical debates on ‘medical opinions’, he believed in 
practicalities like ‘finding ways of treatment and ways of prevention [of diseases,] 
other than the limited ones that we deploy today.’ After all, he claimed, ‘Jenner did 
not talk about the contagiousness of small pox, he discovered the vaccine!’103 In his 
view, states should shift their attention towards rational observation in order to 
develop and enforce good mechanisms for disease prevention, and should also find 
and implement efficient methods of quarantine and purification.  
 
In Marseille, Dupeyron found a model that could be exported to the rest of the 
Mediterranean. There, the Board of Health (the authority in charge of quarantine in 
the city) was composed exclusively of local merchants. Dupeyron claimed that this 
professional group had specific vested interests in eliminating the barriers imposed 
by quarantine; nevertheless, it was one of the most radical Boards in all the 
Mediterranean. These merchants were ‘sometimes more severe than the government 
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100 Baldwin, Contagion and the state in Europe, 1830-1930; John Booker, Maritime quarantine: the 
British experience, c.1650-1900  (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 
101 Dupeyron, Rapport Adressé à Son Exc. le Ministre du Commerce.p24 
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could wish’ in enforcing quarantine.104 The attitude of the Marseillais merchants 
sounds puzzling, and seems to contradict their vested interests. It is easy to presume 
that merchants, above all, supported the elimination of barriers responsible for 
slowing down commercial enterprise. However, the merchants of Marseilles may 
have realised that the practice of quarantine was very much embedded in local and 
Mediterranean traditions of epidemic control. For this reason, instead of trying to 
abolish quarantine, they preferred to control it according to their own rules. Perhaps, 
in their opinion, it was better to have a world in which they could set the rules of 
quarantine than one driven by the rules of doctors or politicians. 
 
The delays imposed by inspections and quarantine imposed specific temporalities on 
the nineteenth century (see Table 1). Quarantine and associated purification methods 
also inflicted costs and losses. Purification may have only rarely destroyed full bales 
of cotton, but it frequently ruined silk and delicate goods. Susceptible cargo was also 
often exposed to aeration in the lazarettos or on board, where the humidity of the 
night and the exposure to salt contributed to the deterioration of manufactured 
products.105 
	  
Like the duration of quarantine, purification strategies diverged widely between the 
Mediterranean ports. Aeration – the exposure of goods to the atmosphere – was, in 
Dupeyron’s view, a particularly good example. In Genova, aeration never lasted 
longer than six days for vessels with foul or suspicious bills of health; in Livorno, 15 
days were required for vessels with foul bills. In Trieste and Venice, three days for 
ships with suspected bills and six for those with foul bills were imposed. Finally, any 
French port would enforce six days of aeration of cargo for suspected bills and 
twelve for foul bills. Similarly, the techniques employed in the purification of letters 
varied from place to place. In Marseilles, correspondence was dunked in chlorine; in 
Livorno, vinegar was used; in Genoa they were quickly flamed; and in Trieste and 
Venice they were fumed in a solution of incense, potassium and sulphur.106   
                                                
104 Ibid.p28 
105 Ibid.p30 
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Dupeyron also noted that quarantine targets were not based on rational choices but 
instead on other considerations. Upon linking outbreaks of plague in Europe with the 
places of departure of the vessels responsible for the transport of the disease, he 
claimed that Egypt was the recurring source of plague. Nevertheless, he noted, 
French quarantine was toughest on vessels which had departed from Constantinople 
– all vessels arriving from there received an automatic ‘foul bill of health’ and were 
obliged to endure long periods of quarantine. In his opinion, ‘foul bills of health 
applied to Constantinople cause[d] great inconvenience, [were] not justified by 
experience and indirectly attack[ed] trade.’107 Not only did vessels from 
Constantinople suffer prolonged quarantine periods, but their cargo was subjected to 
particular purification techniques that were invasive, violent and destructive. Unlike 
the Board in Marseilles, local authorities in Trieste and Livorno did not impose 
immediate foul quarantine upon vessels arriving from Ottoman ports. Because they 
treated these arrivals the same as any others, it was possible for Trieste and Livorno 
to offer them free pratique or quarantine of observation. The system in Trieste and 
Livorno, which was based upon different bills of health, had direct effects on the 
competitiveness of these ports: vessels with clean bills of health were immediately 
granted free pratique, which lowered the costs of shipping. This difference is a clear 
reification of the high heterogeneity of practices across the Mediterranean.  
 
Based on his systematic observations, Dupeyron concluded that (1) there was a large 
space for manoeuvre to improve and reform French sanitary facilities and practices, 
and that (2) there was little agreement between European magistrates regarding 
measures of purification and the duration of quarantine. In order to overcome this 
problem and create a standard across Mediterranean ports, Dupeyron suggested the 
‘organization of a meeting of delegates of all Mediterranean countries.’ In this 
conference, ‘measures to be adopted against several suspected places of departure 
(…)[and] a common sanitary law applicable to all cases’ ought to be discussed.108 In 
his opinion, it was crucial to create a system where vessels arriving from 
Constantinople or the Black Sea would not receive immediate foul bills of health, but 
                                                




instead would be granted free pratique if no plague was present at the point of 
departure and if onboard heath conditions were adequate. Dupeyron also defended 
vessels which were non-susceptible to infection, claiming that they should receive 
immediate free pratique without quarantine or purification. He argued that 
Mediterranean countries should abolish the practice of aeration, without increasing 
the length of quarantine. Finally, he requested that all forms of quarantine be 
eliminated for vessels arriving with clean bills of health from the Antilles and the 
United States. 
 
Doctors and quarantine 
The French government did not immediately implement Dupeyron’s suggestions. In 
fact, it was a German doctor who was credited with the idea of organising an 
international congress where sanitary matters could be negotiated across European 
states. According to a long article published in the Journal de débats politiques et 
littéraires on 10 November 1838, ‘Doctor Bâtard proposed that the emperor of 
Russia and the King of Prussia should participate in the organization of a congress of 
men of state and physicians that shall be nominated by all maritime powers of 
Europe and shall research ways of improving sanitary measures currently employed 
against epidemic diseases in general and plague in particular.’109 Bâtard’s authority, 
he asserted, was based on long experience with plague. He claimed to have treated 
no less than ‘25 to 30.000 people and explored 400 corpses without contracting the 
disease.’110 Articulating the knowledge of scholars and the experience of legislators, 
Bâtard aspired to solve the problem of plague in Europe, as had been done in the 
Orient, and thus ‘make the history of plague a dead book’.111 Of course Bâtard was 
not the first or the only medic to elaborate on the efficiency of quarantine. If we look 
at medical journals like the Lancet, the Gazette Médicale de Paris, or the Archives 
Générales de Médecine, it is clear that there was a long medical debate on this topic. 
However, Bâtard was one of the first doctors to bridge the world of medical 
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publication and the world of daily newspapers, by requesting the organisation of an 
international congress to negotiate sanitary standards. 
 
Bâtard planned to organise a congress composed of physicians and administrators. 
Located in Malta, ‘the congress [should] elucidate the truth of the contagion of 
plague and apply this knowledge into universal sanitary legislation.’112 In his view, 
the combination of medical knowledge and systematic experimentation would allow 
old medical disputes to be solved, and, at the same time, enable legislation to be 
produced that would forever free humanity from plague. Bâtard’s congress would 
make full use of humans for experimentation, in order to understand the aetiological, 
pathological, therapeutic, and prophylactic natures of plague.   
 
In order to ‘determine the natural limits, modes of invasion, and modes of spread of 
the disease’, Bâtard requested that the congress make full use of historical evidence 
and validate any conclusions via experimentation. The collection of historical data 
would allow congressmen to shed light on the nature of plague, and experimentation 
would make it possible to clarify ‘if plague spreads by immediate contagion, 
mediated contagion, at distance, by inoculation.’113  
 
To standardise knowledge and practices, Bâtard came up with a complex agenda of 
experiments to be followed during the international meeting. All experiments would 
be repeated several times, in several places and with different subjects, in order to 
ensure the validity of results across countries, latitudes and peoples. He asked for the 
experimentation to be conducted with control populations, which would allow 
scientists to extrapolate from the results. Bâtard’s aim was that, during the congress, 
subjects of any particular experiment should include, for example, foreigners and 
indigenous people, or vaccinated and non-vaccinated individuals, or healthy people 
and people infected with smallpox. Given that the very nature of the experiments 
would pose severe risk to human lives, Bâtard suggested the use of prisoners as 
subjects. After all, in his view, they owed a debt to humanity.114 
                                                






Bâtard proposed that the congress should conduct pathological experiments in order 
to determine ‘by which ways the morbid invasion proceeds, but also to understand 
the nature of symptoms and lesions that compose the plague.’115 Furthermore, he 
maintained that the medical delegates’ task was to study therapeutic options and to 
‘verify all treatments and medications already considered inefficient [!]’116  Finally, 
he declared, doctors should assess the ‘true value of prophylactic measures and their 
absolute preventive properties.’ The knowledge produced from the completion of the 
above four steps would underpin sanitary reform in the Mediterranean, inspired by 
‘grand humanitarian thought.’117 Following the conclusion of the medical agenda, the 
international delegates should initiate the administrative work. Bâtard insisted, ad 
nauseam, that science and experimentation should form the backbone of the congress 
and that all decisions would be based on those two important paradigms. 
Nevertheless, even before the work of the conference started, he was sure that ‘all 
European maritime lazarettos […] should be replaced by one unique central lazaretto 
in the middle of the Mediterranean.’118 According to Bâtard, this new sanitary 
institution would not employ fuming as a disinfection technique. In his opinion, 
fuming letters and goods was ‘ridiculous’ and inefficient.119 Bâtard did not hesitate 
to declare that, if his directives were followed, plague would disappear. Furthermore, 
he claimed, the centralisation of the system of quarantine via a single Mediterranean 
sanitary station would allow enhanced control over sanitary practices and avoid 
granting despotic individuals too much power. Interestingly enough, Bâtard links 
despotism with greedy local sanitary officials and boards of health, and not with a 
central monopoly of resources. In his view, centralisation was synonymous with the 
standardisation of the quarantine system in the Mediterranean and would be a tool 
against despotism. In opposition to travellers, but like Dupeyron, Bâtard wished to 
construct a rational system of quarantine based on experimentation and systemic 
knowledge. Neither Bâtard nor Dupeyron wished the reformed Mediterranean system 
of quarantine to be inspired by fear and anxiety. 









The diplomatic initiative 
Bâtard did not acknowledge Dupeyron’s report, instead claiming full credit for the 
innovative idea of organising an international congress to discuss sanitary practices. 
However, a few months before his article was published, efforts had been made to 
negotiate transnational legislation that would impose uniformity in the practices of 
quarantine and purification within the Mediterranean. Interestingly enough, the 
major stimulus for these negotiations did not come directly from doctors, travellers, 
or merchants, but from the diplomatic sphere. After all, diplomats, particularly 
consuls based in major overseas ports, played a major role in travellers, doctors and 
merchants’ communication with national governments. These groups tended to 
address their complaints about quarantine directly to diplomats, who mobilised their 
resources in order to tackle problems perceived as unjust both at local and 
international level. For this reason, diplomats were involved in the business of 
quarantine from early on. In this section, I will present two distinct stories that 
eventually converge into a common narrative. The first, from a British perspective, is 
led by naval interests. The second, from a French perspective, is driven by 
commercial interests. Throughout this section, I will refer to diplomatic 
correspondence in order to show how an international agenda was constructed and 
how, in letter after letter, agreements and tensions were teased out. I will show how 
national interests were played out and negotiated in a diplomatic world marked by 
internationalism and finally, will demonstrate the growing importance of the 
business of quarantine, with several European states attempting to control the length 
and practices of quarantine in the Mediterranean. 
 
On 15 April 1838, Admiral Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Mediterranean Fleet, wrote to Major-General Sir Henry Frederick Bouverie, 
Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Malta from 1836 to 1843, complaining about 
the extraordinarily lengthy practices of quarantine on the island. For Stopford, it was 
incomprehensible that a naval vessel arriving from Constantinople with a clean bill 
of health, no sick persons on board and in ‘as good and healthy a state as is possible 
for [a] ship to be’ could be subject to the same period of quarantine as any merchant 
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ship, especially when his vessel carried a doctor on permanent duty.120 Although 
Bouverie agreed with Stopford, neither he, as Governor of Malta, nor the Board of 
Health of the Island had any power to change the situation. In fact, Bouverie’s hands 
were tied. The practice of quarantine and purification in Malta was deemed proper 
and efficient across Mediterranean states. For this reason, vessels departing from 
Malta received automatic free pratique throughout the Mediterranean. However, this 
status quo could only be maintained if merchant and naval vessels alike performed 
the required quarantine. In his reply, Bouverie suggested that if Malta unilaterally 
imposed new rules, ‘the immediate consequence would be the interruption of the free 
pratique of the island with the continent’121 and every vessel departing from Malta 
would be subject to a new quarantine at its destination. Both Stopford and Bouverie 
were very aware of the importance of the British navy’s role in securing commercial 
and geopolitical interests in the Mediterranean. In carrying out this role, strength was 
not a sufficient tool of control and surveillance by itself. In order to control the 
Mediterranean, the British navy had to be able to move fast from one point to the 
other, and quarantine could jeopardise these operations. In fact, if a vessel was 
quarantined in Marseilles, it could be detained for a long period before it was able to 
depart for a new mission.122 
 
The navy letter sent to Bouverie followed normal British bureaucratic routes and, 
around May 1838, reached the Admiralty in London. From there it was transmitted 
to Lord Glenelg, Secretary of State for the Colonies and responsible for Maltese 
affairs. Glenelg was in complete agreement with Bouverie and Stopford. He went as 
far as to condemn the imposition of quarantine upon HMS as ‘repugnant.’ However, 
like Bouverie, Glenelg saw Malta as an important piece of the complex international 
jigsaw of trade and quarantine, and, to the dismay of many, held that Britain could 
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122 On the importance of the British navy in securing Mediterranean interests see C. I. Hamilton, 
Anglo-French naval rivalry, 1840-1870  (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University 
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not act unilaterally; to do so would risk the right of free pratique granted by 
European ports to vessels departing from Malta.123 Recognising that the issue was 
larger than colonial administration, Glenelg contacted the Foreign Office, which 
initiated negotiation with several Mediterranean states in order to decrease the 
duration of quarantine for naval vessels. On 11 June 1838, Viscount Palmerston, the 
Foreign Secretary, dispatched a letter to Frederick Lamb, Ambassador at the Court of 
Vienna. Palmerston was interested to know how many days of quarantine the 
Austrian government required from the Maltese authorities in order to continue 
granting free pratique to vessels departing from Malta and arriving at 
Trieste.124Additionally, the Foreign Secretary asked Lamb to persuade Austrian 
authorities to accept 15 days as the maximum period for which vessels could be 
quarantined in Malta.  
 
Meanwhile, on 12 June 1838, Palmerston wrote to his ambassadors and consuls in 
France, Sardinia, Tuscany and Naples. He acquainted them with the complaints 
raised by the Admiralty and requested them to ‘draw the attention of the Sardinian 
[and other] Government[s] to the marked difference which exists between a ship of 
war and a merchantman, with respect to liability to convey infectious diseases.’ He 
wrote, ‘the order, regularity, cleanliness, and medical attendance, which are found on 
board a ship of war, render such a vessel far less likely than a merchant man to have 
infectious disorders on board: while the sense of honour and the professional 
responsibility of the Commander of a ship of war to his Government give the 
declaration of such officer as to the state of health of his crew, a very different value 
from that which could attach to a similar declaration made by the master of a 
merchantman.’ Thus, he expected these governments to decrease the length of 
quarantine for navy vessels to 'fifteen days, from the time of sailing from the last 
place of departure liable to quarantine; so that, if a ship of war shall have performed 
that period of quarantine at Malta, and shall come from Malta to a Sardinian [or any 
other Italian] port, without touching intermediately at any place, which would render 
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such ship liable to quarantine, such ship shall be immediately admitted to free 
pratique.’125 
 
On 6 July, the Foreign Office received a reply from his ambassador in Vienna. 
Frederick Lamb reported that, after addressing the head of the quarantine 
department, it was clear that Austria was not keen to change its sanitary regulations 
unilaterally. As in Malta, Austrian authorities feared that if they imposed new 
quarantine rules, free pratique rights granted by other nations would be jeopardised. 
That had already occurred when Austrian authorities allowed the ‘premature 
admission to pratique of an ambassador coming from Constantinople.’ Following 
that event, departures from Trieste were immediately put under quarantine in Toulon 
and Marseilles. Although Lamb and the Austrian administrator recognised that, 
individually, the states had no power to modify the actual system of quarantine, both 
agreed that, if a group of nations initiated negotiations for the development of 
common sanitary standards, other nations would join them since ‘commercial and 
financial interests of the Mediterranean States, as well as those of their armed fleets, 
[...] demanded a general revision’ of quarantine regulations. The Austrian authorities 
claimed that due to ‘the great experience of this Government in questions of 
quarantine, Vienna would be the best point on which to assemble Commissioners for 
the purpose.’126 
 
The concern about quarantine in the Mediterranean was not exclusively British. 
Following Dupeyron’s report, France was also determined to change the practice of 
quarantine in the Mediterranean in order to facilitate trade, and engaged in formal 
negotiations with several European states. While Britain informally approached 
Austrian authorities, France had contacted the Austrian Empire first, in early July.127 
But even before that, French diplomats had contacted several other Mediterranean 
states in order to organise an international meeting at which a new sanitary system 
would be discussed. On 22 May 1838, roughly two weeks before the British Foreign 
Office ordered its ambassadors and consuls to contact several European 
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governments, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Molé, dispatched a letter 
to his Ionian Islands consul, Despreaux de St. Sauveur,128 requiring him to negotiate 
the participation of the government of the Ionian Islands in a future international 
sanitary conference. St. Sauveur received a similar letter to the rest of the French 
diplomats contacted by Molé. Molé noted that ‘the divers[e] sanitary practices in 
different Mediterranean ports, the frequent variations of the adopted dispositions, and 
the arbitrary action that many times presides its application’ made any future 
agreement difficult to reach.129 Nevertheless, France wished to organise ‘a meeting 
of delegates of all Mediterranean countries’ in order to establish a common law for 
all nations. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested that at this future 
conference, participants would be required to assess the current sanitary measures 
applied to plague, yellow fever and cholera and ‘determine which  [measures] we can 
attribute a real efficacy, we can achieve uniformity and suppress all unnecessary 
measure[s] that create obstacles to commerce.’ Furthermore, in order to create a 
uniform sanitary system in the Mediterranean, France believed that the future 
delegates would need to debate and negotiate consensus surrounding six major points 
previously voiced by Dupeyron in his report: 
1. To fix a maximum and a minimum of quarantine for arrivals suspected of plague, 
yellow fever, and cholera. 
2. To determine the nature and the expense of purification, both in the lazarettos and 
on board. 
3. To revise the two-fold list of commodities susceptible and not susceptible. 
4. To regulate the use of health officials while vessels perform quarantine in 
national and foreign ports. And to fix the number of days which might be deducted 
from the quarantine of such vessels.130  
5. To fix a tariff for the pay of the health officials taken during the stay in a foreign 
port, and for the expenses of the return of the said officials.  
6. To determine the conditions upon which certain countries actually suspected 
might obtain alleviations of quarantine for arrival from them. 
 
The list was not exhaustive. Through his consular services, Molé assured the Ionian 
Government that the agenda of the future conference was open to any suggestion that 
could ‘facilitate the interests of commerce.’ However, Molé was very clear on one 
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point: France was not going to accommodate commercial interests if they, in any 
way, compromised public health.131 
 
Interestingly enough, the universalism typical of France was not fully transposed 
onto the organisation of these conferences. One might expect them to develop a 
worldwide solution to tackle a world united by disease.132 However, France instead 
limited the agenda of the future conference to the Mediterranean. In the view of the 
French government, the world was not equal in its geographical characteristics. 
Specific latitudes demanded specific, individually tailored sanitary approaches. In 
order to tackle Mediterranean sanitary issues, states needed to develop strategies 
different from those enforced in the Americas, Africa, or in Asia. Even countries 
around the North Sea demanded specific actions different from the ones practiced in 
the Mediterranean Sea, as they were clearly within a different geographical location. 
Molé believed that the differences imposed by geography would not realistically 
allow the constitution of a ‘rigorous uniform system in southern, oceanic and English 
Channel ports', and that countries such as Belgium and Holland had no place in the 
discussion of Mediterranean affairs. The inclusion of Britain was strictly linked with 
her Mediterranean possessions.  
 
While this geographical argument was used to exclude north European powers, it 
was a religious rationale that excluded the North African states of the Mediterranean. 
Molé wished to extend the invitation to the conference exclusively to ‘Mediterranean 
Christian states’ represented by local sanitary administrators. By limiting the 
conference to Christian states, Molé managed to kill two birds with one stone. First, 
the formulation ‘Mediterranean Christian states’ immediately excluded North 
European polities, and secondly, it excluded non-Christian countries such as 
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in the north of Africa. Via these limiting factors, the 
participant countries were funnelled around the latitude of European Mediterranean 
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ports. The exclusion of North African states had, most probably, little relation to 
questions of religious faith. More likely, the delimitation of possible participants was 
driven by French commercial interests. The countries in question contributed little to 
the profitable practice of trade during the nineteenth century.133 
 
The main reason for the French, British and Austrian interests in the Mediterranean 
area was the fact that this sea was transformed, during the nineteenth century, into 
the major maritime avenue linking Europe to the profitable markets of Asia.134 
During this time, two major routes facilitated Euro-Asian trade (see Figure 1). The 
first route involved sailing the Atlantic, crossing the Cape of Good Hope, and 
travelling north to either Bombay or Madras. The Route of the Cape of Good Hope, 
charted during the sixteenth century by Portuguese sailors, was long, susceptible to 
piracy and less predictable in terms of duration of the journey (see Table 2). 
 
Year Departure Arrival Days Miles 
1791 Dunnose Bombay 114 12,924135 
1808 Lizard Point Bombay 108 12,820 
1813 Portland Bombay 129 14,196 
1822 Start Point Bombay 124 14,045 
1824 Lizard Point Bombay 115 12,382 
1829 Lizard Point Bombay 127 13,479 
1832 Lizard Point Bombay 105 14,139 
1832 Lizard Point Bombay 105 14,017 
1833 Spithead Bombay 118 13,344 
1833 Lizard Point Bombay 108 13,153 
1833 Lizard Point Bombay 97 13,701 
1833 Lizard Point Bombay 96 12,942 
  Average 112.8 13,428.5 
  Maximum 129 14,196 
  Minimum 96 12,382 
Table 2 Route of the Cape of Good Hope. Journey duration between England and India 
  
                                                
133 See D. C. M. Platt, Finance, trade, and politics in British foreign policy 1815-1914  (Oxford, 
London,: Clarendon P., 1968). Especially chapter 4. 
134 Additionally, these powers were also interested in the region as a valuable market for 
manufactured goods. See Roger Owen, The Middle East in the world economy, 1800-1914, Rev. pbk. 
ed. (London ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993). p84 
135 Henry Wise, An analysis of one hundred voyages to and from India, China, &c., performed by 
ships in the honorable East India Company's service  (London: J.W. Norie, 1839). Wise noticed that 
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Average 55.3  64.3 
Max 77  103 
Min 46  52 
Table 3 Overland Route. Journey duration between London and Bombay 
 
The second option, the overland route to India, was considerably shorter and safer 
due to the strong naval presence of Britain in the Mediterranean (see Table 3).137 
Notwithstanding its name, the overland route consisted of two maritime sections 
linked by an overland road. The Mediterranean and the Indic were connected by two 
major alternatives: the Euphrates Route (via Scanderoon138) or the Red Sea Route 
(via Alexandria). Although shorter, the first option was only rudimentarily explored 
during the 1830s, and was more a dream than a reality. In fact, during that decade, 
Britain organised several expeditions to study the option of navigating the Euphrates, 
but never managed to develop a continuous communication line between Scanderoon 
and the delta of the river by boat or train.139 The Red Sea Route gained growing 
commercial importance when, in January 1835, the British Government introduced a 
mail steamer between Malta and Alexandria and recommended that the East India 
Company provide a connection between Suez and Bombay. The overland route was 
considerably faster. Travelling between India and England required, on average, 55.3 
                                                
136Ibid. 
137 See Halford Lancaster Hoskins, British routes to India  (New York: Longmans, Green and co., 
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138 Today İskenderun. 
139 See, for instance Curiosities of communication: The road. The railway. The electric telegraph. The 
sail and the steamer. Ocean steamers. Foreign mails, Travelling Hours (London: C. Knight, 1851). 
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days of sailing and overland journey. If a merchant instead opted to sail the Cape of 
Good Hope Route, the length of the journey would rise to an average of 112,8 
days.140 For this reason, control of the Middle East region was of mounting 
importance. Any country that held power over this region would gain a doorway to 
India and to her profitable market. 
 
By restricting the participants of the conference to Mediterranean Christian states, 
France limited the number of future partakers. As such, they enhanced their power 
over the agendas and results of the conference. After all, it is possible to speculate 
that the number of contesting powers would proportionally increase with the number 
of participants; not only would a reduced number of states restrict the possibility of 
inter-state coalitions against a larger power, but it would also decrease the number of 
powerful states. As France only wished to confer with south European countries, 
they suggested that the venue should be located in an Italian port, ‘situated, if 
possible, at an equal distance from the participant ports.’141 
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Figure 1 Major nineteenth century routes between India and Europe 
 
In this complex game of boundary delimitation, Britain, with her Mediterranean 
colonies, was automatically included. However, Molé and his officials initially 
invited the British territories of Malta and the Ionian Islands, instead of Britain 
herself. Nevertheless, France informed these governments that, if they wished, the 
French government was ready to engage in formal negotiations with London on this 
matter. After all, Malta and the Ionian Islands were both formal colonies of Britain, 
without legal capacity to ratify diplomatic treatises. On 11 June 1838, French 
authorities contacted Malta through her Governor, Bouverie. Bouverie contacted the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, but gave little mention to the request that he had 
received in April that year. For some reason, Bouverie did not make a link between 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet’s request to shorten the length 
of quarantine in Malta and the French invitation to Malta to attend a sanitary 
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conference discussing the rules of quarantine in the Mediterranean. In his letter, he 
acquainted Lord Glenelg, the Secretary for the Colonies, with the aforementioned 
invitation and requested further instructions. According to Bouverie, ‘nothing could 
be more desirable for the interest of commerce, as well as for the convenience of the 
public health, than the establishment of a uniform system of quarantine.’142  
 
Nevertheless, the Governor of Malta was fully aware that any consensus would 
involve intense negotiation. He also realised that the Mediterranean was marked by 
an enormous heterogeneity of national sanitary legislation and that local authorities 
often ignored national directives and imposed random regulations that they had 
decided on the spot. In his view, any attempt to create a common sanitary law would 
ultimately result in an impasse where consensus would not be reached and national 
rivalries would escalate. Nevertheless, Bouverie fully supported Molé’s idea. After 
all, he observed, it would only be through a general conference on the subject, 
attended by persons thoroughly acquainted with the details of quarantine, that any 
alleviation of its frequent and unnecessary oppression could be achieved. If the result 
of such a meeting was the reduction of quarantine and the creation of a rational and 
uniform system, then the Governor of Malta had no doubts that the conference would 
perform a great service to society. As such, he requested formal authorisation from 
London to appoint ‘two civil officers, well versed in matters of quarantine, on the 
part of this Government, to attend the conference.’143 No doubt, Bouverie was 
excited about the prospect of creating a uniform system of quarantine for the 
Mediterranean. From the moment that Glenelg was informed of the French 
intentions, he used his office to study the agenda proposed by Count Molé. However, 
due to lack of communication between governmental offices, Britain pursued two 
independent and parallel lines of action regarding the sanitary conference: the 
Foreign Office attempted to organise their own future international quarantine 
conference, and the Secretary for the Colonies studied the possibility of taking part in 
the sanitary conference organised by France. 
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 On receiving Bouverie’s letter, Glenelg ordered J. Lewis, a clerk for the Secretary 
for the Colonies, to study the French proposal and elaborate on interests that the 
British Government ought to defend. Like many others, Lewis viewed 'quarantine 
regulations [as] the main obstacles to maritime intercourse in the Mediterranean, 
especially between its eastern and western extremities.' He pointed out that Britain’s 
naval presence in the Mediterranean, the value of Mediterranean trade, and the new 
line of British steamers between Gibraltar, Malta, Corfu and Alexandria were 
reasons enough for Britain to participate in the attempt to negotiate ‘quarantine 
regulations in the Mediterranean.’ Furthermore, ‘these regulations should not be 
unnecessarily restrictive.’ In his internal Memorandum, Lewis stressed what I have 
previously called the domino effect of the Mediterranean quarantine system:  
If the English Government should change the Quarantine Regulations of Malta and 
its other colonies in the Mediterranean, without previously obtaining the 
approbation of the sanitary authorities of the neighbouring countries, the pratique 
granted in those colonies would not be received elsewhere; and vessels coming from 
any of those colonies would be subjected to a quarantine of observation. [...] The 
latter liability would attach to ships of the Royal Navy; as well as to merchant-
vessels; so that no ship of war sailing from Malta, could communicate with any part 
of France, Italy, or Austria, without being previously subjected to a quarantine of 
Observation.144 
 
Unilaterally, Britain could do very little, and any change could ultimately produce 
‘inconveniences far greater than those arising from the existing system.’ He argued 
that Malta might suffer more than any other British colony: ‘its transit trade [would] 
be almost completely destroyed […and] it would lose its importance as a quarantine 
station.145 Its importance as a quarantine station is now daily growing, on account of 
the establishment of the French steamers to the Levant, and the use of the overland 
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recognised quarantine stations, large numbers of vessels converged into three major Mediterranean 
quarantine stations and generated considerable revenues for the sanitary authorities. 
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journey to India. It would, however, cease to be a quarantine station if its pratique 
was not received by the Board of Health at Marseilless [sic], and by the other 
sanitary authorities of the Mediterranean.’ For this reason, Lewis suggested to Lord 
Glenelg that Britain would only be able to change the actual system of quarantine by 
inviting France and Austria to attend a conference where these issues could be 
discussed.146 The fact that Lewis wished to protect Malta’s position as an important 
quarantine station in the Mediterranean is not surprising. After all, Bâtard, in his 
article published in the Journal des débats politiques et littéraires, had already 
claimed that a central quarantine station should be established in the Mediterranean. 
Although Lewis did not justify his suggestion, his attitude reinforces the argument 
that quarantine was a source of power.  
 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, there were only a limited number of 
quarantine stations in the Mediterranean internationally recognised as practising 
quarantine to the required standards in order to avoid the transmission of diseases 
between vessel, cargo and people and the port of arrival. If a vessel was quarantined 
in any of these given stations, it would not require further quarantines if travelling 
directly to a major European port. As such, the stipulation of the duration of 
quarantine was an important tool in managing the flow of trade in the Mediterranean. 
If, for instance, two vessels arrived with the same cargo at a given sanitary station, 
local authorities had the power to determine the duration of quarantine for each 
vessel with regard to its particular conditions. If different lengths of quarantine were 
applied to the two vessels, the one arrested for the shortest duration would enjoy 
optimum conditions when dealing with the market, as it would be able to offer its 
products without the potential competition of the second vessel, which would still be 
enduring quarantine. Furthermore, each arrival at a quarantine station was marked by 
the payment of sanitary fees according to the size of the vessel and transported cargo. 
Given the limited number of recognised quarantine stations, it is easy to assume that 
local governments collected large amounts of revenue out of the practice of 
quarantine. However, if you take a close look at the balance sheet of the Malta 
quarantine station, it appears that this was not the case (see Figure 2). In fact, John 
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Booker notes that throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, quarantine 
caused great losses to the Maltese authorities.147 Nevertheless, it is without question 
that governments were interested in maintaining the existing quarantine stations. 
Two reasons, not mutually exclusive, justified this attitude; first, it was truly believed 
that quarantine was an efficient prophylactic tool, and secondly, profits were 
indirectly generated from the practice of quarantine. Certainly, the last premise 
implies that quarantine was a tool of power that influenced patterns of trade. 
However, it is not possible to quantify the profit derived from quarantine policies at a 
merchant level.  
 
Figure 2 Income, expenditure and final balance of quarantine in Malta between 1824 and 1850.148 
 
The British Foreign Office only learnt on 2 July 1838 that France was also 
organising a conference to solve sanitary problems in the Mediterranean. When the 
British ambassador to Paris, the Earl of Granville, invited the French government to 
take an active part in the British initiative, Count Molé informed him that his 
government was already organising a congress to reform quarantine practices in the 
Mediterranean. The congress, ‘free from arbitrary power,’ would be composed of 
‘special delegates’ who would challenge and settle old quarantine disputes.  In his 
letter, Molé informed Granville that French authorities had already contacted both 
Malta and the Ionian Islands, and that these local governments supported the French 
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initiative. Similarly, ‘courts of Turin and Florence have already given their full and 
entire consent.’ For these reasons, Molé had no doubt that Britain ‘will also partake 
of the views which have guided us in this business, and will show itself perfectly 
disposed to favour its execution; particularly by addressing to the Lord High 
Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, and to the Governor-General of Malta, such 
instructions and powers as the state of things may render necessary or proper.’149 
Due to the French success in establishing a base of participants for a future 
conference, Britain had to accept the French invitation or else be excluded from the 
future meeting. If the latter option were chosen, it would jeopardise London’s 
dominance of the Mediterranean, as Britain’s voice would not be taken into account 
when negotiating the new rules of quarantine. 
 
The French enterprise expanded its tentacles and on 4 July 1838, Baron Langsdorff, 
the French Chargé d’Affaires at Vienna, informed Prince Metternich, the Austrian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, that ‘the French Government wished to see the European 
States bordering upon the Mediterranean concur in one common system of 
quarantine, which should put an end to the abuses and inconsistencies of the present 
practice.’ Through Lagsdorff’s letter, Metternich learnt that Italian courts had already 
been contacted about this matter, but that France wished Vienna and Paris to 
coordinate their efforts and use the conferences as a platform for their national 
agendas.150  
 
Both Molé and Lagsdorff were perfectly aware that creating a uniform system of 
quarantine was not going to be easy, because of conservative opinions and the 
‘greater or less attachment which exists in different countries for ancient customs, 
and established regulations, but also on account of the diversity of opinions 
predominating in this or that country on the question of contagion or non-contagion, 
which it is impossible to exclude entirely from the consideration of sanitary 
measures.’151 In order to ease the process of negotiation, Molé thought it best to 
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avoid any medical discussion that could jeopardise possible agreed solutions.152 The 
French minister, like Ségur Dupeyron (see section Administrators and rationality), 
believed that only a strict comparative approach to the different protective strategies 
would differentiate efficient mechanisms of disease prevention from non-efficient 
ones. In his opinion, these comparisons would allow the participant states to find 
solutions for avoiding future outbreaks of plague, yellow fever and cholera in the 
Mediterranean. Clearly, Molé was convinced that quarantine and sanitary measures 
were mere administrative issues and not medical problems. Sanitary problems, like 
any other problems that modern states faced, could be solved by a rational approach 
involving the collection of data and its analysis.153 
 
Langsdorff acquainted the Court of Vienna with Molé’s agenda. In a letter to 
Langsdorff (13 June 1838), Metternich, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, saw 
in the future commission  - not congress as the French suggested154– a ‘service 
rendered to humanity’ and progress. He informed the French ambassador that he had 
already been contacted by Britain, but that all three states should probably cooperate 
to create a new quarantine practice that would serve the interests of commerce and 
industry. Metternich noted that plague tended to be endemic in non-Christian polities 
of the East because of their non-use of sanitary practices. However, the Ottoman 
Empire had recently started to adopt new sanitary practices imported from the 
‘European civilization.’ In fact, he continued, many Austrians were now employed in 
Turkey by the Sultan Mahoud, working to construct a better and more efficient 
quarantine service. For these reasons, Vienna was interested in extending the 
invitation to the congress ‘to all the Governments directly interested in the 
establishment of quarantine.’ In addition to France and the Italian states, Austria 
specifically desired to include Britain, Greece and Russia. The reason for including 
Britain, as mentioned above, was her direct control over the Ionian Islands and 
Malta, while Greece and Russia were added to the list because of several occasions 
in the past where they had acted as gateways to the invasion of Europe by plague. 
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Furthermore, Russia had extensive possessions on the Black Sea coast and was in-
between Europe and Asia. For all these reasons, the conference could not exclude or 
ignore any of the above powers. However, it is interesting to note that neither 
Portugal nor Spain was mentioned among the list of potential participants. Certainly, 
Portugal, unlike Spain, was not a Mediterranean country. Nevertheless, both 
countries, due to their Atlantic trade, were important pieces in the South European 
quarantine puzzle. Furthermore, Portugal was used by Britain as a commercial hub 
that linked the Mediterranean with the British Islands.  
 
Although Vienna recognised that the six points suggested by the French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs were crucial to the constitution of common quarantine standards, 
Metternich was not in full agreement with France and her agenda. In his view, ‘in 
order to arrive most expeditiously, and with the greatest certainty at the desired 
result, the Commission ought to found its work only upon known bases [i.e. solid 
knowledge], and which have already acquired the sanction of experience.’155 The 
nature of cholera and yellow fever were not clear, and no consensus had been 
reached among medical communities. For that reason, only plague should be 
addressed in any future meeting, otherwise it would be difficult to ‘obtain positive 
results.’ 
 
In Britain, on 28 July 1838, the Board of Trade (which had been previously 
acquainted with the French idea of organising a international sanitary conference) 
informed the Foreign Office that the French plan was ‘highly desirable’ for Britain. 
The Board looked at the French conference as an opportunity to create ‘general and 
uniform rules, less restrictive in their operation upon trade for future practice.’ The 
Board of Trade wished the Governor of Malta to appoint two civil officers to attend 
the meeting; however, the Board was also of the opinion that Her Majesty’s 
Government should ‘adjoin some English medical man to the Maltese officers.’ 
Finally, the Board suggested that all European powers, especially Sweden, Russia, 
Prussia and Denmark, should also attend the conference, with the purpose of 
‘establish[ing] a uniform system of quarantine for the north as well as for the south 
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of Europe.’156 However, this last idea was dismissed by the Foreign Office on 22 
August, because, according to Lord Palmerston, including northern European states 
could jeopardise the success of the conference. Like the French, Palmerston probably 
feared that if the invitation were extended to other north European states, the balance 
of power could play against British interests. After all, the larger the number of 
participants, the harder it would be to negotiate consensus.157 With the support of the 
Board of Trade, Palmerston contacted the Secretary for the Colonies on the same day 
and urgently requested him to authorise the colonies to accept the French invitation 
to attend a sanitary conference.158 Although he wished Glenelg to pressure the 
colonies to accept the French invitation quickly, it was not until November that he 
was able to communicate to the French Ambassador in London, Count Sebastiani, 
that her Majesty’s Government was ready to ‘accede to the proposal in question.’159 
The fact that the British appeal to cut the length of quarantine was refused by all 
Italian states perhaps contributed to this outcome. After a long wait, neither Sicily, 
Tuscany nor Sardinia accepted the British request to decrease the length of 
quarantine of navy vessels arriving at Malta from Constantinople to 15 days.160 
 
France clearly took the lead; Paris set agendas, selected participants and chose 
venues. By October 1838, several European states were convinced that an 
international conference would soon start and a new system of quarantine would 
emerge. In a letter to the British Ambassador to Vienna on 30 November, Palmerston 
informed Lamb that Britain was ready to join the conference and had already 
appointed its delegates.161 However, for some reason that is not entirely clear, the 
conference never happened. France appears to have forgotten to organise and open 
the event, and little explanation was given to the previously invited states. In fact, in 
a letter of May 1840, the Sardinian Ambassador reported to Palmerston that in a 
conversation with Count Solar de la Marguerite, the Sardinian Minister of Foreign 
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Affairs, the latter confessed that ‘the proposal which came from France two or three 
years ago […] failed [and] he never knew why.’162 
 
Lazarus, raising a conference from the dead  
The conferences that both Britain and France devoted effort towards organising 
during the 1830s were a dead idea by 1840. During a period of ten years, neither 
country – nor any other European state – made any effort to create a uniform system 
of quarantine in the Mediterranean. Although the causes for the abrupt interruption 
of negotiations are not clear – it was not even clear to the involved parties – we can 
and should devote some space to speculation. In Maritime Quarantine, John Booker 
links the sudden demise of the conferences with the necessity of further enquiries 
into the nature of plague. Booker claims that the lack of consensus surrounding the 
contagiousness of plague jeopardised the formation of an international conference. 
After all, the goal of the conference would drastically vary depending on the nature 
of the disease: ‘if plague were proven non-contagious, then any conference should 
consider the dismantling of quarantine rather than the conformity of procedure.’163 
Although the quest for aetiological certainty was an important issue during the late 
1830s and throughout the 1840s, this debate was by no means settled by the 1850s, 
which was when the first International Sanitary Conference took place. Given that 
aetiological consensus was lacking throughout the three decades leading up to the 
opening of the 1851 ISC, Booker’s approach does not seem sturdy enough to hold 
full explicative value.  
 
By contrast, the international events that occurred between 1839 and 1840 within the 
boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, the Eastern Question, offer valuable insight into 
our problem. As shown above, the control over the Middle East became a crucial 
issue, as countries relied on guaranteed access to India and Europe.164 Furthermore, 
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from a naval perspective, both France and Britain tried to achieve a maritime 
hegemony in the Mediterranean in order to protect their national overseas 
interests.165 Although the European struggle for the Near East was not new by the 
end of the 1830s, the escalation of the issue coincided with the abrupt end of 
negotiations over the construction of a uniform system of quarantine in the 
Mediterranean. The dispute over this region was not exclusively confined to 
European nations. Muhammad Ali – the Egyptian ruler under the Ottoman Empire - 
was determined to declare Egypt autonomous and expand its territory over Syria. In 
1831-2, he deployed his army first to Syria and then to Konya in the centre of 
Turkey, and so the Ottoman Empire requested help from European powers. Both 
Britain and Russia developed strategies to oblige Muhammad Ali to return to Egypt 
and thus preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. When, in April 1839, Turkey 
finally advanced on Egyptian troops in order to regain control over Syria and destroy 
Muhammad Ali’s imperial dream, the Ottoman Empire suffered a massive defeat. 
Through the eyes of European states, the tension between Cairo and Constantinople 
was a source of opportunity to assert power in the region.  France, Britain and Russia 
were ready to mediate the conflict, but these countries did not produce a concerted 
strategy. London and St Petersburg aligned with Constantinople, while Paris 
supported Cairo. Since the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1789, France had toyed 
with the idea of gaining a base of influence in the Middle East. As such, the conflict 
between Egypt and Turkey looked promising in terms of securing a settlement in the 
Near East – providing that Egypt would be able to win the war.166 The French-
Egyptian ambition was not well received in Europe. In June 1839, Britain deployed 
her navy to block all sea-lanes between Egypt and the Levant, and, in articulation 
with Russia and Austria, prepared a draft proposal for the diplomatic resolution of 
the conflict. Egypt was requested to return the occupied territories and recognise the 
authority of the Ottoman Empire. However, with the support of Paris, Muhammad 
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Ali refused to accept the terms of the draft agreement. Due to this hostile attitude, 
Britain, Russia and Austria initiated a joint military operation in Beirut and Lebanon 
in September 1840. These actions culminated with the arrival of the British fleet at 
Alexandria in November. Cairo finally agreed to call the troops back to Egypt and 
return the Syrian possessions to Constantinople. France, facing the humiliation of the 
Egyptian defeat, had to join the above European powers in condemning Muhammad 
Ali’s imperial dream. In Anglo-French Naval Rivalry, Hamilton notes that it was 
clear that if a serious clash between the two forces [France and Britain] emerged in 
the Mediterranean – as almost happened in the Egyptian affair – the repercussions to 
France and Britain would be far more severe than losing the Mediterranean links 
with India.167 In fact, Hoskins claims that both Britain and France were close to 
starting a European war.168 Certainly, during the Egyptian affair, French and British 
navies never came into direct confrontation. However, the tense diplomatic climate 
in the Middle East suggests that the clash of French and British interests influenced 
other diplomatic issues such as the organisation of an ISC. Similarly, Schroeder 
argues that the Eastern crisis affected Anglo-French relations and European politics 
in general through the 1840s.169 Moreover, it is unlikely that, post-Egyptian 
humiliation, France would join their diplomatic efforts with Britain towards the 
construction of a uniform system of quarantine in the Mediterranean. Given the 
similar timing between the end of diplomatic negotiations and the escalation of the 
Middle East conflict, it is likely that this issue played an important role in the sudden 
end of quarantine negotiations in 1839. 
 
However, eleven years later, on 12 November 1850, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, then 
President of the French Republic, announced France’s intention to summon 
European states to create a uniform system of lazarettos and quarantine. After this 
announcement, Jules Baroche, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, contacted several 
European ambassadors in France, inviting their countries to participate in what 
would later be called the 1851 International Sanitary Conference (ISC). Like many 
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other diplomats, Paiva, the Portuguese ambassador in Paris received a letter from 
Baroche on 16 April 1851 with details of this future conference. As with many other 
European states, there is no record of Portugal ever being contacted during the 1830s 
diplomatic exchange on the negotiation of a uniform system of quarantine in the 
Mediterranean.170 However, Baroche now wished Portugal to appoint delegates to 
attend the upcoming conference. Influenced by a preliminary study by François 
Mêlier171 and previous negotiations held within European diplomatic circles, 
Baroche was convinced that maritime relations in Europe would improve. 
 
The name International Sanitary Conference was not decided randomly. By 
choosing the term conference instead of congress, the French government was trying 
to ensure that these meetings would not provide a venue for empty theoretical 
debates or inflamed political discussions. The aim of the conference was ‘practical’ 
consequences.172  ‘Health and only health’ was the concern of the meetings.173 
Above all, Baroche saw no point in holding a medical congress where ‘like in an 
arena, one fights for an opinion or a doctrine without acknowledging any correction 
to its proposed idea or doctrine.’174 For this reason, it was crucial that each 
participant country appoint two delegates: a doctor and a diplomat. ‘The first should 
represent the scientific element, the second the administrative, commercial and 
maritime element.’175  
 
The demarcation of boundaries between politics and science was again reinforced in 
a letter sent by France to the British Government on 19 April 1851. According to this 
dispatch, countries ‘must not take into the conference the political conflicts with rival 
powers. The conferences are not a scientific convention; the invited scientists are 
present to help countries reach the best solutions on dealing with cholera. Doctors are 
present to facilitate the process regarding technical questions. The ultimate goal is to 
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protect the interests of the population and the commercial enterprises’.176 Both 
science and politics appeared to be sources of contention for the French government, 
as French state administration was based on a practical and rational model. In order 
to facilitate the achievement of these grand goals, France decided to appoint C. E. 
David, General Consul of France in Genova and François Mêlier, a fellow of the 
National Academy of Medicine and member of the Consultative Committee of 
Public Hygiene, as delegates.  
 
Baroche wanted France to be the venue for the conference. Although the French 
government did not ‘have any concrete idea’, his preference oscillated between a 
‘sea-port’ location and an inland city. On the one hand, a place like Marseilles or 
Port Vendres could offer ‘a useful base of observation to the members of the 
conference.’ On the other hand, cities like Paris or Montpellier ‘offered numerous 
advantages’ such as ‘libraries and scientific institutions.’ Montpellier, for instance, 
was the centre of a famous medical school that could offer valuable library resources 
during the course of the conferences. At the time, Montpellier was connected to 
Marseilles by railways, which could be used by delegates to visit the city and learn 
practical issues of quarantine. There, delegates could see, experiment, and test their 
ideas.177 Wherever the chosen venue, Barroche believed that the conferences would 
start by the end of June 1851, and requested that Portugal cooperate so as to make 
that possible.  
 
With his letter, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs included a document entitled 
‘Bases for the Sanitary Conferences with Indication of Questions that should be 
Addressed and Solved.’ In a 21-point list, France presented an international agenda 
of public health, marked by specific French national experiences, problems, interests 
and idealisms. Barroche aimed above all to create a new international system of 
quarantine that did not ‘compromise the sacred interests of public health’ but at the 
same time allowed ‘free commerce’ to emerge.178 The future ISC would produce a 
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‘Mediterranean Official Sanitary Law’, to be declared ‘mandatory by all and for all.’ 
Although France saw these conferences as crucial events in the ordering of world 
trade and world public health, it was recognised that the aims were rather ambitious. 
For this reason, it was declared that local interests would be considered when 
finalising any international legal document, and that, more importantly, no matter 
what the outcome of the delegates’ negotiations during the meeting, national 
governments would always be able to reserve the right to ratify or reject resolutions.  
 
During the conference, international delegates would decide whether sanitary 
measures ought to be applied exclusively to people and cargo that arrived by sea or 
should also be enforced on overland arrivals. The diplomats and doctors present at 
the ISC would limit their discussion to specific diseases. France suggested that they 
should address sanitary measures for ‘Oriental plague,’ ‘American yellow fever,’ and 
‘Indian cholera.’ Although it was recognised that ‘army typhus’ was also an 
important disease, France had reservations as to its inclusion in the agenda of the 
ISC. 
 
It was intended that once the delegates had arranged a clear framework of discussion, 
they would immediately evaluate the current sanitary system by assessing whether 
the measures practiced were too severe or remained crucial for the protection of 
public health. Doctors and diplomats would also determine the deciding factors for 
when diseases became sporadic or endemic. Barroche noted that the French 
Academy of Science considered ‘that plague was not seen as importable except when 
it reigns in an epidemic state.’ For the sake of public health, the French government 
adopted this faceted vision of diseases when producing their national policy on 
public health. France only applied sanitary measures when plague was epidemic, and 
suggested that all states should adopt the same strategy in order to simplify the flow 
of trade by avoiding unnecessary sanitary practices that detained vessels. If this was 
agreed, delegates would be invited to decide the appropriate sanitary measures that 
should be applied during epidemic outbreaks of diseases. In France’s view, four 
major approaches were possible: ‘quarantine, lazarettos, isolation or general 
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measures of hygiene.’179 In any case, the delegates would also decide whether the 
measures should only be applied to people or should also be enforced on vessels, 
cargo, letters and diplomatic dispatches. Finally, they were required to create a 
common list of susceptible and non-susceptible products. 
 
Barroche was also interested in liberalising the state of bills of health applied to 
vessels departing from the Orient. He believed that people arriving from healthy 
places in Egypt or Turkey should not be considered health hazards in Europe. As 
such, he asked delegates to debate this possibility and produce clear rules governing 
the necessary conditions for free pratique at arrival: i.e. a minimum amount of 
travelling time and a possible imposition of a permanent onboard presence of 
doctors. 
 
Travelling in the Mediterranean was marked by a multiplicity of heterogeneous 
sanitary authorities and legislation. Each local authority typically held sway over 
assessing and securing heath security within its jurisdiction. However, these local 
authorities were not isolated; in fact, they belonged to national consular and medical 
networks, and together certified, issued and validated bills of health. During the 
nineteenth century, a large number of these networks co-existed: after all, Sicily did 
not want to entrust their national health security to Austria, just as Sardinia would 
not feel comfortable depending on Britain to secure epidemic safety in Sardinian 
domains. Nevertheless, France was optimistic that a singular multinational system of 
epidemic prevention could be established within the Mediterranean. Barroche 
suggested that governments could share a common network of consuls – or a mixture 
of consuls and doctors – that would grant bills of health to departing vessels. These 
documents would have universal validity and for that reason would be accepted in all 
Mediterranean ports. The new system would require necessary mechanisms of 
forgery prevention and reliability of information contained in the bills of health. 
 
After deliberating on the above issues, the conference was to focus its attention on 
the creation of a uniform system of quarantine. Barroche hoped that the duration of 




quarantine could be framed around maximum and minimum periods shared by the 
whole Mediterranean – though always keeping specific local circumstances in mind 
– and that delegates would decide whether the duration of traveling would count 
within the period of quarantine or not. During quarantine, vessels, cargo and people 
should be subject to a uniform rule of aeration and purification. Similarly, the 
treatments practised in Mediterranean lazarettos ought to be uniform from place to 
place. Furthermore, France proposed that sanitary fees should be consistent, only 
charged in order to cover expenses associated with public health, and never used as 
tax revenue. 
 
In setting the agenda for the conference, France was interested in creating a universal 
system of quarantine that would overcome the local diversity experienced in the 
Mediterranean. A new international law, transversal to all quarantine stations in the 
Mediterranean, would create a world unified by rationality.  
 
In terms of public health administration the French agenda was, again, 
internationalist and with a focus on creating and managing common resources. Thus, 
the conference was requested to create a common sanitary law that all port boards of 
health in the Mediterranean were to follow. These boards were also to be subjected 
to new regulations: Paris hoped that the new law would oblige the boards to include 
foreign consuls alongside local members. But even more radical was the idea of 
introducing an international tribunal to arbitrate future disputes.  
  
The process of organising an international sanitary conference in the first half of the 
nineteenth century was long and full of obstacles. Although several sections of 
European society requested the reform – or even the annihilation – of the 
Mediterranean system of quarantine, it was soon understood that individual states 
could do little to change the status quo. In fact, every time that a state attempted to 
change national rules of quarantine unilaterally – like Vienna once did – it was soon 
punished by other sanitary authorities, who would refuse to recognise the validity of 
its process of quarantine, and enforce further – and lengthy – quarantine on all 
vessels departing from that state. Quarantine and sanitary practices within the 
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Mediterranean transformed from a local and national issue into an international 
problem marked by a multitude of agendas and conflicts of interests.  
 
At the same time, the centre of gravity of the power and interests surrounding 
quarantine shifted. Power shifted between states until France finally used it to 
organise the 1851 ISC. But power was also juggled between professional groups; 
three major groups disputed the jurisdiction over the problem of quarantine. First, 
doctors, who claimed that quarantine was a prophylactic tool and hence a medical 
issue ruled by medical rationales. Secondly, state administrators, who suggested that 
quarantine in the Mediterranean was heterogeneous and probably inefficient. They 
also held that one of the principal reasons for this chaotic system was the endless 
medical disputes over the nature of plague, cholera and yellow fever. For this reason, 
state administrators demanded that doctors be excluded from the process of 
reforming the Mediterranean quarantine system. In their view, only rationality, 
observation and experience would provide answers to construct a new and efficient 
way of preventing diseases to spread in Europe. Thirdly, diplomats, who were 
involved in the business of quarantine from early on. European diplomatic 
machineries were in charge of surveying local health conditions and reporting them 
to their central authorities. Furthermore, diplomats, mainly consuls, often issued bills 
of health that accompanied vessels from the departure to the arrival port. As the 
overseas representatives of government, they often received complaints from 
merchants about unfair quarantine practices. Diplomats had a formal network of 
resources that could be easily mobilised to organise international initiatives. For all 
these reasons, they managed to secure the affair of international negotiation over 
quarantine under their own jurisdiction. 
  
Interestingly enough, throughout the period of organisation of an international 
meeting to reform the system of quarantine in the Mediterranean, merchants never 
managed to secure an effective place at international level. 
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CHAPTER 2: Between diplomacy and medicine: the ISC as a multi-
professional event 
 
Should we vote by country or by individual? Should the vote be exclusively secret? Or 
should it be secret only certain cases while ostensive in others? Should it be done by 




Before continuing the discussion, Mr Segóvia requests Mr President to let the Conference 
know if there is any precedent regarding th[ese] question[s].  
 
Mr President answers that [according to diplomatic protocol], congresses generally vote by 
country. However, given that in congresses there is only one element, the diplomatic 
element, any analogy would evidently be unfair.180 
 
 
Soon after 11am on 23 July 1851, C. E. David, the plenipotentiary minister 
representing France, opened the first session of the International Sanitary Conference 
(ISC). 24 delegates were waiting to join him at the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Paris in order to construct an international sanitary system. Each delegate 
was expected to contribute his own personal expertise in the governance of 
epidemics and to defend the interests of the country that he represented – countries 
that included Austria, England, France, Greece, Portugal, the Roman States, Russia, 
the Kingdom of Sardinia, Spain, Turkey, Tuscany, and the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies.  
 
Recent cholera outbreaks, epidemic threats of diseases such as plague and yellow 
fever, and myriad contradictory and tedious prophylactic policies practiced in 
European ports underpinned the organisation of the ISC. The conference aimed to 
create a common epidemic policy in Europe through the construction of standard 
shared meanings and  public health practices. These objectives were clearly stated in 
an invitation letter and in the detailed conference programme circulated by the 
French government in April 1851: delegates were convened in order to create a 
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uniform system for the lazarettos and quarantines already existing and operating in 
the Mediterranean Sea.181 
 
In order to avoid the debate being unduly influenced by special commercial interests, 
France prohibited governments from appointing merchants and ship owners as their 
representatives.182 Instead, each participant state was invited to appoint a doctor and 
a consul that could, respectively, contribute scientific and administrative knowledge, 
and maritime and commercial expertise.183 This conflation of professional expertise, 
I argue in this chapter, represented an original international medico-diplomatic 
product – an event without precedence. However, by creating this institution, the ISC 
struggled to find usable precedents and protocol that could guide its efforts. 
Conventionally, diplomatic conferences were uni-professional, and the protocol 
framing such experiences failed to guide the regulatory initiative that combined 
doctors and diplomats in the same negotiation space.  
 
Divided into two parts, this chapter will examine the process of appointing 
delegations and the construction of a protocol to guide the works of the Conference. 
In part one, I will explore two delegation episodes in light of national financial, 
commercial, and scientific agendas. In doing so, I will look at the role of expertise in 
the selection of delegates while investigating how states established mechanisms in 
order to limit the agency of those selected to represent them. In part two, I will look 
at the form of the ISC through the lenses of previous international events and 
contemporary diplomatic modus operandi. After establishing the professional 
originality of the Conference, I will focus on the Conference’s protocol, created to 
assist scientists and diplomats in co-navigating the process of regulating international 
public health. 
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In the morning of 23 July 1851, ten delegates congregated in the library of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris. Opening the proceedings of the conference was 
C. E. David, who had been mandated by the French government to represent its 
interests and oversee the logistics of the Conference. David welcomed the delegates, 
on behalf of his government, and reminded them that they had been convened ‘to 
provide important services to trade and navigation in the Mediterranean while 
safeguarding the public health’ of the participating states.184 The ISC, he stressed, 
was to be a forum of conciliation – a social locale – where, for the sake of humanity, 
national agendas, professional interests, scientific theories, and commercial vested 
interests were expected to come together. Despite this ambitious agenda, only half of 
the expected delegates attended the first session of the Conference – and many were 
not seen at all during the two months that followed the official opening. Although 
some delegates may have been delayed by unpredictable problems, the majority were 
absent because they had become entangled in complex bureaucratic webs that failed 
to appoint them in time to attend the first session. 
 
Portugal: delegating in harsh political and economic conditions 
Portugal, like all the participants, received a formal invitation to attend the ISC in 
April 1851. Following initial inquiries, the French ambassador to Lisbon, Adolphe 
Barroche, eagerly reported to his government that Portugal was interested in taking 
part in the Conference and actively participating in the creation of common 
international sanitary policy. The envoys of Portugal, he affirmed, could be expected 
to arrive in Paris by the end of June. However, despite Barroche’s assurance, the 
Portuguese delegates had still not appeared by early July.185 In fact, they only 
managed to join the Conference in September. In the meantime, French and English 
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diplomats were pressuring the Portuguese government to appoint a delegation, while 
national political and economic variables disrupted their efforts. 
  
In its invitation letter, Paris clearly stated that countries were to appoint ‘an envoy 
among consuls that resided in one of the several ports of the [French] Republic.’186 
The aim of this specification was to ensure that those selected were familiar with 
quarantine practices and the problem of epidemic diseases. Despite these 
recommendations, Portugal decided to appoint the Secretary of the Portuguese 
Legation in London as its diplomatic envoy.187 The reasons underpinning this defiant 
Portuguese decision are not clear. It is possible that during his diplomatic career, the 
Portuguese Secretary developed unique skills and expertise that were perfectly 
aligned with his country’s national agenda. Even if the Portuguese Secretary did not 
handle quarantine affairs on a daily basis in London, the delegate-to-be may have 
been exposed to – and even participated in – the prolific prophylactic debates held by 
English medical and political elites during the first half of the nineteenth century. As 
such, the Secretary may have developed a clear political standpoint on the use of 
quarantine as a tool to control epidemic outbreaks. 
 
More importantly, the decision to challenge the French request may have been due to 
issues of trust. International Relations scholars have long argued that delegated 
agents pursue their own interest, despite constraints imposed by the decisory power. 
Since the agendas of the delegator and delegated are rarely perfectly aligned, 
conflicts between parties are likely to emerge.188 Those who appoint delegates must 
surely try to select persons who fit the agenda to be defended; however, a limited 
pool of possibilities can constrain their choices. Delegating necessarily involves the 
consideration of delegates’ individual characteristics. These characteristics – 
necessarily linked with agency – are often dealt with via mechanisms that limit the 
behaviour of delegates, but, as Hawins and Jacoby argue, delegates can also develop 
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a multitude of strategies to enhance their autonomy.189 For this reason, trust is a 
crucial aspect when selecting representative envoys. 
 
In addition to appointing a diplomat that did not reside in France, Portugal also 
hoped to circumvent the structure of the delegation as originally envisaged. In an 
effort to avoid the additional cost of sending a second delegate, Portugal inquired 
about the possibility of being represented in Paris by a single diplomatic envoy.190 
 
Since the turn of the century, the national economy had suffered chronic financial 
problems, and successive governments had tried to contain the increasing state 
expenses. The invasion of Portugal by Napoleonic forces in 1807 had eroded the 
country’s economy and political governance.191 This problem had been further 
aggravated by the arrival of English military forces that had converted the country 
into a de facto protectorate. Without concrete political programmes to revive national 
economy, internal and colonial trade had been paralysed and political instability was 
growing.  
 
In 1822, the economic problems of Portugal had intensified with Brazil’s declaration 
of independence. Colonial gold and taxes had stopped flowing, and Portugal was left 
bankrupt and insolvent.192  The incapacity to generate income was extreme, and 
international credit markets refused to buy national sovereign debt until 1851.193 
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At the same time as the economic and financial crisis, Portugal had struggled to 
maintain a stable political regime – civil wars, popular revolts, coups d’état, and 
military uprisings had marked the first half of the century. In total, between the turn 
of the century and 1851, seven royal heads had ruled Portugal and a succession of 
governments had formed cabinets, each introducing contradictory policies on the 
economy and other matters.194  
 
Facing overwhelming internal issues, the Portuguese government may have seen the 
appointment of a second delegate as superfluous. The country could have its voice 
represented well in Paris, even by a single individual. Moreover, the decision would 
allow Portugal to save considerable sums relating to salaries, accommodation, and 
travelling. The plan suited Portuguese needs and so a formal request was submitted 
to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. In response, the Minister reaffirmed that 
the aim of the appointment of two delegates was to secure a professional balance 
between doctors and diplomats and an equal representation of medical and 
administrative expertise in the Conference. Nevertheless, he did not object to the 
Portuguese decision, provided that the choice was made in accordance with the full 
agreement of the Portuguese government.195  
 
Despite this support from France, Portugal struggled to appoint the London Secretary 
as its envoy. On 8 July, Adolphe Barroche reported to Paris that his diligence had 
failed due to a cabinet reshuffle that dismissed three ministers, including the Minister 
of the Interior – the only authority with the power to appoint delegates.196 
Nevertheless, the French ambassador hoped to secure a resolution shortly: the 
continuing Minister of Foreign Affairs promised to personally intervene by speaking 
to the new Minister of the Interior, forcing a prompt appointment. Barroche 
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concluded that, if no obstacles were found, a delegate could depart from Lisbon the 
following day.197 
 
Despite successive promises, the Portuguese government failed to appoint a delegate 
during July. By mid-August, 24 days after the official opening of the ISC, the efforts 
of the French Ambassador finally paid off, and a delegation was appointed. As 
Barroche confessed, this feat was not his sole responsibility, instead resulting from 
the collaborative work between the French and English ambassadors to Lisbon. The 
unification of diplomatic synergies around a conference that aimed to establish a 
common sanitary policy in the Mediterranean region reveals the importance that the 
two countries attributed to the event. Moreover, the joint efforts developed by France 
and England – and perhaps the agenda of the new Minister of the Interior – reshaped 
the final structure of the Portuguese delegation. Portugal decided to send two 
delegates, in accordance with the model initially proposed by the organisers.198  
 
This shift indicated that for the new cabinet, the international regulation of 
quarantine was an important issue that justified investing in two delegates. 
Moreover, the government decided to comply with the original delegation structure 
suggested by France. João Mouzinho da Silveira, a key member of the Portuguese 
embassy to Paris, was appointed as the diplomatic envoy. Although he did not reside 
‘in one of the several ports of the [French] Republic,’199 as initially suggested by 
France, Mouzinho da Silveira was well acquainted with maritime law and 
quarantine. In a highly centralised country, public health policy was increasingly a 
Parisian affair.200 As such, the Portuguese diplomat must have been familiar with 
quarantine practices in French ports such as Marseille, and their impact on 
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Portuguese merchants. Regarded as zealous and intelligent by Barroche,201 
Mouzinho de Silveira was considered a good fit to represent Portugal.  
 
Appointed as the medical delegate, José Maria Grande was an accomplished doctor 
who had been elected president of both the Lisbon Society of Medical Sciences and 
the Lisbon Royal Academy of Science. Grande started his career as an army 
physician, but soon devoted himself to horticulture and botanical sciences. In 1841 
he was made professor of botany at the Polytechnic School of Lisbon, and head of 
the Botanic Garden of Ajuda – also in Lisbon. In 1849 Grande published the 
Cultivator’s Guide and Manual,202 and, soon after returning from the ISC, he 
continued to explore these agricultural interests by starting to reorganise the teaching 
of agricultural practices in Portugal.203  
 
As they did not involve epidemic diseases, it was probably not Grande’s research 
interests that played an important role in his appointment, but instead his political 
career probably contributed towards his selection. Soon after finishing his degree in 
medicine at the Universidade de Coimbra, Grande had joined the liberal forces and 
started a political career as a civil governor.204 Later, in 1838, he was elected as 
member of the national parliament, a position that, except for short intervals, he held 
until 1852. As an MP, Grande participated in several permanent parliamentary 
commissions, including one devoted to public health issues (1839-1846), where he 
may have contributed towards national quarantine policies.205 When writing to his 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs, Barroche described Grande as ‘one of the most 
distinguished and influential men of the country.’206  
 
Overall, both delegates satisfied the French ambassador, who noted that the selection 
demonstrated a genuine interest in the sanitary agenda of the Conference.207 More 
importantly, the selection pleased the Portuguese government, which trusted the two 
men to voice and defend its position. From an individual perspective, both delegates 
enjoyed extensive contact networks that contributed towards their appointments: 
Mouzinho da Silveira had been educated in France and was an insider within the 
Portuguese diplomatic world, while Grande’s professional and political career made 
him a well connected man.  
 
The complex appointment episode forced a heavy delay to the arrival of delegates in 
Paris. Mouzinho da Silveira and Grande only joined the ISC almost a full month 
after its start. Nevertheless, they were still able to participate fully in the important 
debates of the Conference, since these were repeatedly adjourned until the majority 
of delegates arrived in Paris. Ultimately, the process of appointing Portuguese 
delegates reflects the impact of national political and economic realities, while 
highlighting the role of social networks and trust.  
 
England, internal policy and external delays 
Similarly to Portugal, other countries also faced issues when appointing delegates, 
and originally selected teams were frequently subject to alteration. In the case of 
England, the appointment of the medical delegate was problematised by the rivalry 
between two state agencies that were attempting to make their own agenda the 
national one through the voice of a delegate. On 24 January 1851 – months before an 
official invitation letter was sent by France – the London Medical Gazette announced 
that Dr. Benjamin Guy Babington (1794-1866) ‘had been nominated by Lord 
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Palmerston to act for and represent the British Government at the Quarantine 
Congress which is shortly to [be] held at Leghorn [Livorno].’208  
 
In 1851, Benjamin Babington was an accomplished London physician who had just 
been elected the first president of the Epidemiological Society. After a brief civil 
service career in India, Babington had returned to England where, in 1820, he had 
started his medical studies at Cambridge. In 1831 he had joined the Royal College of 
Physicians as a fellow, and ten years later had given the prestigious Croonian lecture 
at the same institution.209 More importantly, Babington was very familiar with the 
ISC’s subject of inquiry: in 1832, he had gained first-hand experience of cholera 
during its first outbreak, and, according to the Transactions of the Epidemiological 
Society of London, ‘he devoted much attention to the investigation of the phenomena 
and pathology.’210 Continuing his interest in epidemic diseases, Babington had 
translated and published a seminal German work on the medieval experience of the 
Black Death,211 which, the Transactions claimed, ‘was well received by the 
profession, and unquestionably gave an impulse to epidemiological inquiry among 
our countrymen.’212  
 
In 1848-49, new cholera outbreaks were registered across Europe. As with the 1832 
outbreak, medical communities did not have a common understanding of the nature 
of the disease and could not agree on strategies to prevent new epidemic outbreaks. 
However, this second epidemic coincided with important steps taken towards the 
formalisation of epidemiology as an autonomous scientific discipline in England. 
Until 1850, medical professionals interested in epidemiological data depended on 
papers published by the Royal Statistical Society; however, they were starting to feel 
that it was necessary to carve out a singular space where doctors could produce and 
circulate original epidemiological knowledge. These preoccupations eventually 
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resulted in the creation of the London Epidemiological Society in 1850, and in the 
election of Benjamin Babington as its founding president – just a few months before 
the start of the ISC.213  
 
In the initial preparation meetings for the Society's official opening, Babington noted 
that cholera alone could justify its establishment. He was fully aware of the ‘painful’ 
reality ‘that up to [this] day we know neither the real cause, the means of prevention, 
nor the cure, of this awful malady.’214 However, he hoped that under the sponsorship 
of the Society, ‘the combination of talent in all branches of the [medical] profession 
meeting together under one roof, formed into one body for one good – one national 
cause, that what it is possible for man to effect, shall not much longer remain a 
mystery.’215  
 
In order to produce sound knowledge on epidemic diseases, Babington envisioned 
the Society as an international hub for the circulation of data, coordination of 
research, and production of solid prophylactic policies capable of avoiding future 
epidemic outbreaks.  In this sense, the Society was to play a crucial role in making its 
members ‘acquainted with the scientific researches of men of other countries’216 and 
in ‘making inquiries in all parts of the world, to organize scientific investigations in 
different departments and in various parts of the globe, and to give publicity to the 
result of its manifold labours.’217 Babington’s cosmopolitan agenda was to profit 
from a favourable European political outlook, since the lack of military conflicts 
provided a unique opportunity for ‘the interchange of scientific information among 
medical men of different countries.’218  
 
                                                
213 D. E. Lilienfeld, ""The greening of epidemiology": sanitary physicians and the London 
Epidemiological Society (1830-1870)," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 52, no. 4 (1978). 
214 "Epidemiological Society: the address of Dr. Babington on his proposing the establishment of this 
society, at the general meeting held at the Hanover Square Rooms, July 30, 1850," The Lancet 56, no. 
1412 (1850). 
"Epidemiological Society: Monday, Dec 2 1850 - Dr Babington, President," The Lancet 56, no. 1423 
(1850). 
215 "Epidemiological Society: Monday, Dec 2 1850 - Dr Babington, President." 
216 Horward, "Wellington and the Defense of Portugal." 
217 Ibid. 
218 "Epidemiological Society: Monday, Dec 2 1850 - Dr Babington, President." 
 
 84 
Research and circulation of knowledge was to be the central focus of the Society, 
since, according to Babington, only a correct understanding of the nature of diseases 
could provide a basis for the formulation of efficient prophylactic measures. The fact 
that medical communities did not fully understand the nature of cholera meant that 
Babington was loath to recommend clear prophylactic policies. Despite the 
immediate economic benefits that would result from such a decision, the lack of solid 
evidence for the inefficiency of quarantine as a prophylactic practice meant that it 
would be premature. He feared that if this decision was to be taken, humanity would 
face serious risks: ‘the seeds of death [could be spread] into the heart of populous 
cities, and the most awful results, the destruction of myriads of human being[s], 
[could] follow such [a] mistake.’219  
 
According to Babington, unnecessary epidemic risks must be avoided at all cost: 
quarantine policies should not result from unscientific administrative decisions but 
instead from research developed at an international level and coordinated by the 
newly formed Society. Under the Society’s direction, diseases would be classified 
according to their levels of contagiousness, and once a final list was produced, 
quarantine would be exclusively applied against diseases considered to be 
contagious. By restricting the use of quarantine to this reduced number of diseases, 
commerce would no longer suffer avoidable delays and costs. Babington’s 
internationalist mission was, in many ways, similar to the ISC agenda. The striking 
difference was the professional division of labour as proposed by Babington: the 
creation of an international epidemic governance scheme should be the exclusive 
competence of doctors, not diplomats as planned by the ISC.220 
 
As a prominent leader of the English epidemiologist movement and a supporter of 
the international circulation of knowledge, Benjamin Babington was, in many ways, 
the perfect delegate to represent his country at the ISC. In March 1851, several 
weeks after the London Medical Gazette’s announcement, the French doctor who 
was entrusted to manage the scientific programme of the conference – François 
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Mêlier221 – contacted his minister of foreign affairs to confirm the accuracy of the 
news. Moreover, Mêlier requested further details of the quarantine congress that 
Babington was supposed to attend in Livorno – could it be possible that two 
international congresses were to take place at the same time to address the same 
problems?222 
 
As already demonstrated in the previous chapter, several European states competed 
to be the first to organise an international congress to standardise the practice of 
quarantine in Europe. Mêlier may have been confused, not knowing whether a 
parallel conference was being organised by England when France was planning to 
issue official invitation letters to the ISC. Moreover, according to intelligence 
already secured by the French government, England was to appoint John Sutherland 
as the envoy to the ISC – not Benjamin Babington. In the light of such confusing 
intelligence, Jules Barroche, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, decided to ask his 
General Consul in London, Adrien Louis Conchelet, to clarify the situation.223  
 
Upon receiving Barroche’s letter, Conchelet paid a visit to Edwin Chadwick – the 
Commissioner of the General Board of Health – who confirmed that six months 
earlier he had been asked about a possible quarantine congress taking place in Italy, 
but that the project had fallen silent soon afterwards. The Gazette’s announcement 
may have been an editorial mistake resulting from a lack of updated information – or 
a conscientious editorial effort to put forward Babington’s name as delegate to a 
future sanitary conference.  
 
Chadwick was not surprised by the circulated rumours. Babington was clearly at 
odds with the anti-quarantine policy defended by the Board and its publications;224 as 
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such, Chadwick interpreted the attempt to promote Babington to be a strategy to 
challenge the growing power of the Board and restore pro-quarantine policies in 
England and abroad. As shown in chapter one, the creation of the General Board of 
Health in 1848 had sparked an era of competition where two governmental 
institutions struggled to secure a monopoly on public health policy in England. The 
Quarantine Act of 1825 had granted the exclusive power to decree quarantine in 
England to the Privy Council.225 However, the failure of the Council to prevent the 
1848 cholera outbreak had led to a progressive transfer of power to the General 
Board of Health.  
 
From a legal perspective, under the Nuisances Removal and Disease Prevention Act, 
the Board of Health was sanctioned to ‘provide for the cleansing of streets, houses, & 
removal of nuisances, and interment of the dead’ if ‘any part of the United Kingdom 
shall appear to be threatened with or affected by any formidable epidemic, endemic, 
or contagious disease.’226 However, these powers could only be mobilised once the 
Privy Council had deemed them necessary and issued an order granting the Board 
temporary powers to oversee policy relating to epidemic governance in the state. 
Facing the uncontrollable spread of cholera in the country, in October 1848 the 
Council had given the Board powers for six months and paved the way for Chadwick 
to secure, temporarily, the control of a further aspect of public health in England.227  
 
In addition, the publication of the 1849 Report on Quarantine by the Board of Health 
further  undermined the existence of the Privy Council as the gatekeeper of the 
epidemic safety of England. Instead of agreeing with the Council’s traditional 
support of quarantine practice, the Board of Health suggested a policy shift based on 
the removal of nuisances that fostered the development of epidemic, endemic and 
contagious diseases.228 In other words, with the publication of the Report on 
Quarantine, the Board of Health tried to reduce the power of the Privy Council to 
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introduce quarantines in England and highlighted the importance of the sanitary 
agenda, already spelt out in the Nuisances Removal and Disease Prevention Act, that 
transformed the Board of Health into the main caretaker of public health in the 
country. 
 
Within the ideological, theoretical, and institutional conflict, the appointment of 
Babington emerged as a final attempt on the part of the Privy Council to protect a 
pro-quarantine policy and to set it as official policy both in England and abroad. 
After all, as Chadwick noted, the quarantine department of the Privy Council saw ‘its 
existence threatened as [a] result of the anticontagionist principles of the board of 
health.’229 Facing this risk, the Privy Council tried to find ‘partisans of the ancient 
doctrines in the College of Physicians of London and Dr Babington was chosen to 
defend’ quarantine and the Council.230 Chadwick concluded that whatever ideas 
Babington would put forward, they would be ‘less advanced than those of the Board 
of Health.’231  
 
In the context of the above struggle, it was no coincidence that Conchelet visited 
Edwin Chadwick – and not the Privy Council – to gather intelligence on the selection 
process for the English delegation.  First, the General Board of Health was gaining 
momentum in setting the public health agenda for England. Secondly, as R. A. Lewis 
concluded, the ‘voice of the Board was the voice of Chadwick.’232 Thus, Chadwick 
was expected not only to hold privileged information but also to influence the 
process of appointing delegates. In this sense, the Babington episode was a residual – 
and failed – attempt to restore the lost power of the Privy Council and to secure a 
pro-quarantine agenda in England and in the Mediterranean region. 
 
The choice of Babington as a potential delegate to an international conference was 
finally ruled out with the official appointment of John Sutherland (1808-1891) on 2 
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July 1851. After graduating in 1831 from the University of Edinburgh, Sutherland 
had settled in Liverpool where, in addition to his medical practice, he had edited 
several medical journals devoted to the sanitary improvement of the region.233 Later, 
in 1848, Sutherland was invited to join the General Board of Health where, under 
direct instructions from Edwin Chadwick, he conducted a special inquiry on cholera. 
Initially, this inquiry was to have taken place in Germany but, on the eve of his 
departure (26 September 1848), Sutherland was instead directed to go to Hull ‘in 
consequence of the appearance of several cases of the disease on board a vessel in 
the port.’234 This detour marked the start of a larger investigation conducted by the 
Board of Health, which enabled Sutherland to observe the local circumstances 
causing outbreaks of cholera in England and Scotland. Eventually, Sutherland’s 
observations were published as a 164-page long appendix to the Report of the 
General Board on the Epidemic Cholera of 1848 & 1849, an appendix that had 
largely shaped the main report signed by Ashley, Edwin Chadwick and Southwood 
Smith.235  
 
Sutherland believed that ‘the health, the well-being, and the duration of the life of 
man [were] intimately connected with the observance of the natural laws of the 
universe in which he dwells’,236 and unsurprisingly, he attributed the causes of 
cholera to local characteristics ‘by virtue of which the epidemic obtains such power 
over the resisting vital forces of individuals, as to produce that class of phenomena 
usually ranked under the general designation of cholera.’237 Furthermore, Sutherland 
argued that ‘overcrowding; dampness; filth; want of ventilation and atmospheric 
pollution, proximity to graveyards (…), pigsties, offensive sewers (…); narrow, 
closely-built, and confined neighbourhoods, bad water [and] the impregnation of the 
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subsoil of towns with organic matter from filthy streets, cesspools’ were examples of 
‘local defects’ frequently linked with fatal outbreaks of the disease.238  
 
Because local circumstances were the major cause of epidemic diseases, Sutherland 
believed the use of quarantine to be useless and injurious. In the case of vessels 
arriving from affected ports, no arrangements were made to ascertain the existence of 
on-board cholera cases, let alone treat them. In fact, assistance would be sent only 
when the disease was fully developed, which, in many cases, meant that it was too 
late to avoid the inland spread of cholera.239 More problematically, while the 
application of quarantine to cholera presumed the disease to be contagious, 
Sutherland’s experience suggested that the disease could not become ‘epidemic 
unless certain conditions prevail which must be existing for some time before any 
case of the disease can occur.’ 
 
 In summary, Sutherland understood that the development of cholera was due to pre-
existing local circumstance. For this reason, quarantine was useless – if not 
dangerous – and only an effort to remove the local nuisances could secure the 
epidemic safety of populations.  This aetiological and prophylactic model, defended 
by Sutherland, was similar to the one presented by the Board of Health in its Report 
on Cholera and on Quarantine. For this reason, the endorsement of Sutherland by 
Chadwick must have been a natural step to secure a continuous defence of the public 
health agenda of the Board, both nationally and internationally.  
 
Because of either economic matters or aetiological beliefs, the Foreign Office, the 
Board of Health, and John Sutherland defended the elimination of the practice of 
quarantine in England and Europe. In a letter sent by Palmerston to Sutherland, the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs affirmed that ‘the main object which Her Majesty’s 
Government have in view of sending delegates to attend [the ISC was] to assist in 
simplifying and liberalizing, as much as may be found practicable, the whole system 
of Quarantine, and especially to endeavour to relieve commerce from the weight and 





vexatious obstructions which the existing quarantine system prevalent in most of the 
countries of Europe imposes upon it.’240  
 
John Sutherland’s stance represented a common ground, where the aetiological and 
prophylactic premises of the Board and the commercial interests of the Foreign 
Office could meet without conflict, and generated mutual advantages for the two 
institutions: Palmerston saw his commercial agenda supported by the scientific 
expertise and credibility of Sutherland, while the Board of Health gained access to a 
powerful international platform where the official position of England could 
potentially be moulded according to its own agenda. As such, the Board also saw its 
agenda legitimised by the Foreign Office, an ally that could be advantageously 
mobilised in the future. 
 
While the space of the ISC was inhabited by doctors and diplomats, the conference 
was primarily the product of several diplomatic machineries. For this reason, the 
Foreign Office instituted a set of mechanisms to control its delegates, in particular 
John Sutherland. In this sense, any possible intention of the Board of Health to 
control the agenda of the conference was prevented by Palmerston, who invited John 
Sutherland to attend his office ‘in order that [he could] receive any further 
instructions with which it may be found requisite to furnish [him] in regard to the 
conference.’241   
 
In addition to the agenda personally conveyed to the British delegate in London,242 a 
letter sent by Palmerston on 10 July supplied further instructions. Sutherland was 
expected ‘to discuss fully the various questions which may be brought forward at the 
Conference.’ However, at the same time, he was not to ‘commit Her Majesty’s 
Government to any decision with respect to any question without express orders 
                                                
240 Palmerston to Sutherland, 10 July 1851, Inclusion in the Procès-verbaux de la Conférence sanitaire 
internationale ouverte a Paris le 27 juillet 1851, Yale University: Cushing/Whitney Medical Library 
19thCent RA422 In8 1851+ 
241 Foreign Office to John Sutherland, 8 July 1851, Inclusion in the Procès-verbaux de la Conférence 
sanitaire internationale ouverte a Paris le 27 juillet 1851, Yale University: Cushing/Whitney Medical 
Library 19thCent RA422 In8 1851+ 
242 No records were found detailing the meeting between Palmerston and Sutherland.  
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from Her Majesty’s Government.’243 Sutherland was also required to produce 
periodic reports on the works of the conference in collaboration with his fellow 
diplomatic delegate. Finally, the medical envoy was asked to maintain constant 
communication with the English ambassador to Paris for further guidance. If doubts 
existed, Sutherland was to represent the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and not the 
Central Board of Health. 
 
Surprisingly enough, when John Sutherland was appointed to attend the ISC, no 
diplomat had yet been selected to join him in France. Although sources do not fully 
document the process of the selection of this second delegate, the official 
proceedings of the conference show that the diplomatic envoy missed the first 
session – despite residing in France. This delay suggests that bureaucratic problems 
may have occurred at the Foreign Office: occasionally, diplomatic correspondence 
was lost or delayed, requiring new orders to be sent when an expected answer did not 
arrive.  
 
The fact that a doctor was the first delegate to be appointed to attend a sanitary 
conference should not be understood as a manifestation of a world dominated by 
medicine (rather than diplomacy). As shown above, the actions of Sutherland were 
carefully circumscribed by diplomatic instructions, and, more importantly, the ISC 
was an event organised by diplomats who endeavoured to maintain tight control over 
the works of the conference. The primacy of appointing Sutherland over the 
diplomatic envoy may instead denote a concern about recruiting non-diplomatic 
personnel to attend a diplomatic event. Palmerston may have sensed that selecting a 
doctor might require time-consuming negotiations in order to address both the 
complex vested interests within the medical profession and medical bureaucracy and 
the competing agendas between institutions such as the Board of Health and the 
Privy Council. In contrast, appointing a diplomat would take no more than an 
internal and ordinary decision of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and did not require 
the endorsement of any other institution or professional group. 
                                                
243 Palmerston to Sutherland, 10 July 1851, Inclusion in the Procès-verbaux de la Conférence sanitaire 
internationale ouverte a Paris le 27 juillet 1851, Yale University: Cushing/Whitney Medical Library 




On 10 July, the English consul at Brest, Sir Anthony Perrier, was finally appointed as 
England’s diplomatic envoy.244 Perrier was an experienced diplomat and regarded by 
the Foreign Office as an asset in the pursuance of an international anti-quarantine 
policy. First, as the consular official of a major Atlantic port, Perrier was familiar 
with the practice of quarantine in France, and its costs and problems. In a report 
published in 1860 by the House of Commons, Perrier remarked that before 1850 
‘quarantine measures were frequent and rigour[ous] at Brest…[where] ships from all 
quarters often underwent long and expensive quarantines on slight grounds.’245 
Secondly, as the English envoy to the 1839 and 1843 International Commission for 
the regulation of fisheries on the coasts of Newfoundland and France, Perrier had 
been trusted to negotiate the delicate details of a new agreement on the fishery 
practices of those coasts. The double experience of representing England in 
international events (as opposed to the local commitments that consuls typically 
undertook) allowed Perrier to gain an important insight into the world of 
international policy-making.246 
 
As with the Portuguese delegation process, in choosing representatives, England 
tried to create the perfect alignment of delegator and delegate agendas. As such, trust 
was again crucial, and, in the case of the medical delegate, his scientific profile and 
networks paved the way to Paris. In this sense, divergent medical views on 
epidemics were seen by the Foreign Office to have important political implications, 
thus making the ISC a political as much as a medical arena. 
                                                
244 Palmerston to Perrier, 10 July 1851, The National Archives of the UK TNA: PRO FO97/210. The 
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see: United States Permanent Court of Arbitration, North Atlantic Coast fisheries arbitration. 
Appendix to the Counter case of the United States before the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The 
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Twenty-four odd characters 
When all 24 delegates finally joined the conference, they brought a unique set of 
expertise built by a multitude of professional backgrounds, institutional affiliations, 
and aetiological and prophylactic positions. 
 
As previously noted, the French invitation mentioned that countries were requested 
to appoint a consul already residing in a French port. In addition to Portugal, several 
other governments ignored the French suggestion and appointed diplomats based in 
other countries: Tuscany and Greece delegated their agendas to consuls based in 
Mediterranean ports highly exposed to quarantine – Genoa and Malta – while Spain 
appointed its consul in Singapore. Finally, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies selected 
its consul in Brussels. Out of eleven diplomats expected to reside in a French port,247 
only three did so; four were based in non-port towns in France, and four elsewhere. 
 
While the appointment of some consuls with substantial quarantine experience can 
be easily understood, the choices of Spain and the Kingdom of Two Sicilies are less 
immediately comprehensible. Segóvia, the Spanish consul in Singapore, had finished 
his diplomatic mission there and returned to Spain to receive a new post in Latin 
America just prior to the start of the ISC. Underpinning the Spanish decision, 
perhaps, was an interest in the views of a diplomat experienced in distant markets 
and the impact of quarantine on long haul trade. The periodic circulation of 
diplomats may also shed light on the decision to appoint Louis Falcon as the Sicilian 
delegate: before being stationed in Brussels, it is possible that he had held office in a 
large Mediterranean port and thus developed expertise on quarantine matters. 
However, his poor attendance at the ISC suggests that he may have been appointed 
only to satisfy the French delegation requirements: Falcon participated in a mere 16 
out of 48 sessions of the ISC. Moreover, the contrasting activity of Dr Giuseppe 
Carbonaro, his medical counterpart, suggests that the Sicilians regarded the defence 
of public health as a medical affair and not a diplomatic business.  
 
                                                




Medical delegates to the ISC were characterised by a close association with the 
regime they represented. For example, the Turk, Dr Bartoletti, was a member of the 
Constantinople Superior Board of Health, while the Sardinian, Dr Carbonaro, was 
the Secretary of Naples’ sanitary authority. Another Sardinian, Bô, held a chair in 
medicine at the University of Genoa and presided over the national medical society. 
Likewise, the Russian, Spanish, French, and Roman medical envoys held leading 
positions in national health authorities in charge of regulating quarantine and other 
public health affairs.  
 
In addition, most of the doctors had developed a parallel research career with 
extensively published work on epidemic diseases and quarantine. Carbonaro,248  
Betti249, and Capello250 had published works on local cholera outbreaks, and 
preventive and curative strategies against the disease; Bô’s work had focused on 
yellow fever and French quarantine policies;251 while Mêlier,252 Monlau253 and 
Sutherland254 had located the hygienic causes of diseases.  
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In all, the vast majority of medical and diplomatic delegates were highly regarded 
professionals with vast experience in epidemic surveillance and management. For 
this reason, the ISC was a heterogeneous social arena where official national 
scientific and political positions were circulated, debated, and negotiated. Moreover, 
due to the specialisation of delegates, delegators such as the English Foreign Office 
imposed mechanisms to control their actions abroad. In this sense, delegators 
established rules and determined the margin of discretion with which delegates were 
able to negotiate, while at the same time imposing rigorous reporting proceedings. 
Delegates were to represent their nations and not their own vested interests.  
 
II 
Order and protocol 
Soon after the start of the conference, delegates concluded that no existing protocol 
could provide proper guidance to the ISC. By the 1850s, diplomatic conferences 
were an established genre with crystallised forms of conduct. Likewise, international 
professional meetings had become a frequent phenomenon, even if guided by 
incipient protocols. At a crossroads where diplomacy met medicine, the ISC failed to 
fit into a clear recognisable nineteenth-century model of international congregation. 
This section will look at the strategies that delegates developed in order to establish a 
protocol to flexibly guide the works of the ISC in a way that satisfied all involved 
parties, and assess how the instituted rules contributed towards a peculiar power 
distribution among the professional groups.  
 
From chaos to order in the diplomatic world 
 
In the aftermath of the havoc caused by the Napoleonic wars, European powers 
convened in Vienna to establish a new political order. The Congress of Vienna 
resulted from the surrender of the Napoleonic forces in 1814 and the signature of the 
Treaty of Paris. This treaty settled the terms of peace and stipulated that ‘all powers 
engaged on either side in the present war, [should] within the space of two months, 
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send plenipotentiaries to Vienna, for the purpose of regulating, in General Congress, 
the arrangements which [were] to complete the provisions of the present treaty.’255  
 
The agenda of the Congress of Vienna was loosely defined via secret agreements 
between participants and a few other documents that were made public. A 
conservative attempt to restore and legitimise the power of the old order of European 
royal houses, the Congress aimed to redraw the European political map by creating a 
German Federation, establishing new borders between Poland and Germany, 
extending the possessions of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and constructing a 
neutral Switzerland. Equally ambitious were the Congress’ intentions to regulate the 
navigation of rivers on an international basis and introduce social reforms to abolish 
and outlaw slavery.256  
 
According to the Treaty of Paris, all nations were to participate in the Congress as 
equal partners, regardless of whether they were on the winning or losing side of the 
war. However, pre-existing agreements between Austria, England, Prussia, and 
Russia (the Quadruple Alliance) established two classes of participants: the first were 
countries that, through their political and economic power, were able to determine 
the agenda of the Congress, while the second were countries that did little more than 
legitimise the event.257  Moreover, the inequality of participants was further 
aggravated by the lack of guidelines regarding the composition of delegation teams. 
While Portugal decided to send an ambassador, England was represented by the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Russia by the Tsar himself. The diversity of 
participants’ social and diplomatic status reinforced the dynamics of subservience 
and inequality.258 
 
This lack of clear organisation also materialised in other dimensions of the Congress. 
Scheduled to open on 1 October 1815, it was continuously postponed without ever 
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being officially opened – despite the fact that work had started in September 1814. 
Moreover, the organisers of the Congress only allowed one specific venue where 
delegates could convene and negotiate. These two limitations resulted in unofficial 
and non-transparent events. Thus, the works of the Congress developed in 
unconventional venues such as ballrooms, hunting parties, private residences and 
even boudoirs, where the participants were chosen according to the interests of the 
organisers.259 Understandably, the Congress of Vienna never appointed an official 
such as a president or a secretary that could act as an official steering committee. 
Instead, the Congress operated though tacit agreements between participants, and 
with committees created ad hoc under the leadership of England, Austria, Prussia, 
Russia, and France.  
 
Interestingly enough, the lack of an official opening did not preclude an official 
closure of the Congress, where all participating powers convened in order to sign the 
Final Act of 9 June 1815. Between the start of the non-official works and the official 
closer, the Congress lasted over half a year. Tim Chapman argues that drafted 
documents, circulated before the start of the Congress, and the existence of secret 
agreements between the Quadruple Alliance members, led participants to believe that 
a final act would be signed after a few weeks of work.260 But a congress primarily 
organised around the social capital of the participants, who preferred the informality 
of the boudoirs to the space of an open congress, cost – among other things – time. In 
fact, the inexistence of formal protocol was a result of an old diplomatic order, 
composed of a restricted number of actors armed with diplomatic savoir faire that 
allowed the emergence of ad hoc fluid rules.  
 
Between 1815 and the start of the ISC in 1851, the diplomatic world changed, as 
practice was increasingly codified and formalised. The effects of the Congress of 
Vienna were indeed extensive. For a start, it was only the first in a series of 
congresses, which aimed to keep European peace and solve international disputes. 
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These congresses were organised in order to stabilise the political map of Europe 
while suppressing attempts at revolution that would undermine the status quo.261  
 
While some of these congresses were still dominated by informality and fluid praxes, 
by 1851, the crystallisation of diplomatic practice was evident. On the eve of the 
ISC, Charles de Martens262 published the fourth edition of his Diplomatic Guide in 
Paris. This book aimed to ‘systematically expose the laws and customs of 
diplomacy’ for students intending to initiate a diplomatic career or individuals with 
an interest in the mechanisms of diplomacy.263 Although the accuracy and influence 
of this publication is uncertain, the fact that the Guide was already in its fourth 
edition in 1851 suggests that the book was a popular manual for aspiring diplomats 
and reflected the diplomatic protocol practised in mid-nineteenth century Europe.  
Arguably, Martens’ publication translated a diplomatic world marked by set models 
and hierarchies.264  
 
Non-diplomatic conferences  
According to the Union des Associations Internationales, during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, 26 international non-diplomatic conferences and congresses were 
organised in Europe – and by the end of the century, the number rose to 1,000.265 
Organised by different professional and interested groups, international conferences 
and congresses were used as venues to debate physics, naturalism, slavery, peace, 
prisons, economy, and agriculture – to name just a few topics. The extensive list of 
events denotes a clear burgeoning of a new social phenomenon, linked with 
processes of circulation of knowledge, standardisation of social practices and the 
creation of transnational political movements. Delegates from all over the world 
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converged on cities such as London, Brussels, and Paris, and during set periods of 
time negotiated common meanings and future practices. 
 
In Colloques et sociétés, Claude Tapia develops a typology in order to grasp the 
multitude of nineteenth-century congresses. In his view, international congresses 
were divided into seven major categories: political meetings of heads of states or 
governments; economic and monetary meetings; ecclesiastic assemblies; trade union 
meetings; meetings of political organisations; international, scientific, technical, 
literary and artistic conferences; and professional meetings.266 The common link, 
Tapia argues, is that conferences and congresses served as forums for the circulation 
of knowledge, coordination of policies, strengthening of ideologies, reinforcement of 
administrative machineries, and regulation of social life.  
 
The 1846 World Temperance Convention and the 1847 Congress of Economists 
were two examples of international events emerging from the greater nineteenth-
century world of international congresses and conferences.267 Unlike diplomatic 
events, congresses which were connected with political movements, social reform, 
and professional groups had no capacity to regulate the matters within their scope of 
debate. The lack of an official state representation and mandate to act in the name of 
governments limited the action – but not the ambition – of participants. Individuals 
who took part in these events merely represented particular scientific and academic 
societies, private and religious groups, or their own persona. 
 
Emerging three decades after the Congress of Vienna, the World Temperance 
Convention and the Congress of Economists were marked by a formal and 
transparent organisation. Before the start of the event, organisers drafted agendas, 
determined the duration and venues of the event, and internationally circulated 
invitations to participants. Lasting four days, both events accommodated a large 
number of participants, arriving from all over the world. Opening in London, the 
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Temperance Convention registered 301 participants – mostly priests and doctors – 
interested in elevating society’s moral qualities and creating a coherent political 
programme to curb the world’s alcohol consumption levels.268 In Brussels, the 
Congress of Economists assembled 175 European and American delegates – 
including Karl Marx and Adolphe Quetelet. Together, and ‘in [the] name of science 
and humanity,’ delegates looked at the advantages of free trade and produced 
guidelines for future trade policies.269 
 
Unlike the Congress of Vienna, the Temperance Convention and the Congress of 
Economists elected officers (a presidential and secretariat team) that managed the 
event and moderated debates. Convening daily, at set times, participants were invited 
to participate fully in the debates. Although ‘no member was allowed to speak twice’ 
at the Temperance Convention due to the high number of participants,270 no 
limitation was ever imposed at the Congress of Economists. Both events sponsored 
the printing and distribution of copies of the detailed conference proceedings and 
lists of participants. These documents transformed the events into objects, capable of 
being mobilised and circulated, while standardising knowledge into crystallised 
forms. In this sense, printed proceedings allowed international events to gain a 
temporal and geographical scale that surpassed their ephemeral limitations. 
Ultimately, the mobility of discourses contributed towards the unification of political 
and scientific programmes. 
 
The formalisation differences between the Congress of Vienna and the non-
diplomatic events of the 1840s should not be seen as an inherent characteristic of 
professional events. Instead, the difference marks an organisational shift that 
eventually normalised the running of international congresses. Organised in order to 
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facilitate the circulation of political agendas and the circulation of knowledge, 
international congresses and conferences were platforms of intellectual exchange, 
where political and epistemic communities were constructed and reaffirmed.271 
Moreover, these international events established temporary centres for the 
coordination and planning of socio-political and economical life through the re-
invention of political boundaries, the creation of common discourses, or the 
collection of scientific evidence used to support given initiatives. In order to do this, 
the organisers of these events increasingly imposed codified orders, translated 
through protocol. Because of this use of protocol in the regulation of international 
congresses and conferences, the professional boundaries between groups were 
clearly maintained. This was particularly true in the case of diplomatic initiatives that 
locked other groups out of proceedings, until the organisation of the ISC. 
Building the format of the International Sanitary Conference 
The French decision to invite participating countries to be jointly represented by a 
diplomat and a physician marked the end of an era in which diplomats claimed 
exclusive access to diplomatic events. Certainly, this transition occurred 
progressively and in a controlled way: doctors did not invade the space of the 
conference. Instead, under a specific set of rules and mechanisms of surveillance, 
they were invited to share their expertise. Nevertheless, the introduction of a second 
professional group into an already established diplomatic sphere imposed new 
problems and challenges to existing diplomatic protocol. The new professional 
ecology, established by the ISC, required the reinvention of previous conference 
models and the adoption of explicit rules to facilitate the peaceful and productive 
cohabitation of doctors and diplomats.  
 
The intention of creating a bi-professional conference was detailed in the pre-
programme that was circulated before the conference started. Authored by François 
Mêlier, this document, following common diplomatic practices, detailed the terms of 
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reference that delegates were expected to address during the conference.272 In the 
document, Mêlier stressed that the ISC should use science as a guide for the 
protection of public health and international trade. Nevertheless, he did not 
determine how the professional groups should be ranked in the conference. As 
science was to play a role in the works of the Conference, did Mêlier expect doctors 
to lead the ISC, or were they to be subordinated to the diplomats who were 
ultimately responsible for the organisation of the event? Alternatively, Mêlier may 
have envisioned a conference where doctors and diplomats were to act as equal 
delegates, but was it expected that doctors would be treated equally in the process of 
constructing common international law? In order to solve these tensions, 
conventional diplomatic protocol had to be adapted to the particular challenges 
imposed by the ISC.  
 
As a creation of European diplomatic machineries, the ISC operated, to a certain 
extent, within diplomatic canon and protocol. Charles de Martens’s The Diplomatic 
Guide, mentioned earlier, dedicated a section to congresses and conferences, two 
distinct diplomatic artefacts that varied in the type and number of participants as well 
as the outcomes typically produced.273 According to Martens, conferences were 
meetings between two governments, represented by plenipotentiary ministers, and 
took place ‘under the meditation of a third power.’274 In contrast, congresses were 
‘assemblies of plenipotentiary ministers nominated by their respective governments 
to negotiate peace or to produce solutions for general political questions that divided 
the assembled states.’275 From the perspective of diplomatic protocol, the nature of 
                                                
272 The pre-circulation of a conference programme was a standard diplomatic option to facilitate 
debate and reduce the duration of the meetings. According to Martens, these articles were tendentially 
short, clear and precise in the stipulation of the bases of any proposed treaty to be signed by the 
participating parties. Martens and Wegmann, Le guide diplomatique: Précis des droits et des 
fonctions des agents diplomatiques et consulaires; suivi d'un traité des actes et offices divers qui sont 
du ressort de la diplomatie, accompagné de pièce et documents proposés comme exemples, p1. 
273 Fifteen years later, in the fifth edition of the Guide Diplomatique, Martens dropped the distinction 
between the two objects and concluded that ‘there is no precise distinction between congress and 
conference. In general, the name congress is given to very important meetings that leads to a general 
treaty.’ Charles de Martens, Le guide diplomatique. Précis des droits et des donctions des agents 
diplomatiques et consulaires, 5 ed., vol. 1 (Paris: A. Durand, 1866). p179 
274 Martens and Wegmann, Le guide diplomatique: Précis des droits et des fonctions des agents 
diplomatiques et consulaires; suivi d'un traité des actes et offices divers qui sont du ressort de la 
diplomatie, accompagné de pièce et documents proposés comme exemples, 1.vol 1 p200 
275 Ibid.vol 1 p194 
 
 103 
the ISC was closer to the format of a congress: no mediator was present, and 
delegates were invited to address a specific problem, the standardisation of sanitary 
practices.  
 
The name of the ISC was a deliberate decision on the part of the organisers. As the 
previous chapter notes, the French administrator who first suggested the articulation 
of sanitary policies in the Mediterranean argued for a simple meeting of delegates 
[réunion de députés]276 to produce a desirable solution. The semantic change, 
implied in the French decision to organise an international sanitary conference, was 
an attempt to ‘define, in the most simple way, the nature of the practical deliberations 
that should be agreed on instead of abstract theories.’277 For the same reason, France 
rejected the organisation of a congress – ‘a word that could imply a political 
character that, it was thought, would not be properly attributed to the meeting in 
question.’278 Thus, the ISC was not, according to the French government, a political 
arena. 
 
Although the name chosen for the ISC challenged diplomatic protocol, the selection 
of a venue to host the conference followed the conventional model described by 
Martens, who suggested that conferences and congresses should be located in the 
‘city (…) better situated to allow [delegates] to communicate as quickly as possible 
with their [governments].279 By the time that countries were invited to attend the 
conference, the French government had yet to decide the final location of the ISC. In 
the letter of invitation, the French authorities indicated Paris and Port-Vendres as the 
most likely cities to host the conference.  
 
With the support of the participating countries, Paris (specifically the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs) was selected for its accessibility and centrality.280 In addition, as the 
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administrative and intellectual capital of the French empire, Paris was, according to 
Palmerston, the city ‘best adapted for the purpose [of the conference] inasmuch as it 
[was] the place where all kinds of information connected with the subject matter of 
inquiry might most easily be obtained.’281 Historians and sociologists of science have 
noted the importance of space in the production and circulation of science, and 
argued that local circumstances condition particular projects.282 The ISC was no 
exception. Paris was the ideal locale to procure and circulate data that could inform 
an effort to create international sanitary regulations. The proximity to governmental 
institutions connected to the governance of public health, and the existence of rich 
libraries, offered abundant resources that could be mobilised in order to assess the 
value of quarantine and inform aetiological and prophylactic discussions. 
 
The same geography that enabled the procurement and circulation of knowledge also 
limited the nature of the conference: hosted at the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, delegates had no direct access to victims of epidemic diseases or places for 
scientific experimentation. However, this restriction was in line with the 
Conference’s pre-programme, which forbade the ISC to become a scientific congress 
devoted to experimentation and endless academic debates.283 
 
The pre-programme invited countries to send their delegates to Paris, in time for the 
opening of the conference, by ‘the end of June’ in 1851.284 The lack of a precise date 
for the opening of the ISC was a common practice in the organisation of international 
congresses – the Congress of Vienna, for example, was expected to convene three 
months after the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. This option served to 
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accommodate the need of delegates to travel long distances and to minimise, as much 
as possible, the impact of notoriously unreliable transport systems. By setting the 
start of the ISC at the end of June 1851, France, in their view, gave delegates enough 
time to arrive in Paris. Moreover, the French organisers anticipated that the timing of 
the ISC would allow participants sufficient time to implement the recommendations 
of the Conference before the summer of 1852, when a fresh outbreak of epidemic 
disease was anticipated, associated with the hot weather.285 
 
Arriving on 11 July, John Sutherland was one of the first delegates to reach Paris, 
and soon consulted C. E. David regarding the details of the ISC. David stated that ‘a 
sufficient number of delegates had not yet arrived to enable a meeting to be 
called.’286  A week later, David observed that some delegates were still to arrive in 
Paris; however, those already in the city desired to start the conference as soon as 
possible. Thus, David proposed opening the conference on 21 July but deferring any 
important decisions until all the delegates had arrived.287 Like Sutherland, other 
delegates arriving in Paris visited David, not only to present their official credentials 
but also to gather detailed information about the future of the ISC. These visits were, 
indeed, expected by David as an integral part of the diplomatic protocol.288 
 
The ISC eventually opened its doors on 23 July,289 and after a short welcome speech 
by David, Joseph Lavison, the Austrian general consul at Marseille and the senior 
delegate present, proposed the appointment of the French diplomat as the president 
of the conference. After a quick consultation, all the members attending supported 
Lavison’s proposal.290 The selection of David – and not a medical delegate – as the 
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president reinforced the diplomatic ideology that oriented the organisation of the 
conference, while following traditional diplomatic protocol. It is not surprising that 
Palmerston directed Sutherland to vote for David: ‘the conference [was] held in Paris 
[and] it would seem to be a proper compliment to the French government that M. 
David (…) should be chosen [as] president.’291 
 
As the newly appointed president, David declared the conference constituted, and 
introduced Ernest Baroche, Jules David and Désormeaux, the secretaries directly 
appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Agriculture and 
Commerce to assist delegates and write up the proceedings of the conference. 
Incidentally, this appointment transformed the ISC into a quasi-family enterprise: 
Jules David was the son of C. E. David and Désormeaux the son-in-law of Dr 
François Mêlier, the second French delegate.292 This nepotism on the part of the 
French ministers introduced an important element of control to the works of the 
conference, and allowed David and Mêlier to use their advantageous position to 
shape the proceedings of the ISC according to specific agendas.293  
 
Each session started with the reading of the proceedings of the previous day. 
Delegates could request the correction of any mistakes and, once satisfied with the 
final product, the proceedings were approved and signed. The text was then 
forwarded to the Imprimerie Nationale (the French official press house) to be printed 
and subsequently distributed among delegates. Finally, in addition to private reports, 
delegates forwarded a copy of the proceedings to their governments, which used the 
information to scrutinise the work of their envoys and to dispatch further orders. The 
constant flux of correspondence between the delegates and their governments 
contributed to the extended duration of the conference. During the six months for 
which the ISC was convened, delegates requested and waited for precise orders to 
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Décembre 1888," Mémoires de l'Académie de Médecine 36(1891). p28 
293 An analysis of the impact of David-Mêlier family network can be found in the next chapter. 
 
 107 
arrive, a time-consuming process. In 1851, Paris was still not connected to other 
European capital cities through a telegraphic network, and so all correspondence was 
transported by sea or overland.294 According to the 1855 edition of Bradshaw’s 
General Railway and Steam Navigation, the distance between Paris and London 
could be covered in 13 hours – providing that the ferry or the two trains were not 
delayed.295 Of course, correspondence between Paris and distant cities such as 
Istanbul required additional time. Furthermore, frequent letters circulated with 
requests for information, which meant that further time was required to organise the 
official national position put forward by delegates.  
 
After several postponements, the ISC eventually established an operational routine. 
Unlike the Congress of Vienna, the ISC was officially opened and held in a room at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dedicated to the proceedings. In addition, like the 
Temperance Convention and the Congress of Economists, the ISC employed a 
president and an administrative team that contributed towards the efficiency, 
transparency and accountability of the conference. The expected outcomes, 
meanwhile, followed the Congress of Vienna’s model: the ISC aimed to produce a 
document which would legally bind participant states to a piece of international law. 
Finally, like previous diplomatic initiatives, the ISC received the patronage of the 
hosting political elite: the Minister of Foreign Affairs, his director of consulate and 
commercial affairs, the Minister of Agriculture and Trade and his chief of interior 
trade made regular visits to the conference and were directly involved with its works.  
 
Both ministers attended the second session of the ISC and, as the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs noted, ‘the [existing] diversity of sanitary regulations plagued [Europe and] 
damaged commerce between different nations.’296 Delegates were reminded that the 
ISC was underpinned by the ultimate necessity of finding common solutions for the 
protection of public health. At the same time, it was emphasised that these measures 
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should not ignore the need for swift international circulation of goods, indispensable 
for the proper ‘development of peoples and industry.’297 More candidly, the Minister 
of Agriculture and Trade concluded that ‘time [was] money’ and unnecessary 
sanitary obstacles to commercial transactions inflicted considerable losses, which 
should be avoided.298 Both ministers stressed the need for the priorities of public 
health and commercial freedom to be balanced, and hoped that this would be 
achieved through the scientific knowledge and diplomatic expertise of delegates. 
  
Doctors and diplomats alike were expected to contribute towards the construction of 
a sanitary system, through complex processes of negotiations and compromises that 
often challenged national agendas. Foreseeing problems ahead, the ISC president 
decided to clarify the format of the conference and to create rules capable of 
‘accelerating [future] deliberations.’299 It was expected that debating and voting 
would be two crucial activities undertaken at the ISC. Regarding the process of 
discussion, delegates agreed not to interrupt speakers and to avoid presenting 
proposals or opinions identical to those already under debate. The agenda of each 
session was to be determined by the president, who also had the power to conclude 
the debate and order a final vote of the proposals under discussion; this would 
require the support of an absolute majority in order to be passed. Finally, due to the 
importance of the debates and the necessity of voting on each presented proposal that 
was presented, delegates were required to attend all sessions of the conference – 
except if formal authorisation had been granted beforehand.  
 
Procedures for voting were critical to the success of the ISC in producing resolutions, 
and this issue was to generate heated debate amongst the delegates. In order to 
construct a voting system capable of gaining the participants’ support, David invited 
the envoys to decide whether votes were to be counted by country, as was usually the 
case in diplomatic conferences, or by individual, as with professional conferences 
and congresses. The decision on this matter could potentially shape the outcome of 
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the conference and would determine the status, legitimacy and power of each 
professional group. It would establish whether or not medical and diplomatic 
expertise were indeed equal in a conference organised through diplomatic 
mechanisms. One necessarily wonders whether doctors – without diplomatic 
training, experience, and affiliation – could be trusted to shape future international 
laws. Similarly, diplomats were required to deliberate on specific sanitary issues 
despite having no formal medical training. Could the construction of a sanitary code 
be trusted to professionals with limited aetiological and prophylactic knowledge? 
According to David, diplomatic protocol dictated that delegates should vote by state, 
yet previous diplomatic initiatives were reserved to diplomats. The lack of a clear 
precedent allowed delegates to decide the concrete rules of the ISC, and potentially 
to change the future of diplomacy by creating a precedent. 
 
Starting the voting debate, Pietro Betti (the Tuscan doctor) reminded the Conference 
that France had invited countries to ‘send two delegates and not a delegation.’300 In 
his particular case, he had not ‘receive[d] an imperative mandate’ from his 
government and believed the ISC to be a platform where free ideas could be 
exchanged. Betti expected votes to be counted individually: ‘each delegate had a 
unique character and his convictions c[ould], with no inconvenience, differ from his 
colleague’s.’301  
 
In contrast, Segovia, the Spanish diplomatic envoy, argued that the terms of 
reference given to delegates were not just a matter of individual responsibility. 
Delegates were acting on behalf of governments, and it should be expected that 
diplomatic and medical representatives would vote together. If delegates voted 
individually and against each other, governments would see their representation 
neutralised and jeopardised.302 In a similar vein, Perrier added that individual voting 
could harm the equal representation of states in cases when one of a country’s 
delegates was unable to attend the conference, as only one vote could then be cast by 
that country. Furthermore, Dr Sutherland of England pointed out that, although 
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delegates were expected to represent two different elements, he trusted that 
diplomats and doctors would be in permanent agreement. For this reason, votes 
should be cast on a delegation basis and not individually.303 
 
Submitting the matter to the floor, the two voting scenarios were submitted to ballot. 
Delegates decided that all future voting was to be counted on an individual basis.304 
Each delegate would vote by raising his hand, but, if a third of delegates requested it, 
voting could be made secret. Finally, if voting results were even, the vote of the 
president would  determine the outcome.305 The voting method introduced by the 
delegates distinguished the ISC from traditional diplomatic congresses, which had 
typically relied on nation-based voting systems.  
 
Tensions between traditional diplomatic protocol and innovative solutions that met 
the needs of the ISC could also be found in the debates on the Conference’s expected 
outcome. In the programme pre-circulated by the French government, countries were 
invited to send two delegates to attend the Conference in order to produce an Official 
Sanitary Code for the Mediterranean. However, delegates such as the Tuscan 
diplomat feared that governments would not support a treaty based on individual 
votes rather than national directives. Thoughtfulness, he claimed, was required, and 
he stressed that the final outcome should modestly be titled draft sanitary regulation 
and submitted, in due time, to further negotiations between national governments and 
their offices for foreign affairs.306  
 
In contrast, Perrier defended a bold initiative. He argued that, as participating states 
reserved the right not to ratify the ISC’s outcomes, delegates should set themselves 
ambitious aims: a sanitary convention to be submitted for final approval from the 
governments. This option would also save precious time, since a draft regulation 
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would require governments to organise a new conference and to appoint new 
delegates who would then compose a final convention.307 
 
Deciding upon the name of the final document to be produced by the ISC was a 
complex matter, which required an unequivocal agreement on the potential impacts 
of the conference. According to the Spanish diplomat, three major options were 
available: first, the conference could produce a declaration of principles to guide 
future sanitary legislation; secondly, delegates could create a regulation detailing 
future sanitary practices; and thirdly, a convention could be signed and secure the 
standardisation of sanitary practices in the region.  
 
The discussion on the outcomes of the ISC ended when Lavinson, the Austrian 
delegate, reminded delegates that the pre-circulated programme was clear regarding 
the matter: a sanitary code for the Mediterranean was the ultimate goal of the 
conference. In order to achieve this, he suggested that they formulate both a 
convention and a detailed sanitary regulation entitled Draft Convention Followed by 
a Settlement for its Implementation.308 The precision of this debate derived from a 




This chapter has shown that appointing delegates was a complex process that 
involved the recruitment of persons whose individual and professional agendas were 
closely aligned with national sanitary agendas. In a context of representing a nation 
abroad, trust was a crucial factor in selecting envoys. However, delegators made sure 
to issue detailed instructions and request the production of periodic reports in order 
to keep delegates under control.  
 
As a new international institution that gathered together diplomats and physicians, 
the ISC revisited diplomatic protocol in order to regulate its works. By introducing a 
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voting system that privileged individual expertise, delegates carved a space for 
debate that, to some extent, separated themselves from their states when drawing up 
a draft sanitary convention and regulation. Although states maintained their decision-
making capacity and power, delegates defined their role as determiners of medical 
and administrative matters.  Though diplomatic institutions tried to secure a tight 
control over the works of the conference by limiting the autonomy of their envoys, 




CHAPTER 3: Between science and practice: quarantine and politics 
of classification of diseases 
 
 
‘Now, it is clear that quarantines and sanitary cordons are not efficient against 
diseases that are exclusively epidemic because these precautions cannot form a 
barrier that avoids the introduction of the epidemic constitution importable by 
winds, probably by magnetic currents which cross our globe and possibly by 




‘You say that quarantines are impossible and illusory but you accept them for 




A few minutes after opening the fifth general session of the International Sanitary 
Conferences (ISC), C. E. David, the elected president, invited all the participating 
delegates to address what he thought to be the most serious, central, and urgent 
matter of the conference: the selection of the diseases that were to be subjected to 
sanitary measures.311 Other delegates also viewed the imminent debate as crucial to 
the very success of the ISC: Anthony Perrier, the diplomat sent by London, privately 
reported to Lord Palmerston, his Foreign Secretary, that the issue under discussion 
was ‘one of the most important points’312 because delegates were in reality deciding 
the future of quarantine in the Mediterranean Sea.  
 
Stakes were indeed high for all participants. Changes in the practices of quarantine 
had the potential to reshape international public health, to distress trade, and to 
introduce new navigation practices in the Mediterranean region. As I argue in this 
chapter, the debate on quarantine was situated at the crossroads between medical 
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knowledge, diplomatic interests, and individual convictions. Furthermore, I will 
claim that the decision on the number of diseases that were to be subject to 
quarantine was a classificatory exercise; during the course of the ISC, delegates 
distinguished between two sorts of diseases – diseases that required quarantine and 
those that did not.  
 
The classification of cholera was particularly complex and, in many ways, followed 
national controversies on the aetiological properties of the disease and the 
prophylactic value of quarantines. From an aetiological perspective, the debate 
navigated around two axes: endemic and epidemic diseases; and contagious and 
anticontagious diseases. According to the 1849 Beaude’s Dictionnaire de médecine 
usuelle and the 1832 Adelon’s Dictionnaire de médecine, endemic diseases 
developed in specific locations due to causes inherent in those places.313  Moreover, 
because inherent causes tended to be permanent, endemic diseases were also 
permanently registered during specific periods and seasons.314 Meanwhile, Adelon’s 
dictionary described epidemic diseases as ‘affections produced by general causes that 
temporar[il]y reigned over a great number of individuals.’315 The origins of these 
causes were usually seen as exogenous to the local outbreak. 
 
Underpinning the contagionism and anticontagionism axes were concepts connected 
to the causes of the disease’s manifestation. Pure contagionists believed that the 
disease-causing matter was produced in the body of sick persons and transmitted by 
touch, fomites (clothes, bedding, and general objects that entered into contact with 
the sick and that were capable of conserving the poison and transmitting it during a 
period of time), or infection (produced by the sick, these viruses were released into 
the immediate atmosphere and inhaled by the healthy). On the contrary, non-
contagionists believed that the causation of diseases was matter in the atmosphere 
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and physical environment (miasma). Once inhaled through the lungs, the matter 
entered the blood and disrupted the physiological balance of individuals.316 
 
Despite being useful as provisional and initial navigation concepts, clear-cut 
definitions and oppositions between contagionism and anticontagionism have been 
largely criticised by scholars of history of medicine. These concepts accumulated 
layers of connotations over time. Each period added its own attempts at definition, 
but was inevitably affected by previous histories of the concept. Hence, the 
‘historian’s difficulty in arriving at workable definitions even within a specific 
historical context is often a reflection of contemporary lack of precision.’317 
 
As Margaret Pelling showed, mid-nineteenth-century English doctors and state 
officials produced no clear opposition between contagionism and anticontagionism. 
Instead, the two terms were used as limits in order to produce particular aetiological 
views and to originate a set of adaptable, malleable and in-between positions such as 
the idea of contingent contagionism. Although complex and even contradictory, 
these positions resulted from compromises ‘consistent with interests, experience and 
methodology alike.’318 Furthering this idea, Christopher Hamlin demonstrated that 
contagionism and anticontagionism explanations were not mutually exclusive, 
essentially opposed or even incompatible.319  
 
The fluidity of concepts described by Pelling and Hamlin was also true in the case of 
the ISC. By framing the debate around the axes of epidemic/endemic and 
contagious/anticontagious, doctors and diplomats defined and classified diseases 
such as cholera.320 However, unlike earlier debates, which shaped national 
quarantine policies and eventually led to the organisation of the Conference, the ISC 
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itself was composed of a restricted number of actors trusted by their countries to 
defend national agendas and to produce a common sanitary policy for the 
Mediterranean region. As a social arena shared by the two professional groups of 
diplomats and doctors, the ISC allows us to understand the international dynamics of 
classification of diseases and the process of constructing a common public health 
policy through efforts to balance public health ideals and international trade interests.   
 
More specifically, in this chapter I look at the process of establishing quarantine as a 
valuable tool in the quest to protect public health and trade, and argue that judging 
the value of quarantine was an exercise of power, space, aetiology, history, and 
diplomacy. The first and second parts of this chapter deal with the limitations of the 
existent historical models used to explain the nineteenth-century prophylactic 
choices of European polities, and suggest that to understand the ISC, a deeper 
understanding of state agendas and state delegation is required. Underpinned by the 
Edinburgh Strong Programme, the third section of this chapter builds a theoretical 
framework based on the act of classification. By introducing a model that carefully 
merges the two bases of science and politics for the co-production of reality, this 
chapter challenges the previous understanding of nineteenth-century international 
epidemic control policies. 
 
Section IV, V and VI of this chapter deal with the process of establishing a shared 
classificatory system in the space of the ISC, thereby grounding the analysis 
empirically. Section IV focuses on the power of diplomacy, particularly the 
Programme Commission appointed by the president of the ISC and composed of a 
selective group of delegates. Section V addresses the issues of individual agency and 
expertise in the space of the Conference by looking at the reception of the 
classificatory report presented by the Programme Commission. Finally, section VI 
looks at the power of numbers and the political negotiations used to create a majority 




Classification of diseases as a historically and geographically situated problem 
 
On 14 August 1851, Guglielmo Ménis — the Austrian medical delegate — opened 
the debate on diseases and sanitary measures, and reminded his colleagues that 
before the start of the ISC, a provisional program had been circulated between all 
participants. This document invited European states to create a sanitary system to 
prevent the importation of contagious diseases in the Mediterranean region.321 
Because delegates were allowed to address contagious diseases only, Ménis saw no 
reason to debate cholera, a disease that he believed to be epidemic.322 He argued that 
plague and yellow fever – true contagious diseases - should be the only diseases 
under consideration, since sanitary measures such as quarantine were only effective 
when trying to prevent this disease category.  
 
Likewise, Dr Angelo Bô, the Sardinian delegate and author of several studies on 
quarantine and contagious diseases,323 argued that sanitary measures should be 
reserved for diseases like plague and yellow fever. Unlike Ménis, he viewed cholera 
as a contagious and importable disease – one that travelled from India to Europe and 
the Americas. However, he noted that smallpox, syphilis, and many other diseases 
were similarly contagious. Moreover, in his view, these other diseases ‘acquired, 
after many centuries, the right of residency’ and no sanitary measure was ever 
applied against them. He therefore asked why Europe should enforce quarantines 
against cholera if this disease shared the same contagious properties as smallpox and 
syphilis and was already endemic in Europe.324  
 
                                                
321 Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol 1, 27 September 1851, p6 (Ménis). My italics 
322 Throughout this paper, I use cholera, cholera morbus, Asiatic cholera and Indian cholera not as 
synonymous but in the same way delegates used it.  
323 See, for instance, Angelo Bo, Sulla dottrina dei contagi e delle malattie contagiose considerata ne’ 
suoi rapporti colla pubblica preservazione: commentari  (Genova: Tipografia dei Fratelli Pagano, 18-
-). See also, ———, Sulle quarantene contro la febbre gialla d’America e sulla inefficacia degli 
ordinamenti quarantenari della Francia: Relazione di una commissione creata dal Consiglio 
Generale di Sanita Marittima sedente in Genova. 
324 Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol 1, 27 September 1851, p7 (Bô) 
 
 118 
Although the two delegates both contested that cholera should not be subject to 
future quarantine measures, Ménis and Bô used different sets of arguments to justify 
their positions. In other words, as I argue in this chapter, despite the fact that both 
delegates classed cholera as a disease that should not be quarantined, each used a 
different set of auxiliary classifications to support their final classification. Ménis 
wished to avoid the use of quarantine measures because cholera-morbus was a non-
contagious disease. On the other end of the spectrum, Bô considered cholera to be a 
contagious disease, but, due to other factors, also wished to avoid the introduction of 
quarantine for cholera.  
 
Not all delegates shared the anti-quarantine views of Ménis and Bô. In fact, while 
trying to construct a unified way of classifying diseases, the ISC became the stage of 
a diplomatic and medical controversy, which would only be solved by a long 
international debate on the value of quarantine and the nature of diseases. More 
importantly, the conclusions of this debate shaped the future of international public 
health policy-making by establishing rules, agendas and professional dynamics. 
 
Aetiological debates were far from an alien subject among medical communities 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. The mere existence of the ISC was the 
consequence of the failures of these communities to establish a largely shared 
definition of cholera perceived as true and valid. Since the first outbreak of cholera 
between 1829 and 1832, doctors had developed a set of strategies in order to 
establish the nature of cholera. In Poland, for instance, in 1831, Dr Foy ‘practised on 
himself some most daring and disgusting experiments’ in order to demonstrate that 
cholera was not ‘propagated by immediate contagion.’ Foy ‘tasted the vomited 
matter, inspired the breath of patients labouring under the disease in its most violent 
form’ and even ‘inoculated himself with the blood drawn from one of the victims.’325 
During the same period, Nicolas Chervin proposed a similarly radical solution, 
although not by risking his own skin in the process. He suggested that the French 
government procure ‘bed linen, garments, beds, &c., just taken from the dead and 
dying of’ cholera in the Baltic region while securing ‘60 to 100 volunteers of 
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different ages and temperaments and habits’ to be clad, exposed and ‘imposed [to 
the] fomites of the contagious’ during a maritime expedition to end ‘in one of the 
least populous districts of the north-west of France.’ Conclusions could then be 
drawn regarding the true nature of cholera and the ways to avoid future outbreaks:  
if the hundred individuals thus situated escape unharmed, restrictions are nugatory 
[sic], and are prejudicial to one of the first interests of nations. If, on the other hand, 
the disease explodes amongst the experimentalists, uncertainty will be at an end, 
and the philanthropic merchant will learn to submit with resignation to the 
restrictions imposed on commerce for the safety of his fellow men.326 
 
A few years later, in 1849, John Snow claimed that cholera was spread through water 
supplies. To prove it, he initiated a methodical process of relating statistical 
epidemiological data on cholera to the London systems of water distribution and 
sewage disposal. Snow suggested that healthy people swallowed the poison of 
cholera through soiled water or hands and for this reason the disease ‘might be 
checked and kept at bay by simple measures that would not interfere with social or 
commercial intercourse (…) It would only be necessary for all persons attending or 
waiting on the patient to wash their hands carefully and frequently (…) Or, if that 
cannot be accomplished, to have the water filtered and well boiled before it is 
used.’327 In France, and elsewhere, doctors employed microscopes to look at the 
excrement of cholera patients. In 1849, Pouchet described the existence of small 
animalcules – vibrio rugula – in rice water excretions, while the London Royal 
College of Physicians published a report on cholera through which, with detailed 
microscopic observations, the College tried to find ‘cholera bodies.’328  
 
In sum, doctors around Europe used several methods and rationales to produce 
theories explaining the nature of cholera and to develop strategies that would prevent 
any future outbreak of the disease. The number of aetiological theories was such that 
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some medical journals, such as the Lancet, refused to publish any more articles on 
cholera in 1849.329 Inevitably, this continuing lack of professional agreement on the 
nature of cholera and on the research methodologies severely constrained the work of 
ISC delegates when they tried to produce a common quarantine policy for the 
Mediterranean region.  
 
Moreover, the number of avenues available to resolve this controversy was limited 
by the programme set for the ISC. Under French influence, delegates decided to 
avoid transforming the ISC into a scientific venue and ‘discussions of pure science 
and theory’ were ruled out.330 The agreed aim of the ISC was to produce solutions of 
practical application, rather than research. However, delegates were asked not to 
avoid the use of scientific deductions, observations or results – those were 
considered ‘the best guides to follow’ and their exclusion would be a ‘true heresy’, 
as the Programme Commission noted.331  
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From Ackerknecht to Paris: the problem of national agendas 
 
Despite representing two different states, Dr Ménis from Austria and the Sardinian 
Dr Bô jointly opposed the use of quarantine as a prophylactic tool to control the 
spread of cholera in Europe. These delegates were not alone: also against the use of 
quarantine were the French and English delegations as well as other individual 
delegates. As will be shown below, a variety of reasons underpinned these positions, 
among which matters of national traditions and practices played important roles. 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, European states developed different 
prophylactic strategies to control epidemic diseases. While certain countries 
privileged quarantine, others opted for hygienic strategies to improve local 
conditions that were deemed responsible for the development of epidemic 
diseases.332 In order to understand this national variation, Erwin Ackerknecht 
developed a model based on individual political ideologies.333 In his model, 
prophylactic measures reflected particular aetiological approaches and were 
associated with political and economical interests: contagionist actors defended the 
application of quarantine while anti-contagionists proposed non-quarantine measures 
to control epidemic outbreaks. While anticontagionism was ‘motivated by the new 
critical scientific of their time’,334 contagionism, he noted, was so old that is seemed 
never to have been submitted to rational examination. Contagionism and quarantine 
were, in Ackerknecht’s view, associated with old bureaucratic powers and suspect to 
all liberals who were trying to reduce state interference to a minimum.  
 
In Anticontagionism between 1821 and 1867, Ackerknecht claims that associations 
between ideology and prophylactic measures were never made at a state level but 
instead from an individual perspective. For example, rather than focusing on the 
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position of the French state, he looked at the discourse of French doctors. After a 
careful analysis of medical debates in France and England, Ackerknecht concluded 
that ‘intellectually and rationally the two theories balanced each other too evenly.’335 
Support for contagionist or anticontagionist theories – or in other words, support for 
or opposition to the application of quarantines – was the result of individual 
trajectories, economic outlooks and political loyalties: ‘these, being liberal and 
bourgeois in the majority of the physicians of the time brought about the victory of 
anticontagionism.’336 In this sense, he suggested that ‘the ascendency of 
anticontagionism coincide[d] with the rise of liberalism, [and] its decline with the 
victory of the reaction.’337  
 
This idea was re-interpreted by Peter Baldwin who claimed, in Contagion and the 
State, that Ackerknecht connected politics and prophylaxis at a level of states.338 In 
this sense, Baldwin argued, quarantine, as a traditional tool against epidemic 
diseases, was favoured by absolutist, autocratic or conservative regimes; meanwhile, 
‘liberal, democratic systems, reluctant to interfere with individual freedom, [which] 
sought less intrusive strategies (…) preferred to forego preventive interventions 
altogether.’339 This geo-political association is far from simple, as Baldwin noted. 
First and foremost, it is difficult to produce a clear-cut list of autocratic and liberal 
states: Baldwin presents Britain as a liberal country and Austria and Russia as 
continental autocracies. However, he places France somewhere in-between the two 
political spheres, and leaves the remaining European countries uncategorised, with 
the exception of Prussia. Given the political complexity of the post-1848-
Revolutionary Europe, Baldwin’s analysis is not surprising. According to Jonathan 
Sperber, there were two large models of European political organisation in the 1840s, 
and little had changed before the start of the ISC.340 The first was demonstrated by 
the constitutional monarchies of France, the Netherlands, Belgium and some 
Scandinavian and German states, which exercised political power using a 
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fundamental law that limited, to some regard, despotic measures. The second was 
epitomised by the remaining continental European states – particularly the Italian 
polities, Prussia and the Austrian Empire – which practiced a political absolutism 
where no fundamental rights were granted to subjects.341 With this constitutional 
divide in mind, we can infer that the majority of states that participated in the ISC 
were absolutist, autocratic or conservative regimes.  
 
Recognising the inability of this model to explain the quarantine practice of 
nineteenth-century Europe, Baldwin argued that national prophylactic policies also 
depended on the geographical position of a given country in relation to the epidemic 
route of transmission of a disease. In the case of cholera, which travelled from India 
to Russia and from Russia to western European states, he claimed that countries 
further away from the original epidemic centre had the opportunity to learn from past 
prophylactic experiences and adapt their own strategies when facing an epidemic 
outbreak. ‘In a more general sense, the importance of geography is revealed in the 
basic split between the Mediterranean countries, in close contact with the Orient 
founts of cholera, and the Atlantic nations at a further remove.’342 In theory, a map of 
this model would divide the prophylactic attitude of the participant countries into two 
distinct groups – a group of countries closer to the Orient who supported the practice 
of quarantine and a group of countries closer to the Atlantic who would defend 
sanitary measures. 
 
However, the national strategies developed during the first half of the nineteenth 
century to control the spread of cholera reveal too many exceptions to this model, 
such as Russia and Austria, both with vast territories, who tried to impose 
quarantines on their eastern frontiers but did not adopt such practices in the western 
parts of their territories. In the Italian Peninsula, some states supported the use of 
quarantine while others despised it. Despite these exceptions, Baldwin suggests that 
Europe was divided ‘between Mediterranean and Atlantic, north and south’ and that 
this basic geographic dichotomy highlights ‘fundamental geo-epidemiological 
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blocs.’343  Although the prophylactic histories of these blocs were marked by a 
variety of twists and tergiversations, Baldwin argues that a common prophylactic 
history can be traced. 
 
Assembling the representatives of twelve European states with the aim of creating a 
common sanitary policy for the Mediterranean region, the ISC was an arena for 
states to put forward their official prophylactic visions. For this reason, the ISC is an 
ideal ground to test Baldwin’s model and to understand how different states, through 
their delegates, articulated the necessity of protecting their domains with the range of 
available prophylactic measures. As this chapter will show, the ISC reveals a more 
complex history than the one presented by Peter Baldwin. By using the state as a unit 
of analysis, Baldwin downplays the important role of individual agency and neglects 
the fact that states simply cannot be represented without people. In the case of the 
ISC, this approach raises obvious problems: each participant state depended on their 
envoys to defend national agendas. However, long distances separated Paris from the 
envoys’ diplomatic centres; furthermore, in 1851 there were no major telegraphic 
connections between these centres, and delegates and their governments depended on 
time consuming overland or sea couriers to transmit and receive updates. As will be 
shown below, the surveillance and control of delegates became a major issue during 
the conference, and some delegates used the states’ weak surveillance and power 
technologies to impose personal agendas. In this sense, despite the fact that doctors 
and diplomats received direct orders from their national governments, these agents 
enjoyed certain levels of independence when judging and classifying cholera within 
the prophylactic framework designed at the ISC. Furthermore, under certain 
conditions, individual envoys had the capacity to challenge the terms of reference 
trusted upon them, and even used their networks of influence to shape new national 
prophylactic agendas. After all, classifying is an act of exercising power. Outside the 
direct sphere of surveillance from their states, delegates developed strategies to 
impose private agendas and align national mandates according to their interests. 
These national and individual agendas had a direct impact on the process of deciding 
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Problems of classification of diseases 
 
The ISC is an extremely interesting case study for understanding the process of 
classification of diseases. With the shared goal of creating a common and singular 
quarantine policy for the Mediterranean region, several European states, professional 
groups and individuals used the conference as a social arena to fight for the 
imposition of a classificatory system that best suited their interests. For this reason, 
the involved actors had to produce visible agreements, both at the level of creating a 
common disease classificatory system and on the rules to sort out diseases 
accordingly. The set of classes was rarely a problematic issue –almost all delegates 
agreed that diseases were to be classified either as diseases to be subjected to 
quarantine measures or as diseases not to be subjected to quarantine measures. 
However, delegates struggled, for two months, to agree upon rules of classification. 
During this process, they mobilised a battery of resources both inside and outside of 
the conference in an effort to pursue their national agendas and individual 
conviction. Ultimately, delegates battled to impose their desired conceptual 
framework. 
 
Matters of classification344 have long fascinated historians and sociologists of 
science. David Bloor, Barry Barnes and John Henry – among other members of the 
Edinburgh School – developed a framework for the analysis of the social process of 
categorisation, based on what they termed finitist conceptions of reality. Bloor 
argued that ‘all systems of knowledge (...) are constituted by the divisions that are 
drawn between kinds or sorts of things’ and he revisited the idea of Durkheim and 
Mauss that the ‘classification of things reproduces the classification of men.’345 
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Ordering and ascribing properties to things is never a natural or objective activity. 
On the contrary, classifying is a crossroad between nature, society and individuals. 
By looking at the classification work of Boyle and Newton in the practice of 
seventeenth-century physics, Bloor claims that both physicists arranged ‘the 
fundamental laws and classifications of their natural knowledge in a way that artfully 
aligned them with their social goals.’ Within their specific interests, Newton and 
Boyle could produce a myriad of classifications – they just needed to use their 
imagination. However, in a Wittgensteinian sense, creativity is not a stray 
phenomenon but instead a tamed social product. Creativity is constrained by 
circumstances which impinge upon the individual – instincts, biology, past 
experiences, social interactions, training, and anticipations of and response to 
sanctions.346 As such, the act of classification of a particular set of entities or 
instances is bounded to specific circumstances. 
 
Underpinning the theoretical work developed by the Edinburgh School is the idea of 
meaning finitism: meaning is always open-ended and is created in a step-by-step 
fashion. Meaning follows usage, cannot independently exist from it and never settles 
in definitive forms - meaning can always be contested.347 Furthermore, to understand 
the meaning of a concept, actors must learn and understand a set of connected 
concepts used in a process of classification. For example, in the process of 
classifying diseases to be quarantined and diseases not to be quarantined, actors 
may use concepts such as epidemic, endemic, and contagion, to name just a few. 
This constellation of attributes conveys the sense in which all members of the 
category resemble each other and are correctly classified together.348 Classification is 
the process of examining the instances of a given term: to learn to classify is to learn 
to employ the classifications of some community or culture.349 In other words, 
classifying a given disease as a disease to be quarantined results from previous 
experiences – if disease x was previously classified as to be quarantined, and if y 
                                                
346 See Bloor, David, Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions  (London: Routledge, 1997). p20 
347 Bloor, David, "Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 26, no. 4 
(1996). p850 
348 Barnes, Bloor, and Henry, Scientific knowledge: A sociological analysis. 
349 Barry Barnes, "On the conventional character of knowledge and cognition," Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences 11(1981). p305 
 
 127 
resembles x, it follows that y should also be a disease to be quarantined (I shall 
return to this point below).350 However, determining the level of resemblance 
between diseases is far from simple. In fact, Barnes et al. noted that asserting 
similarities is a process of outweighing inevitable differences – no two things are 
completely the same.351 For this reason, if a new disease is compared with diseases 
already classified either as to be quarantined or not to be quarantined, one will 
invariably find that the new disease will have both similarities to and differences 
from the members of any pre-established categories.  
 
Of course, the categorisation of something is not exclusively made by comparing it 
with the existing members of the category/ies that it may be classed under. In fact, 
the process often relies on complex operations of establishing relations between the 
thing to be categorised and a constellation of other concepts – concepts which are 
categories themselves. For instance, diseases to be quarantined might be those that 
(1) spread in a regular and predictable fashion and are (2) epidemic in their nature. 
Links between the categories can, in some cases, be formalised in a set of rules: for 
example, ‘all epidemic diseases are to be classified as diseases to be quarantined.’ 
However, the constellation of connected categories does not in itself completely 
determine the meaning of the first category, because each member in the 
constellation also can have indeterminate meaning.352 The meaning of ‘epidemic’ is 
subject to change as much as the set of diseases used to classify it. In parallel with 
the set of descriptive categories used to classify a given thing, the classification 
process depends on resemblance judgments between new particulars and the existing 
members of a category.  
 
From a schematic perspective, classification requires two non-separable elements: an 
infrastructure of classification – a set of categories – and the rules for sorting things 
out into those categories. In most of the cases, as Bowker and Star note, classifying is 
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an intuitive, invisible and unproblematic process. 353 Due to individual and collective 
histories of classification, both infrastructure and the act itself of sorting things is 
crystallised in everyday life. For example, for most individuals it would be 
unproblematic to sort two piles of books – the first for books with yellow covers and 
the second for books with blue covers. Classification problems emerge when new 
things to be classified are found which do not clearly fit into existing classes (for 
instance, books with both yellow and blue on their covers), or when the classification 
system is renegotiated (e.g. books should be sorted according to the fonts on their 
covers or – as we will see in the case of the ISC, the rules of disease classification 
are revised). In these situations, the act of classification can lose its invisibility and 
may even become the focus of heated dispute.  After all, as Foucault shows, the 
capacity of ordering the world is a strong source of power and an efficient way of 
protecting and exploiting resources.354 For this reason, while exercising the power of 
imposing classes of diseases, delegates faced resistance from those who did not agree 
with the rules of classification. 
 
IV 
The diplomatic turn and the classification of diseases 
 
The first classificatory struggle over cholera arose soon after Ménis and Bô 
expressed their anti-quarantine views. Through a rhetorical move that exposed the 
classificatory rules of diseases, Dr Carbonaro, the medical envoy from the Two 
Sicilies, concluded that cholera must be classed among diseases to be quarantined. 
To reach this conclusion, he first looked at plague and noted that this disease was 
quarantined because it was importable, travelled from person to person and because 
of the ‘preventive influence of isolation.’355He then noted that cholera resembled 
plague in all these aspects: it had departed from Asia and found its way down to 
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Italy, and when quarantines were established, such as in Persia in 1822 or around the 
Russian imperial palace of St Petersburg, outbreaks had been avoided.356 For these 
reasons, Carbonaro expected cholera to be classified among diseases like plague and 
yellow fever, i.e. a disease to be subjected to quarantine measures.  
 
A fervent opposition to Ménis and Bô’s proposed classification grew among the 
delegates and caused a true impasse in the development of the ISC. In order to 
resolve the conflict, C. E. David (the French diplomat and president of the 
Conference) suggested the creation of a special commission to study, coordinate and 
prepare a possible classificatory rule capable of gaining a majority of support among 
the delegates. Furthermore, in order to make the most efficient use of the ISC’s time, 
the Programme Commission357 was requested to create a detailed agenda and 
guideline for the Conference and a draft sanitary system for the Mediterranean.  
David appointed the Programme Commission at the end of the fifth general session. 
He envisioned a commission composed of a restricted group of members, who could 
work ‘with calm and maturity’ and develop a document to be openly scrutinised in 
subsequent general sessions.358  
 
Headed by Betti, the Tuscan medical delegate, the Commission contained three other 
physicians and three diplomats:359 medical delegates represented France, Sardinia 
and Greece, while diplomats represented Austria, England and Spain. According to 
the proceedings of the conference and the available diplomatic sources, the selection 
of this group was smooth and unproblematic. Although uncontested, David’s 
selection of names raises important questions of representation, power and 
orchestration of agendas.  
 
Considering the majority of doctors among the commissioners, one could argue that 
the classification of diseases was under medical jurisdiction and, consequentially, 
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that diplomats were mere advisors in the process of constructing a common sanitary 
policy for the Mediterranean. However, upon close attention, the choice of 
commissioners reveals a possible diplomatic scheme devised to secure control over 
the agenda of the conference. In fact, David’s selection guaranteed the majority of 
commissioners who supported the French classificatory agenda: the French, 
Austrian, English, Sardinian, and Spanish commissioners believed that cholera 
should be classed among non-quarantined diseases. This left the Tuscan and Greek 
doctors alone in their quest to defend cholera as a disease that should be quarantined. 
As will be shown below, this diplomatic machination in the appointment of 
commissioners paid off. France managed to secure the Commission’s presentation of 
a programme tailored to its needs. 
 
Having appointed the Commission, David secured a room at the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs where the new commissioners could meet daily, uninterrupted. A 
final report was expected within a week, but due to the complexity of the mandate, 
the final document was actually presented to the ISC two weeks after the expected 
deadline. Curiously, the report that was read to the delegates revealed an uncommon 
level of agreement among commissioners. In fact, no apparent disagreements or 
tensions between them can be found in the report presented to the Conference. 
However, the lack of controversy may have resulted from the French strategy to 
silence opposition and make the process of disease classification as invisible as 
possible. François Mêlier, the French medical delegate, now appointed as the 
Commission’s secretary and reporter, suggested that ‘proceedings of the Commission 
[should] neither be printed, copied, nor communicated in extenso to the other 
delegates’360 until the principles laid down in the French government’s programme 
had been fully discussed and conclusively modified, rejected or adopted. In other 
words, what happened in the Commission was to stay in the Commission.  
 
Although the commissioners agreed with Mêlier’s secrecy policy and no proceedings 
were ever published, many, like Anthony Perrier — the English diplomat — rushed 
to report privately on the state of affairs of such an important organ of the ISC to 
                                                




their Foreign Offices.361 Through these reports, we can get a glimpse of the processes 
by which an initial compromise was struck on the question of categorisation. In early 
September, the Commission presented a 41 page long printed report on the Questions 
of the Programme and their Solutions. According to Perrier, the report was 
‘masterly’ in its production by Mêlier, who used his writing and negotiation skills to 
bring ‘round those who at first opposed his measures’ and agendas. In fact, his 
procès verbaux were so ‘very ably drawn out’ that they could not ‘fail to carry 
conviction to many in the general conference as they have already done in the 
committee.’362 Mêlier had already confided to Perrier that he held the power to 
manipulate the composition of the proceedings. On one occasion, when the two had 
the opportunity to dine privately, Perrier confessed his discontent with the fact that 
the ISC was marching towards a situation where quarantines had to be applied 
against cholera, as this was against his mandate as the diplomatic envoy of England. 
In response, Mêlier asked for patience: ‘you will see that in my composition I will 
modify all those things.’363  
 
Mêlier indeed had the capacity and power to influence the proceedings of the ISC 
according to his own agenda and this ability eventually shaped, to some extent, the 
report presented by the Commission.  The report reminded delegates that the 
problem of the decision about which diseases required sanitary measures was not 
confined to what Mêlier described as ‘the civilized world’, but instead that ‘all 
humanity [was] interested in its solution.’364 The aim of the report was to design a 
sanitary system for the Mediterranean where public health was ‘before and above all’ 
things. Public health, it claimed, was a ‘sacred interest, sacred like life, inviolable 
like it.’365 However, the needs of humanity and civilisation were not exclusively 
public health needs. Mankind required free communications. After all, the ‘period of 
great civilization’ lived by delegates was characterised by ‘ceaseless exchanges, 
faster and multiple relations’ and for the sake of civilisation these had to be 
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protected. Governments, delegates and the Commission were required to reconcile 
public health, free communications and trade. The ISC should be ‘inspired by high 
values of public good.’366  
 
The Commission’s report asserted, in line with the previous views of delegates at the 
ISC, that the first step to producing a sanitary system was to ‘determine which 
diseases regarded as importable from a country to another, should be the object of 
sanitary measures.’367 Before addressing this problem, the Commission imposed 
certain rules to guide both its works and the general ISC. By setting these rules, the 
Commission hoped to secure the successful construction of a uniform international 
sanitary system. 
 
For this reason, politics was to be excluded from the conference. Scientific and 
theoretical discussions were to be avoided too: the ISC was practical in its nature and 
not a venue for research. In light of this decision, the use of words like contagion or 
infection was to be restricted since, according to this body, they did not contribute 
towards practical outcomes. Moreover, by attempting to restrict the role of politics 
and science, the Commission hoped to ease the process of building a flexible and 
uniform system of practices capable of being adapted to local climates and 
geographical realities. Needless to say, politics and science were, in fact, the major 
operators of the ISC. 
 
After establishing this framework, the Commission was ready to present the list of 
diseases to be quarantined. Although France had invited European states to consider 
whether diseases like plague, yellow fever and cholera belonged to the common 
category of diseases to be quarantined, the Commission noted that the inclusion of 
cholera in this list was a mere formality intended to ‘demonstrate deference and 
respect for the opinions of’ all states.368 Unequivocally, the Commission declared 
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plague and yellow fever as diseases to be quarantined while cholera – due to its 
aetiological nature and prophylactic history – should be placed among diseases not to 
be quarantined.  
 
From an aetiological perspective, the Commission recognised that cholera had an 
exotic nature external to Europe and that it was ‘susceptible of importation.’369 
Furthermore, cholera shared the spreading characteristics of other diseases that the 
Commission classed as to be quarantined. However, no available knowledge was at 
hand to help fully understand the nature of cholera and predict its spread or 
outbreaks. Equally problematic was the fact that the disease was now ‘acclimatized 
in Europe’ and its seeds could be found everywhere.370 For these reasons, quarantine, 
as a tool to break the process of cholera transmission, was hopeless: no barrier could 
be efficiently erected to protect a place already contaminated with the disease. In 
particular, a continent where cholera was already endemic would profit little from 
the practice of quarantine. As such, cholera should be classed accordingly as a 
disease not to be quarantined.  
  
Moreover, according to the Commission, the prophylactic history of cholera proved 
that quarantine increased the epidemic risk of cholera. Quarantines had a perverted 
and contradictory effect as they encouraged future outbreaks by concentrating 
passengers onboard vessels or in lazarettos where the disease could be freely spread. 
The Commission maintained that the nature of cholera required particular conditions 
to nourish, only found in certain foci of corruption and infection.371 By not 
classifying it among diseases to be quarantined, the Commission hoped that the 
future Mediterranean sanitary system would provide an incentive for states to 
eliminate these foci either by abolishing quarantine stations, or by cleaning and 
ventilating houses and vessels. 
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Interestingly enough, the justifications underpinning the proposed classificatory 
system mirrored ideas summarised by the English Board of Health in several past 
reports. This particularity may have derived from the diplomatic efforts of Anthony 
Perrier in aligning the ISC programme with that of his own country, which were 
perceived by the Commission as ‘perfectly rational.’372 In this sense, the 
Commission argued, in addition to the negative prophylactic effects of quarantines, 
classing cholera as a disease to be quarantined would inflict severe costs to 
commerce and would not promote free trade among nations – an effort that nations 
like France and England had endorsed since the early 1800s by negotiating (or 
imposing) reformed bilateral tariff arrangements that facilitated the distribution of 
their products in Europe and elsewhere. The politics of trade seemed to inform the 
scientific reasoning of the Commission. 
 
Passed by five out of seven commissioners, the report finally proposed a sanitary 
system where cholera was classified as a disease not to be quarantined. Although the 
ISC aimed to establish a standard sanitary practice in the Mediterranean region, the 
Commission granted some flexibility to local authorities in dealing with the epidemic 
risk of cholera. While they did not allow the employment of quarantines, local 
authorities were authorised to isolate specific vessels perceived as hazardous. In a 
first analysis, the empowerment of local authorities contradicts the internationalist 
aim of the ISC. However this strategy was no more than a diplomatic attempt to rule 
out quarantine in Europe completely, in a legitimate and standard way. To facilitate 
this, the Commission forbade local authorities to decree mandatory isolation to all 
vessels arriving from a specific location – this would be no more than a camouflaged 
quarantine and a perversion of the isolation power. In any case, the Report appeared, 
to all participant states and sanitary authorities, to be guided by a spirit of 
responsibility, humanity, and hospitality when dealing with embarkations feared to 
be infected with cholera. In order to protect local populations, authorities could 
isolate a vessel but never repel it: nations were asked to embrace the treatment of the 
sick through a system of lazarettos. Old quarantine stations were to be converted 
from isolation locales to open treatment outlets.  
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After establishing the aetiological bases of plague, yellow fever and cholera and 
assessing the success of quarantine in preventing these diseases, the Commission 
determined that only plague and yellow fever could be efficiently prevented with this 
sanitary measure. It was now time for the Commission to work out the details of the 
application of quarantine against these diseases. The commissioners were to decide 
whether quarantines should be enforced as soon as an individual case of plague or 
yellow fever was reported or only when the diseases reached an epidemic stage. 
Alternatively, quarantines could be permanently practiced in order to avoid any 
potential risk of contamination. The Commission also had to decide whether two 
diseases with distinct aetiological natures could be tackled with a common 
quarantine programme or the international sanitary policy for the Mediterranean 
should prescribe distinct procedures for each disease.  
 
Similarly, the process of determining the specificities of quarantine was underpinned 
by aetiological assumptions and the prophylactic history of quarantine. This time, 
commissioners were particularly interested in the epidemic risk of plague and yellow 
fever, the customary practice of quarantine and its efficiency in securing the 
epidemic safety of Europe. 
 
In the specific case of plague, the Commission based its resolutions on the 1846 
Report on Plague published by the French Academy of Medicine.373 Like the French 
Academy, the Commission argued that from an aetiological perspective, the sporadic 
and epidemic status of plague was problematic in its identification, given that the 
number of affected people was not enough to correctly distinguish the two 
realities.374 In order to do so, other characteristics had to be taken into consideration; 
however, the Commission avoided any further consideration of the matter. They 
claimed that whether it was sporadic or epidemic, plague could potentially spread 
and risk the epidemic safety of Europe, given that even ‘a sporadic outbreak in one 
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locality could perfectly become epidemic in another [place] if displaced and 
transformed.’375 Through travel, sporadic plague could hypothetically find optimal 
conditions to develop into epidemic outbreaks. In the face of such a catastrophic 
scenario, the Commission could only defend the use of quarantine and the 
mobilisation of any other possible protections. No resources were to be spared when 
protecting public health! 
 
The apparent commitment of the Commission to using quarantine as a prophylactic 
tool was no more than an illusion. After establishing an epidemic model where an 
individual case of plague could potentially jeopardise the epidemic safety of Europe, 
the Commission devised an astonishing mechanism to avoid quarantines for this 
disease. The premise was relatively simple: although in theory a single case of 
plague was enough to originate an epidemic, this case had to exist in order for the 
disease to spread. Or, to put it differently, if plague did not exist, no epidemic risk 
existed. Hence, no quarantine measures were required to protect European 
populations. This extraordinary argument again led commissioners to mobilise 
French medical literature in an effort to clarify the risk of plague in Europe. By 
looking at studies on oriental plague by Prus, Willemin, Suquet, and Fauvel – all 
reputed French physicians – the Commission noted that Egypt registered its last 
plague epidemic between 1841 and 1842. More surprisingly, based on the vast 
French medical literature, the Report concluded that the Orient was a plague-free 
region and the absence of the disease was ‘an acquired fact.’376 Logically, if plague 
did not exist in the Orient, no scientific grounds justified the existence of expensive 
quarantine and purification of cargo.377  
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Astonishingly, despite such conclusions, the majority of commissioners voted that 
‘plague, even if sporadic, [should] be the object of sanitary measures.’378 The same 
report that claimed that plague was nonexistent, and that sanitary measures against it 
were useless, proposed a system based upon quarantine. This incongruous and 
schizophrenic outcome is hard to understand, but it may have resulted from the direct 
intervention of François Mêlier, who was in charge of writing the final report. As 
seen above, Anthony Perrier, the English diplomat, had already praised the 
persuasive and writing skills of Mêlier. The contradictory ideas defended in the 
Commission’s report may have been the result of Mêlier’s power (and hope) to 
manipulate future debates in the general sessions of the ISC according to personal or 
national sanitary agendas. Mêlier may have had the power to impose his sanitary 
model in the Report, but was unable to control the vote of all the commissioners.  
 
In an effort to rationalise the use of quarantine against yellow fever, the Commission 
compared the prophylactic history of the preventive models practiced in Spain and in 
Genoa. By doing so, they hoped to create a universal model of quarantine capable of 
eliminating all unnecessary – and costly – measures. In Genoa, the Commission 
noted, quarantine was decreed for both sporadic and endemic cases of yellow fever. 
In addition, all vessels were visited by a doctor trusted to inspect and certify the 
sanitary condition of the embarkation – this was even applied to ships arriving with 
clean bills of health. If judged necessary, medical inspectors or the Genovese 
sanitary authorities had the power to declare quarantine at any point. In contrast, 
Spain practised seasonal quarantines for yellow fever. Despite the fact that Spanish 
ports were in constant communication with colonies where yellow fever was 
endemic, Spain only demanded quarantine in three situations: during summer time, 
in periods of intense heat, or when yellow fever was epidemic in the Americas. 
During the remaining time, Spain granted free pratique to vessels arriving from its 
American colonies.  
 
The Commission noted that both systems had proved to be efficient in avoiding 
yellow fever outbreaks. However, in the quest to trim all unnecessary and expensive 
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sanitary measures, thus helping the free flow of trade, people and military 
movements, they decided to adopt the Spanish model as the future sanitary standard 
for the Mediterranean region: unanimously they agreed to ‘confine sanitary 
precautions to epidemic yellow fever and reject them against sporadic yellow 
fever.’379  
 
In conclusion, based on aetiological suppositions, prophylactic histories and 
diplomatic efforts, the Commission constructed a sanitary model for the 
Mediterranean based on two classes of quarantinable diseases. Crucial for this 
enterprise was the restricted and controlled number of commissioners that were in 
charge of building such sanitary code, and their capacity to make parallels between 
the Commission’s programme and their national sanitary agendas. In fact, from a set 
of seven commissioners, only the Tuscan and Greek doctors defended a pro-
quarantine agenda, leaving the majority of the European map dotted with anti-
quarantine supporters; this defies Baldwin’s geo-epidemiological model (see Figure 
3).   
 
 
Figure 3 Distribution of quarantine votes in the Commission 
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Between states and expertise. The power of individual agency  
 
On Saturday 6 September, delegates were summoned, at 10:15, to attend the seventh 
general session. In total, twenty delegates were present at the meeting and heard 
François Mêlier reading the Commission’s report for over two hours. Delegates were 
now expected to approve the work of the Commission, produce the final version of 
the International Sanitary Code for the Mediterranean, bring the ISC to an end, and 
return home as soon as possible. However, the pace of the following sessions was 
anything but speedy. Delegates revolted against the classification of diseases 
proposed by the Commission, and, instead of approving their draft, battled for the 
imposition of a classification that satisfied their agendas. These conflicts were 
located both inside and outside the space of the conference, and culminated in some 
delegates defying national missions in order to protect personal agendas.  
 
The group of delegates who listened to the Commission’s Report included the 
recently arrived Dr Agostino Cappello380 and C. Escalon, the Papal States (or 
Roman) envoys. In a private letter to London, Anthony Perrier confided that these 
delegates appeared to ‘have special instructions from the Roman Sanita on each and 
all the articles in Dr Mêlier’s programme, and have orders not to yield on any 
point.’381 More problematically, the Roman agenda was not aligned with Perrier’s 
mission: Cappello was a ‘staunch contagionist’ and Escalon, who was considerably 
more liberal, was ‘under Cappello’s domination.’382 The pair, Perrier feared, were 
ready to mobilise and organise other delegates and to challenge the Commission’s 
classification of cholera as a disease not to be quarantined. In fact, to Perrier’s 
astonishment, the Romans were fully prepared to initiate a pro-quarantine campaign. 
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Soon after Cappello’s arrival at the conference he distributed ‘a printed notice to all 
the delegates, containing instances of cholera having been transmitted by contagion’ 
and stressing that the Roman States had been spared from cholera outbreaks thanks 
to the enforcement of strict sanitary measures.383 Although Perrier was apprehensive, 
David was not concerned with the Roman offensive. In fact, the French diplomat was 
convinced that the most powerful nations had enough resources to control the results 
of the ISC: the support of England and the ‘influence of France and Austria [was] 
sufficient to get greater points carried through’ and institute a liberal sanitary system 
in the Mediterranean.384 Little did Perrier know that the first attack on the liberal 
agenda was soon to arrive from an ally: John Sutherland, the English medical 
delegate.  
 
Without consulting his government or his fellow delegate, Sutherland launched a 
heavy attack on the rules of classification of diseases set forth by the Commission. In 
his opinion, the classification of diseases to be quarantined was not ‘in accordance 
with scientific truth.’385 The system proposed by the Commission was ‘neither more 
nor less than the practice of the greater part of Europe, (even Spain) in 1832,’386 the 
time of the first cholera outbreak, and since then, science had demonstrated that 
quarantine was useless ‘to stop the march of diseases reputed as transmissible,’ i.e. 
plague, yellow fever and cholera.387 In accordance with the latest publications of the 
English Board of Health that he had co-authored, Sutherland urged the ISC to replace 
quarantine policies in the Mediterranean with hygienic measures.388  
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Pragmatically, the English doctor recognised that the ISC was not a ‘scientific 
academy’ but a venue where ‘consideration other than scientific should be taken into 
account.’389 In fact, Sutherland agreed that the classificatory system proposed by the 
Commission ‘offered the best possible [diplomatic] arrangement’, but as a man of 
science, he could not support a system that so deeply contradicted scientific 
postulations.390 While the model proposed by the Commission made too little use of 
quarantine for the Papal States’s delegates, it was over-dependent on this 
prophylactic tool for Sutherland, and for this reason, he believed that his duty was to 
abstain from voting on any quarantine matter and challenge the orders received from 
London.  
 
What was intended as an ultra-liberal attempt to classify all diseases as diseases not 
to be quarantined resulted in an unintended attack against the anti-quarantine party. 
By not supporting the Commission’s classificatory model, Sutherland risked 
jeopardising the machinations of Perrier and Mêlier, who had skilfully worded a 
Report that to a large extent abolished the use of quarantine and protected the 
economic interests of the liberal parties. The abstention of Sutherland reduced liberal 
voting power, and weakened the capacity of England, France and Austria to control 
the outcome of the ISC. To the great surprise of the English Foreign Office and 
Anthony Perrier, Sutherland was ‘unwilling to concede any thing that would in any 
manner detract from the principles laid down by the Board of Health’ or to follow 
orders from London.391 Perrier considered Sutherland ‘too sensible a man to sacrifice 
the reality for a shadow’,392 but, torn between the Foreign Office and the Board of 
Health, Sutherland decided to abstain from voting; at stake were his scientific 
principles and convictions. 
 
Problems with loyalty were not exclusively English. As already shown in Chapter 2, 
the ISC had developed a voting system that allowed ‘delegates of some of the 
Mediterranean powers […] to vote according to their convictions without being 
                                                
389 Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol 1, 23 September 1851, p3 (Sutherland). 
390 Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol 1, 23 September 1851, p3 (Sutherland). 
391 Perrier to Palmerston (private), Paris, 25 September 1851.TNA:PRO FO/97/211. 
392 Perrier to Palmerston (private), Paris, 25 September 1851.TNA:PRO FO/97/211. 
 
 142 
exposed to the censure of their government’393 and reduced the capacity of 
governmental control. In accepting these rules, governments and the organisers of 
the conference underestimated the power of individual agency and empowered 
delegates such as Sutherland to pursue personal agendas. 
  
However, voting was not the only way in which delegates could protect their 
personal interests. In fact, delegates like the Spanish diplomat, António Segóvia, 
successfully explored parallel avenues in order to impose his classificatory rules of 
diseases upon the ISC and even upon his own government. Like other delegations, 
the Spanish envoys did not agree on a single strategy to classify diseases regarding 
its quarantine status.394 Although the Spanish doctor, Dr Monlau, eagerly defended 
the classificatory agenda received from his government, Segóvia bluntly disagreed 
with the pro-quarantine policy imposed by Spain.  
 
In an attempt to promote his personal classificatory agenda and secure the help of 
possible allies, Segóvia contacted David soon after the Report had been read. He 
informed the President of the ISC that through the Ambassador to Paris, he had 
received orders from the Spanish government ‘to withdraw from the conference, 
under protest, should quarantine measures against cholera not be adopted.’395 
Incidentally, the Spanish Ambassador also disagreed with the Spanish agenda and 
immediately requested new instructions from his government in Madrid in an 
attempt to allow Segóvia to join the anti-quarantine party. A reply from Madrid was 
expected to arrive in five or six days, the time available for Segóvia to mobilise all 
his resources to secure the elimination of quarantine in the Mediterranean region. 
 
Fearing that a possible Spanish abandonment could jeopardise the success of the 
ISC, David contacted Anthony Perrier. He hoped that together they could use their 
countries’ influence in Madrid to manipulate the Spanish government and protect the 
classificatory system proposed by the Commission. Not knowing about David’s 
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initiative, Segóvia also contacted the English diplomat and requested England to use 
its diplomatic machinery to influence his government in Madrid directly. In private, 
Segóvia exposed in detail the ‘actual position of sanitary affairs in Spain’ and 
elaborated a complex plan to change the Spanish national agenda on quarantine.396 
So audacious was his plan that Segóvia ‘consented to put his opinions in writing.’397  
After clearly exposing the relationships and missions of Spanish major sanitary 
actors, Segóvia suggested that foreign diplomats should specifically lobby the 
Minister of the Interior and two other influential members of the Spanish Board of 
Health. Although it is not possible to follow Segóvia’s diplomatic plotting in more 
detail through the available sources, it is certain that his efforts eventually paid off. 
Spain never abandoned the ISC, and her delegates started to defend an agenda 
closely aligned to Segóvia’s classificatory model. 
 
Afraid that his diplomatic efforts might not produce the desired effects, Segóvia 
devised an alternative plan based on the linguistic particularities of the Report. 
Aware of past conflicts that originated from quarantine classificatory disagreements, 
the Spanish diplomat tried to neutralise the blunt classification proposed by the 
Commission. Instead of internationally classifying cholera as a disease to not be 
quarantined, Segóvia produced a model that he hoped would satisfy all parties. The 
solution was simple: the ISC would return the classificatory decision on diseases to 
national governments. By doing so, all polities would regain the power to perform 
quarantines on vessels arriving from countries where cholera was epidemic. This 
attempt to maintain the sanitary status quo apparently challenged the ISC aspiration 
to construct a uniform sanitary practice in the Mediterranean region, which was the 
very reason the ISC was called into existence. However, Segóvia introduced an 
important caveat: quarantine could only be applied to specific vessels; it could not be 
decreed against a specific country or region.  
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The linguistic trick proposed by the Spanish diplomat did not greatly differ from the 
Commission’s report. Both proposals struggled to impose a concept of individual 
isolation or quarantine and revoke the orthodox practice of quarantines against entire 
regions and states. However, by retaining the word quarantine, Segóvia hoped to 
reassure pro-quarantine governments and local populations from the Mediterranean 
shores long ‘accustomed to consider quarantine as the only safeguard against 
infectious diseases’398 This twisted attempt at a consensual solution for the 
classificatory problem of cholera was short lived. After his idea was presented to the 
Austrian envoys, Segóvia was informed that this delegation would never consent to 
any type of quarantine measure, whatever its nature.  
 
Between successes and defeats, delegates mobilised a multitude of resources inside 
and outside of the ISC in order to protect individual agendas and to align national 
mandates with their own convictions. In this sense, the ISC reveals an interesting 
compromise between individual agency and national delegation strategies. In many 
cases, states seem rather inefficient and powerless to survey the actions of their 
appointed delegates. In the same way, national agendas, like that of the Spanish, 
appear to be like sandcastles, capable of being reengineered by the right tools. The 
fluidity of national agendas seriously compromises Baldwin’s geo-epidemiological 
model when applied to the ISC. First, it is hard to ascertain the official national voice 
in a delegation composed of two people of different backgrounds and agendas, with 
equal voting capacity. Secondly, the easy transformation of national agendas 
undermines the validity of a solid epidemiological model supported by geographical 
categories.  
 
                                                




Numbers against diplomatic dreams and individual agendas 
 
Although England feared the aggressive pro-quarantine pamphlets distributed by the 
Papal envoys, the first serious assault against the Anglo-Austrian-French agenda was 
made by another Italian delegation. On 23 September, Dr Betti from Tuscany opened 
the tenth general session, and argued that the Commission’s decision to class cholera 
as a disease not to be quarantined was based on a bad comparison between cholera 
and diseases like syphilis and smallpox. In actual fact, the Commission had never 
established a relationship between cholera, syphilis and smallpox, but Betti’s claim 
sparked and reshaped the classificatory debate. Moreover, it opened new avenues for 
pro-quarantine delegates to protect and put forward their agendas. 
 
According to Betti, the Commission’s classificatory decision was based on two 
principles: first, that cholera, like syphilis and smallpox, spread in an unpredictable 
way; secondly, that all three diseases were acclimatised to Europe or, to put it 
differently, were endemic in Europe. Thus, Betti noted that the Commission assumed 
the incapacity of quarantine to control the spread of cholera and classified the 
diseases as not to be quarantined. However, he pointed out, the Commission had 
failed to acknowledge that the spreading properties of cholera were similar to those 
of plague and yellow fever. In fact, Betti thought both diseases spread erratically, 
because when cities were newly infected, certain districts, houses and individuals 
were randomly spared. Likewise, Dr Carbonaro, the Sicilian physician, recalled that 
cholera jumped from London to Paris without contaminating intermediate locales 
because the distance between the two cities had been travelled during the incubation 
period: a ‘healthy-looking man from London could carry the morbid principle that 
develops [only] in Paris.’399 Cholera, like plague and yellow fever – all transmissible 
diseases –  ‘spread through maritime communications, caravans, armies, pilgrims, 
                                                
399 Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol 1, 23 September 1851, p9 (Carbonaro). 
 
 146 
isolated individuals and [material] things’400 and, for the sake of uniformity and 
rationality, should be classified as a disease to be quarantined. 
 
The two Italian doctors also contested the Commission’s classificatory scheme from 
an endemic perspective. Carbonaro recalled that 24 outbreaks of yellow fever ‘during 
the course of 120 years’ had not been enough to declare the disease ‘acclimatised to 
Spain’,401 but the Commission was happy to judge cholera as endemic based on two 
single outbreaks. Moreover, Betti argued that no serious argument could sustain the 
classification of cholera among diseases like syphilis and smallpox, when the former 
had been continually present in Europe for over 12 centuries and cholera for no more 
than two decades. Once again the two Italian delegates demanded the reclassification 
of cholera as a disease to be quarantined, like plague and yellow fever. 
 
Not surprisingly, the main opposition to the reclassification effort of cholera came 
from Dr Ménis, the Austrian physician and member of the Commission. Although he 
agreed with his government’s official classificatory position, Ménis did not agree 
with the reasons that underpinned the Austrian decision. According to Vienna, 
cholera was a disease not to be quarantined because of its epidemic and non-
contagious nature. However, as a physician with a vast cholera experience gained in 
Brescia between 1836 and 1849, Ménis believed that the disease spread through a 
‘sui generis principle, called contagion, miasma or infection.’402 This principle was 
‘volatile and easily escaped barriers erected to contain [the spread of the disease].’403 
This had been the case when in 1831, despite rigorous sanitary cordons, cholera 
entered Austrian Galicia through Russia and from there travelled to Hungary and 
finally to Vienna, where even a double sanitary cordon failed to protect the city. At 
the same time, the ‘capricious’ cholera never reached cities like Mantua, Cremona, 
Lodi and Milan – even when their neighbouring city of Brescia registered a cholera 
outbreak and the free communication of people and cargo was unrestricted by 
quarantine. The manner by which cholera spread, Ménis concluded, could underpin 
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both pro and anti-quarantine arguments, thus ‘post hoc, ergo propter hoc 
argumentation had no value.’404 His practice and experience with the disease led him 
to determine that quarantine measures were ineffective against cholera. If cholera 
was contagious and quarantine was useless against it, then it must share the same 
properties as diseases like smallpox, measles, and scarlet fever, and no government 
or doctor, he argued, ‘ever thought to impose quarantines against these disease 
despite there was no doubts that they were contagious.’405  
 
Regarding the attempts to make a specific link between plague and cholera based on 
their shared contagious nature, Ménis stated that such efforts were supported by bad 
scientific evidence. According to the Austrian delegate, while the two diseases 
shared a contagious nature, the specificities of each contagion were distinct and 
produced different ways of ‘marching, affecting the human fibre, and predilection for 
victims.’406 Unlike cholera, the march of plague, or to put it another way, the spread 
of plague, was fully understood and predictable. Moreover, plague had ‘a big affinity 
with the human fibre’,407 with the capacity to annihilate entire populations, while 
cholera rarely killed more than two or three per cent of a given population – even in 
the worst epidemic cases, it never affected more than five per cent. In fact, cholera 
was a selective disease that ‘exclusively attacked the scum of the society: the 
immoderate, drinkers, fornicators, decrepit, sick, alienated, imprudent, and the 
timorous.’408 For this reason, unlike with plague, the moral condition of populations 
was crucial to the development, prevention or treatment of cholera: ‘courage, 
resignation, a calm spirit and faith ‘were the adequate weapons to fight cholera, a 
disease that should remain classed as not to be quarantined.  Ménis, like other 
doctors, progressively transformed the ISC into a medical forum where aetiological 
questions were extensively debated and linked with prophylactic strategies. 
Moreover, Ménis, like many other delegates, used an accumulation of anecdotal 
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evidence to attempt and defend tentative correlations between facts, medical theories 
and the design of epidemic prophylaxis.409 
 
The discourses from delegates within both classificatory parties were, in the opinion 
of Dr Costi, the Greek delegate, ‘remarkable’.410 However, he could not find 
‘anything new, anything that had not been repeated by physicians’ in countries where 
cholera outbreaks had been registered.411 In a nutshell, certain delegates claimed that 
cholera was a contagious disease and presented countless cases where the imposition 
of quarantines avoided outbreaks, while other delegates listed numerous cities where 
cholera never appeared despite free communication of people and goods. Costi 
wondered how delegates would choose between the two classificatory positions and 
create a ‘rational, uniform and not illusionary’ international system of public 
health.412  
 
The construction of such a system required, in the opinion of the Spanish doctor, 
Monlau, a consensual agreement on the contagiousness of cholera. However, a 
definite and absolute position on the matter was unreachable: Asiatic cholera-morbus 
was not constantly, essentially and universally contagious. Moreover, ‘it was 
contagious or became contagious in circumstances that human science was not able 
to determine with certitude.’413 On the one hand, impartial observations of facts 
demonstrated that cholera was sometimes contagious, or behaved in the same way as 
contagious disease. On the other hand, the same observations demonstrated that in 
many cases the disease was not contagious. Facing this reality, an ‘impartial man 
could not, and should not, declare himself exclusively contagionist or anti-
contagionist.’414 However, neither could an impartial man deny that, in many cases, 
quarantine was sometimes effective against cholera. To abolish its use for this 
disease was not ‘sensible and in certain countries such abolition would be cruel 
because it would steal an illusion […] an illusion that reassures the spirits, an illusion 
                                                
409 I borrow the idea of ‘accumulation of anecdotic evidence’ from David S. Barnes, Lazaretto, 
epidemics, politics, and quarantine in a nineteenth-century city  (forthcoming).  
410 Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol 1, 27 September 1851, p25 (Costi). 
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very close to the reality and as consequence, an illusion that protects.’415 Besides, he 
continued, ‘in certain countries and localities, the abolition of quarantine would be 
much more than risky, much more than cruel: it would be impossible.’416 
 
Instead of simply classifying diseases as to be quarantined and not to be 
quarantined, Monlau explored the meanings of these classifications beyond the 
practice of quarantine. By classifying cholera as a disease not to be quarantined, the 
Commission was not only granting permission for sanitary authorities to isolate 
vessels but also allowing them to perform hygienic measures. According to the 
Spanish doctor, hygienic measures included cleansing, aeration and ventilation, 
dispersion of people, purification of vessels and cargo, and in certain conditions, the 
isolation of vessels. Surprisingly, this was no different from Monlau’s conception of 
sanitary and quarantine measures which likewise involved ‘cleansing, aeration, 
ventilation, dispersion of people, purification of cargo and, if judged necessary, 
isolation.’417  
 
In the face of these similarities between sanitary and hygienic practices, Monlau 
endeavoured to convince the ISC to reform the classificatory system and mark 
diseases as either diseases not to be subjected to hygienic quarantines or diseases to 
be subjected to hygienic quarantines. Quarantine would no longer be synonymous 
with its old etymological meaning, implying dreadful quarantine stations and their 
mistakes, suppositions, fiscal demands and out-dated, ridiculous and vexatious 
practices. Instead, Monlau wished to class cholera, plague, yellow fever and ‘all 
other transmittable diseases’ under a ‘rational system of precaution’ concerned with 
foci and vehicles of infection, ports and populations capable of developing diseases. 
In shaping these classificatory categories, Monlau aimed to ease consensus among 
delegates by linking the practice of quarantine with the typical hygienic measures set 
forth by the Commission. 
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The efforts to create new classificatory frameworks never gained momentum. 
Instead, through the development of debates, delegates became increasingly aware 
that the majority did not support the Commission’s classificatory solution, and were 
instead defending the classification of cholera as a disease to be quarantined. 
Delegates from Tuscany, Sardinia, the Papal States, Sicily, Spain, Portugal and 
Turkey had already requested the introduction of either mandatory or optional 
quarantines in the Mediterranean region. In an attempt to conciliate the two 
classificatory parties, the Portuguese doctor, Dr Grande proposed ‘mandatory, as 
much as possible, the most rigorous hygienic measures and to leave quarantines 
optional.’418 Grande believed that hygienic measures like ventilation, cleansing, 
dispersion of the sick, draining of marshes, cleaning of ports, cities and villages, and 
performing sanitary inspections of homes and vessels should be the pillar of any 
action aiming to mitigate ‘cholera and zymotique diseases’.419 
 
Grande also understood quarantine to be a crucial tool of international public health. 
However, he was aware that if it were made mandatory, the works of the ISC would 
not gain the support of northern and central European states, while if it were simply 
prohibited, southern nations would never consent to the decision or put it into 
practice. At first glance, this geographic division by Grande seems consistent with 
Baldwin’s geo-epidemiological model. However, according to the Portuguese doctor, 
it was the physical geography of a place that was directly connected to the success or 
failure of quarantine. He claimed that ‘Portugal, for example, has still a great number 
of islands: Azores, Cape Verde, etc., and in most of them there is only one or two 
disembarkation ports. It is therefore unnecessary to say that quarantines can be 
extremely efficient against the contagion’ of cholera.420 Alongside Portugal, there 
were other southern European countries such as Greece and Sicily, whose territories 
were also composed by islands, who regarded quarantine as essential to the 
protection of public health. Although Grande defended a model where states could 
classify cholera either as a disease to be quarantined or not to be quarantined, he 
thought it best to limit the power of states and sanitary authorities by not allowing 
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quarantines against cholera to be longer than those in cases of yellow fever. In this 
sense, the geographical argument presented by the Portuguese doctor was radically 
different from the one made by Peter Baldwin in Contagion and the State. The 
crucial factor in defining the prophylactic policy of a given country was not its 
position on the globe, but the topography of its territory.  
 
Although Dr Rosenberger was not authorised by the Russian government to vote on 
any matter related to quarantine, his mandate did not restrict him from fully engaging 
in the debates. By quickly comparing the number of causalities caused by the 1829-
32 cholera epidemic, when quarantine had been used, with the 1846-9 epidemic, 
when it had been abolished, Rosenberger concluded that the number of cholera cases 
was three times higher in the period without quarantine. Like Grande, Rosenberger 
believed that the success of quarantine was constrained by geographical factors. For 
that reason, ‘island[s], peninsulas separated from the continent through an isthmus 
[…] and al[l] maritime ports’421 should perform mandatory quarantines for the sake 
of building a uniform system of international public health. However, unlike Grande, 
Rosenberger believed it was not enough to declare that the duration of cholera 
quarantines should be shorter than those of yellow fever. He specified that the 
incubation period of the disease did not exceed five days, and so quarantines should 
not last longer than that.  
 
Facing a majority of delegates who defended the classification of cholera as a 
disease to be quarantined, David, in the capacity of president of the ISC, ordered the 
Commission to reconvene and produce a new classification of cholera in accordance 
with the classificatory ideas so far presented. One hour later, the Commission 
announced that, under specific conditions, cholera was to be classed as a disease to 
be quarantined. All departures from places where cholera had been declared were to 
be subjected to observation quarantines of up to five days if the duration of the travel 
was shorter than that period. Finally, the Commission suggested that places of 
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departure that neighboured cholera outbreaks or were used as intermediary travelling 
stops would also be subject to observation quarantines of up to three days.422 
 
In the vote on the Commission’s classificatory proposal, out of 23 present delegates, 
15 voted in favour. Surprisingly enough, as will be further explored below, several 
delegates, who had passionately defended the classification of cholera as a disease 
not to be quarantined, shifted their position and supported the creation of an 
international system of public health based on the practice of quarantine. Four 
delegates voted against and four others abstained. In the end, from north to south, 
and east to west, the majority of European states legitimised the use of quarantine in 
the Mediterranean (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4 Distribution of votes after the pro-quarantine classification of cholera by the Commission 
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Underlying the abstentions and anti-Commission votes were three main reasons: 
scientific reputation, rigidity of the model proposed by the Commission and the 
strategy to tame the practice of quarantine in the Mediterranean region. Dr 
Sutherland defied orders received from London and abstained in order to avoid 
jeopardising his scientific reputation. The Sicilian, Dr Carbonaro, found the system 
proposed by the Commission too rigid – although he agreed with the classification of 
cholera as a disease to be quarantined, he considered that the five day limit imposed 
by the Commission was not sufficient to avoid the spread of the disease. Similarly, 
this temporal limitation motivated the delegates from the Papal States and Spain to 
vote against the Commission. Like Carbonaro, the Roman doctor, Dr Capello, and 
the Spanish doctor, Dr Monlau, believed in the classification of cholera as a disease 
to be quarantined; however, the Spanish and Roman delegates found themselves 
obliged to vote against the Commission. As a physician and as the Roman 
representative, Cappello understood that quarantine limits decreed centrally could 
potentially jeopardise the actions of local sanitary authorities when local epidemic 
safety required more than five days of quarantine.423  As for Monlau, he argued that 
these limits contradicted the rigorous quarantine traditions practiced in Spain – a 
practice that his country did not wish to abandon.424 In both the Spanish and Roman 
cases, the delegates noted, the Commission could easily secure their support if the 
practice of quarantine was not framed within rigid temporal limits. However, this 
policy directly threatened the aim of the ISC – the construction of a uniform system 
of public health in the Mediterranean – and did not receive the support of other 
delegates. 
  
The articulation of the Spanish delegates’ votes against the Commission’s 
classificatory agenda unravels and encapsulates different motives and quarantine 
agendas. As shown above, the two Spanish delegates defended two distinct 
classifications of cholera. Segóvia, the diplomatic envoy, mobilised a set of resources 
to reshape the pro-quarantine mission received from Madrid, while Monlau 
persistently defended the imposition of rigorous quarantines in the Mediterranean 
region. Ultimately, both delegates voted against the classification of cholera as a 
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disease to be quarantined, but their reasoning differed. Monlau, as already 
mentioned, did not support the relaxation of quarantine practices. Segóvia, 
meanwhile, disagreed with the introduction of a system based on quarantine. 
However, because Segóvia voted with Monlau and did not reveal his motives 
publicly, he managed to avoid direct confrontation with the government of which he 
was an envoy, and successfully compromised his individual agenda with the agenda 
of his country. 
 
The third reason for abstention – presented by the Austrian delegates – was 
intricately connected with the swing in attitude of the English diplomat and the 
French delegation – the delegates that most strongly insisted on the elimination of 
the practice of quarantine in Europe. During the classification debate, Dr Ménis and 
Lavison threatened, under the orders received from Austria, to abandon the 
conference if cholera was classified as a disease to be quarantined. Nevertheless, 
despite the Commission’s decision to classify cholera as such, neither delegate left 
the Conference. Moreover, the Austrian delegates did not vote against the new 
classification of cholera. Instead, by abstaining, Ménis and Lavison legitimised the 
use of quarantine in the Mediterranean region, just as Perrier, David and Mêlier did 
by supporting the new classification of cholera. The contradiction between the 
agendas previously defended by these delegates and the final result of the 
classificatory process could be seen as a setback against the elimination of quarantine 
in Europe and the diplomatic efforts of England, France, and Austria. However, this 
contradiction is in fact no more than a powerful chimera that camouflages the victory 
of the anti-quarantine party. Certainly, these countries did not manage to discard the 
use of quarantine in the Mediterranean region. However, by limiting and regulating 
its uses, they produced a uniform and accountable public health system and removed 
the costs associated with the uncertainty of the duration of travel. If ratified by the 
participant governments, the system produced by the ISC would allow passengers, 
merchants and shipping companies to plan the duration of journeys more accurately 
by limiting the capacity of local sanitary authorities to decree random values of 
quarantine against passengers, crew, cargo and vessels. Traders, passengers and 
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vessel owners would have the option to move between ports quickly in order to 
shorten the duration of travelling and maximise investments.  
Conclusions 
The end of the classificatory debate over cholera marked the legitimisation and 
regulation of the use of quarantine in the Mediterranean region. Throughout the 
debate, doctors became increasingly important in defining the prophylactic model 
that was to be enforced in Europe against epidemic diseases. Although the use of 
science was pronounced to be limited by the ISC, doctors continued national 
aetiological debates and shared anecdotal evidence on the triumphs and defeats of 
quarantine in Europe. Nevertheless, these debates were always framed by diplomatic 
rules and goals that were, to a large extent, achieved by the dominant powers at the 
ISC. In fact, the classification of diseases according to the use of quarantine 
entangled medicine and politics in a complex scheme, where two professional groups 
each tried to monopolise the jurisdiction over the classificatory problem. Thus, the 
final result encapsulates the tensions between doctors and diplomats, politics and 
medicine, and individual and national agendas.  
 
Moreover, the detailed analysis of the negotiation of an international system of 
public health contradicts the conventional understanding that scholars have 
previously produced on quarantine and political ideologies. The geo-epidemiological 
model put forward by Peter Baldwin in Contagion and the State is far too simplistic 
to understand the nuances and political stratagems staged during the ISC. The so-
called liberal states were, to a large extent, interested in an international prophylactic 
policy against epidemic diseases based on quarantine – as long they were regulated, 
accountable and foreseeable. 
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CHAPTER 4: Between public health and state sovereignty: clashes 
of concepts and boundaries 
 
Gentlemen, is it only in the Levant that sanitary institutions are not perfect? What are we 
doing here? Why are we assembled here if not to improve the sanitary institutions in our 
countries? 
Bô, Séance 35 
Mr Vitalis does not think that the current Egyptian Board [of health] gives enough 
guarantees because foreign delegates [to the Board] only have consultative voices, unlike in 
Constantinople where they enjoy deliberative powers. 
Vitalis Séance 39 
What?! You want me – an independent state – to be subjected to a congress of doctors and 
foreign consuls? [A congress] that will declare which are the diseases against which I should 
protect my country as if my doctors did not know it? [A congress] that will talk about the 
convenience or inconvenience of quarantines as if they could protect the public health of my 
people better than me, their governor. (…) What does it matter to a Russian or a Turk if 
Cadis or Malaga are devastated by yellow fever? And will those foreigners also address my 
commercial interests and the ways to protect them? All this, my dear gentlemen, is what we 
would certainly had said a century ago however in 1851 we have not replied like this. And 
where we are here together – we foreigners – to find a solution to these important questions. 
Segóvia, Séance 43 
 
 
By mid-December, winter had fully arrived in Paris. After several months of debate 
over common aetiological and prophylactic meanings, delegates were finalising the 
practical details of the future transnational sanitary system. Some argued that the 
system of protection in Europe should make use of the sanitary engineering of the 
Orient and the erection of prophylactic walls capable of preventing the flow of 
diseases westwards. Others – like the Sardinian, Dr Bô – saw an opportunity to 
reform sanitary practices across Europe: from East to West, from North to South, 
new common policies would protect public health in a singular and united fashion. 
 
Both strategies required careful analyses of each country's epidemiological and 
prophylactic reality as well as an assessment of their levels of epidemic risk. In other 
words, each region was to be submitted to the scrutiny of delegates to decide if the 
guarantees were sufficient to grant the region a place in the exclusive club of nations 
connected through free pratique: an elite among which common sanitary practices 
and mutual trust were prerequisites to a world without quarantine. But the extent to 
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which nations would sacrifice their independence in order to belong to this world 
remained an open question. 
 
As this chapter will show, the transnationality of epidemic governance clashed with 
modern ideas of sovereign states. Despite Segóvia’s overall optimism, delegates to 
the ISC argued that the Conference was exceeding its competencies by removing the 
power of states to deal with national epidemic issues, imposing the views of 
foreigners on the structure of national sanitary institutions, and even suggesting the 
creation of international sanitary courts capable of disputing national legal decisions.  
In other words, the ISC planned to control and govern sanitary structures 
traditionally placed under the exclusive sovereignty of states. 
Sovereignty bargains 
Instead of viewing national sovereignty as a legalistic concept, the chapter follows a 
recent social constructivist wave in the field of International Relations, which 
explores sovereignty as ‘an aggregated concept that varies according to historical and 
social circumstances.’425 More than a monolithic concept, sovereignty is seen 
(according to this view) as a practice that states perform in order to assert autonomy, 
control, and legitimacy both inside and outside their borders. 
 
The performativity of sovereignty allows ample space for negotiation. States can 
engage in what Bruce Byers calls sovereignty bargains. In these bargains, ‘some 
obligations that limit state sovereignty are voluntarily accepted in order to enhance 
the effectiveness of sovereignty.’426 The negotiations involve rights, capacities, and 
responsibilities in three realms: those under a state’s jurisdiction; those under other 
states’ jurisdiction; and those in the commons. In each bargain, the three elements 
are modified in order to produce common, transboundary solutions. Yet Karen Litfin 
warns against the overuse of Byers's concept: ‘the term sovereignty bargain should 
be used with a good dose of caution because it connotes a certain degree of 
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intentionality on the part of a unitary actor that may not actually exist.’427 
Nevertheless, this is a valuable starting point in understanding the kind of trade-offs 
and concessions associated with the international negotiation of a sanitary system 
aiming to govern epidemic diseases across Europe.  
 
History and the national-international nexus 
In a 2006 article, Valeska Huber explores the tensions within ‘a world [that] was 
growing together to an unprecedented extent due to new means of transportation.’ It 
was also a world that faced new epidemic challenges due to its increased 
interconnectedness. Looking specifically at the ISCs as the first attempt to tackle the 
problem of transactional propagation of diseases through interstate cooperation, 
Huber shows that the delegates endeavoured to establish transnational standards and 
to create sanitary ‘membranes’ that could halt the progression of epidemic diseases 
while allowing the flow of vessels, trade, and passengers. One of the most salient 
projects that delegates pursued was the conversion of heterogeneous and localised 
quarantine practices into uniform and preventive hygienic ones, that boosted the 
speed of communications in the Mediterranean region. For this purpose, ‘delegates 
proposed specific administrative, technological and scientific techniques, the 
categorisation of border crossers into dangerous and non-dangerous groups and new 
concepts of borders.’428 As such, the internationalist project proposed by the ISC 
included the reform of Ottoman sanitary structures in light of European-style sanitary 
organisations and the creation of standard travelling documents that were validated 
and accepted by all participants.  
 
Although Huber looks at several issues that directly affected the autonomy, control, 
and legitimacy of participating states, this chapter explicitly shows that the 
Conference emerged as a relevant social locale where, under the lens of public 
health, state sovereignty was negotiated. By furthering Huber's analysis, this chapter 
will demonstrate that states negotiated their sovereignty and partook in specific 
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bargains in order to advance internationalist interests such as the promotion of public 
health and trade in the Mediterranean region, while protecting specific national 
goals. Ultimately, the design and enforcement of surveillance apparatus required 
governments to standardise their practices and bureaucratic structures in order to 
simplify proceedings, eliminate epidemic risks and raise overall confidence in the 
international system’s capacity. At the same, the legitimate opportunity to redesign 
models of epidemic governance raised fears about the possibility of states loosing 
control over their domestic affairs. As the chapter suggests, under the flag of 
constructing a safer epidemic word, the ISC was used to enhance the political control 
of certain countries’ sanitary machineries 
 
This chapter will highlight the success and nuances of parallel interventionist 
agendas by focusing on the advantages that states expected to extract by bargaining 
away their sovereignty. Because states faced different national problems, they valued 
the advantages of the debated policies differently. For some, it was more important 
to profit from the outcomes of these policies than to secure the control and autonomy 
of their resources. Leaving aside the cost/benefit formula of these policies, delegates 
tended to find it easier to organise their neighbours’ sanitary organisations than allow 
the ISC to have a say in the way their governments should protect the population’s 
health. Throughout this chapter, the contexts and rationales surrounding the 
bargaining process will be untangled in order to demonstrate how certain states 
profited from allowing the sacrifice of certain elements of their sovereignty. 
 
As the ISC approached its end, delegates completed two documents to be submitted 
for ratification by their governments. While the Draft Sanitary Convention set major 
guidelines in matters of international sanitary governance, the Draft International 
Sanitary Regulation detailed precise rules to be executed in the Mediterranean and 
the North Sea. Together, the documents substituted local heterogeneities with 
transnational regularities in the form of international law.429 The deal was tempting: 
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the ISC promised to protect public health and further commercial and maritime 
relations for the price of some international control over national policies and 
resources. The measures that the participating countries were asked to accept had the 
potential to improve health conditions and make sanitary systems uniform, while 
relieving navigators from unnecessary impositions.430 This could easily be perceived 
as a win-win situation, but as this chapter will show, a complex web of interests 
underpinned the negotiations of a novel international system of public health.  
 
Divided into two sections, the chapter first looks at mechanisms developed to 
standardise public health institutions in Europe in order to support the claim that the 
interventionist ISC agenda was received with apprehension by delegates. Although 
most envoys agreed that changes to the organisational structure and competencies of 
sanitary institutions were needed, they also appreciated the need to protect their 
countries’ autonomy, control and legitimacy over public health affairs.  
 
The second section focuses on negotiations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire 
to secure free pratique for all Oriental departures. Through a process of controlling 
sanitary policies and even institutions, European powers managed to secure a strong 
presence in the Ottoman Empire using the excuse of epidemic safety. Together, both 
sections show a double interventionist standard. However, by putting the difference 
in context, it highlights the advantages that nations gained from allowing the ISC to 
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A continental quest for autonomous and legitimate national legal systems 
 
After a long weekend’s break, delegates congregated once again in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. On the agenda for that day, Tuesday, 9 December 1851, was the 
organisation of sanitary authorities. France had invited governments to make sanitary 
organisations as uniform as possible. While Paris wished to take ‘laws and practices 
of each country’ into consideration, the French requested that delegates consider the 
feasibility of instituting a new sanitary organisation, composed of agents (to be 
appointed by central governments) and local personalities. The aim was to conciliate 
the necessity of imposing a central authority that was able to offer sanitary and 
administrative guarantees, while allowing a certain degree of flexibility in order to 
satisfy local requirements.431 In addition, France wished to open sanitary councils to 
foreign consuls as an attempt to break discriminatory practices against foreign 
vessels and allow free information flow between all interested parties. Under the 
form of ‘international law’, consuls would be summoned every time decisions that 
concerned their nations were to be made locally.432 These proposals were strikingly 
similar to the organisation of the French sanitary system, which France attempted to 
impose as a template to be applied elsewhere in Europe.433 
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Soon after the start of the Conference in July, the Programme Commission accepted 
and reinforced the French proposal by judging the uniformisation project to be an 
‘excellent idea.’ The Commission argued that ‘the presence of consuls in [sanitary] 
councils could not be more advantageous’ and invited delegates to consider the right 
number of consuls for local councils and to grant foreign members deliberative 
powers.434 The goal was to create efficient and responsible sanitary organisations. 
 
In mid-October, a new commission was appointed. Headed by François Mêlier, the 
Commission on the Organisation of Sanitary Magistracies or Authorities included 
diplomats from England, Russia, Tuscany, Spain and two doctors from Portugal and 
Sardinia. One month later, the final report was read to the ISC and in its eleven pages 
the commissioners presented further details of a new model for governing sanitary 
authorities in Europe. 
 
The problem, simply put: Mediterranean sanitary authorities were heterogeneously 
designed and their structure varied not only internationally but also within national 
territories. Often, these institutions – like the Marseille Intendancy – enjoyed 
considerable autonomy and were not accountable to central governments.435 Alone, 
they designed and imposed policies, performed sanitary inspections, and enforced 
sanctions on offending captains, crews, merchants, and passengers. The 
concentration of power within regional authorities undermined the efforts to create 
coherent national sanitary programmes by favouring local interests. Moreover, the 
dispersion of power across local authorities contradicted modern ideas of central 
governments as power and policy brokers.436  
 
Facing these problems, the ISC Programme Commission – in line with initial French 
recommendations – suggested rearranging sanitary authorities by placing them under 
the direct control of the central government. While the directors of new local sanitary 
authorities would be directly appointed by the government, the Programme 
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Commission would allow local concerns about sanitary matters to be heard by 
instituting consultative local boards of health. Combined, the two measures aimed to 
resolve the dichotomy between centralisation of sanitary governance and local 
sanitary interests.437 
 
According to the Commission, important commercial ports were expected to 
establish a sanitary station headed by a Director of Health. This governmental agent 
– ‘active leader of the service’ – was required to direct subordinate staff; execute 
sanitary laws and regulations; assess the sanitary status of arriving vessels; deliver 
bills of health to departing ships; and survey the sanitary conditions of the port and 
region under his jurisdiction. Given these requirements, the Commission judged 
doctors to be the most suitable professionals to head sanitary stations. Moreover, to 
secure accountability and loyalty while curbing potential corruption, the 
Commissioners supported the compensation of Directors of Health with a fixed 
salary paid by central governments.438 
 
The Commission also set guidelines for uniformising the structure of local councils. 
According to these guidelines, the councils were to be composed of civil and military 
leaders, notable local citizens, members of local administration, merchants, doctors 
or chemists, and, of course, the Director of Health. The commissioners 
recommended the inclusion of a good number of men of science in order to secure 
the implementation of hygienic measures.439  
 
Although local in their nature, the Commission believed that local councils would 
profit from opening themselves up to local diplomatic communities. By inviting local 
consuls to elect a delegate to the councils, they hoped to improve international trust 
in local measures. As witnesses, consuls could offer valuable accounts of sanitary 
conditions abroad while sharing local sanitary conditions and policies. The double 
flux of knowledge circulation, it was expected, would improve sanitary surveillance 
and raise confidence in the system. However, in order to avoid international 
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interference in local interests, consul-delegates were deprived of any deliberative 
power. Instead, they were exclusively invited to observe council meetings and offer 
their advice when requested. In addition, in cases where local authorities were 
considering the imposition of quarantine against a given country, the diplomatic 
representative of that country would also be invited to attend the council. By 
increasing dialogue between local and international authorities, the Commission 
aimed to minimise mistakes resulting from long-distance communication problems.  
 
The ideology of centralisation proposed by the Commission was in line with the 
political system that post-Revolutionary France had built and often tried to impose 
elsewhere through warfare, diplomacy, or other economic and cultural initiatives.440 
Since 1792, French central administration had undergone a revolution: staff numbers 
expanded, and a rigid bureaucratic structure took shape.441 The professionalisation of 
state affairs in France was made possible through the reorganisation of the territory, 
cities, taxation structure and collection, new model of justice enforcement, and new 
transportation network that established Paris as the political and economical centre of 
France. From an organisational perspective, the centralisation impulse resulted in the 
introduction of a new administrative model based on three institutional levels: the 
local municipal entities, the regional départements, and the national central 
ministries based in Paris. In this system, a strict chain of command was established: 
administrative chiefs of the départements were directly appointed by the emperor 
and responsible for the implementation of orders from Paris.442 Paris, as the 
bureaucratic head of France was transformed into the ‘capital of modernity’ through 
the expansion of state functions and the development of a rational bureaucracy. 
However, the centralisation of Paris was a result of international aspirations. During 
the nineteenth century, the French attempted to construct Paris and France as the 
centre of the civilised world.443 
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The sanitary governance model introduced by France directly influenced the 
administrative restructuring proposed by the ISC. In this sense, it is important to 
understand the historical evolution of these authorities and the increasing 
centralisation of sanitary affairs in order to grasp the Commission’s proposals. By 
the turn of the nineteenth century, the jurisdiction over health-related issues was 
dispersed and shared between several ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Commerce and the Ministry of the Interior. According to Matthew Ramsey, 
Napoleon was ‘well aware of the potential benefits of public health measures [… 
but] made only a limited contribution to developing the administrative apparatus to 
implement them.’444 
 
Interestingly enough, the major institutional innovation of the Napoleonic years was 
not the creation of central government sanitary authorities but the establishment of 
the local Health Council of the Département of the Saine by the Paris prefect of 
police in 1802. Certainly, municipal health boards were not unheard of in France. On 
the contrary, these sanitary institutions survived the Revolution in major port cities. 
The innovation introduced by the Parisian prefect of police – and later used by the 
ISC as a model – was the permanent character of the council and the employment of 
salaried staff recruited from among leading public health professionals. However, 
unlike the reform proposed by the ISC, the Health Council remained an advisory 
body without powers to establish local or national sanitary policies. In contrast, the 
Council was responsible for analysing typical nineteenth-century sanitary issues 
associated with increasing urbanisation, circulation of people, and the insalubrity of 
modern cities. Moreover, as early as 1815 the Parisian Council aspired to break with 
its localist nature and coordinate a nationwide system of health councils; however, 
these plans never materialised.445 
 
Post-Revolutionary France continued the centralisation efforts sketched out by the 
Parisian Council. In 1820, the Restoration established the Royal Academy of 
Medicine as a central public health institution to respond to all governmental public 
health inquiries. The consultative capacity of the Academy was reconsidered after 
                                                
444 Ramsey, "Public Health in France." p54 
445 La Berge, Mission and method: the early nineteenth-century French public health movement. p144 
 
 166 
the 1821 yellow fever outbreak in Spain and the later creation of a special 
Commission to oversee the national practices of quarantines, sanitary cordons, and 
sanitary stations. The success in avoiding yellow fever in France paved the way for 
new legislation and a new permanent national institution. In 1822 the French 
Government created the High Council of Health under the direct responsibility of the 
Ministry of the Interior, no longer ruled by a professional organisation.446 The High 
Council was trusted to implement a new sanitary code and oversee a provincial 
network of sanitary commissions. Despite several administrative problems, the 1822 
legislation ‘did reorganise and effectively nationalise the system of sanitary 
protection of the frontiers.’447 The legislation even managed to restrict the traditional 
autonomy of the Marseille Intendancy of Health and place it under the direct control 
of the Minister of the Interior – just as the ISC now wished to place sanitary 
institutions under the control of central governments. 
 
Conflict between national and local sanitary governance emerged in 1850 with 
cholera outbreaks in Malta. Fearing possible contagion in France, the Marseille 
intendants imposed a five-day quarantine on all vessels arriving from the 
Mediterranean island. Disagreeing with this measure, on 20 July the central 
government dispatched a telegram ordering the immediate suspension of quarantine 
and the reestablishment of free pratique to vessels arriving without on-board sick or 
dead. Defiant, the Intendancy maintained its quarantine policy. Paris issued new 
orders, and Marseille continued to ignore them. After three days of correspondence, 
the central government had had enough. Paris issued a decree that exonerated the 
Intendancy and appointed François Mêlier as its Extraordinary Commissioner to 
Marseille.448  
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As a senior state agent, Mêlier epitomised the centralisation shift that marked France 
during the first half of the nineteenth-century. Thus, it is not surprising that as the 
author of the ISC programme, a member of the later Programme Commission, and 
head of the Commission on the Organisation of Sanitary Magistracies or Authorities, 
Mêlier imposed a centralisation ideology on the ISC project. In the particular case of 
sanitary authorities, central states were expected to attain control over its operation 
through the appointment of health directors. In the same move, the over-influence of 
local interests was to be curbed through the creation of new boards of health with 
exclusive consultative capacities.  
 
When delegates met to debate these measures, Ebeling, the Russian envoy, 
announced that he was forced to abstain from voting on any measure that obliged his 
Empire to reorganise sanitary institutions. Ebeling’s declaration caused some 
surprise. After all, the Russian diplomat had been an active member of the 
Commission where he had shown personal support for the reformist agenda. 
However, as described in the previous chapter, delegates often struggled to choose 
between national and individual agendas. More importantly, the fact that the model 
under discussion resulted from an international institution immersed states in a 
conflict between international efforts of standardisation and the protection of national 
sovereignty. 
 
Russia was not the only state to be apprehensive about the Commission’s 
interventionist agenda. Austria refused to support measures that contradicted its own 
sanitary policies, while the Two Sicilies and Portugal had reservations about an 
international engendering of national sanitary affairs.449 Although the Austrian, Dr 
Ménis, appraised the standardisation measures developed by the ISC, he strongly 
disagreed with a common organisational model. In his view, the Conference should 
limit itself to issuing guidelines that states could then use if they wished to reform 
their unique sanitary systems. Forcing mandatory organisational changes, Ménis 
reckoned, directly intervened in private state affairs. Moreover, ‘each government 
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ha[d] its administrative principles, its particular rules to manage state administration’ 
that resulted from populational, geographical and climatic peculiarities.450 If an 
international reorganisation of sanitary authorities did not account for local realities, 
it was destined to failure. No state would adopt or execute it. For Ménis, it was 
pointless to work out details of a common model of sanitary organisation since the 
nations were destined to maintain their heterogeneous practices of administration.  
 
While Austria had reformed its sanitary system recently, this did not seem to impact 
its resistance position as much as the necessity of allowing administrative practices 
to serve local needs and the fear over international interventionism that jeopardised 
national autonomy. The reforms introduced in Austria, between August 1841 and 
September 1847, created a system in many ways similar to that now proposed by 
France: sanitary affairs were placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Trade, 
which, through its Central Maritime Sanitary Council, regulated health affairs and 
quarantine practices.451 The Central Council also coordinated a network of 
subordinate offices, each composed by one state agent and a controller.452 The major 
difference between the two organisations was the role of foreign consuls: if France 
wished to open local health councils to foreigners, Austria was determined to avoid 
their presence. 
 
Facing opposition, Dr Mêlier tried to highlight the similarities between the Austrian 
system of organisation and the one now under discussion. In addition, he stressed 
that the Conference’s strategy for uniformisation was designed in a way that allowed 
states to preserve their autonomy over sanitary organisation.453 In parallel, English 
and Spanish delegates openly voiced their pro-reformist and interventionist position. 
Together, they repudiated Austro-Russian attempts to preserve the status quo in a 
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venue justly organised to promote change. As Segóvia concluded, ‘if each [country] 
was to stay in the same way, it was useless to discuss [any uniformisation 
agenda].’454 Spain stated that any reformist action would require a gradual 
implementation, but change was still needed if uniformisation was to be achieved. 
  
At first glance, the English pro-centralisation position may appear rather 
contradictory, given that traditional localist sanitary initiatives were developed 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. By the 1850s, Whitehall had 
developed policies and infrastructures to supervise and impose national sanitary 
standards within the framework of local autonomy. Thus, centralisation was, with 
some exceptions, more of a political consequence rather than a political objective in 
itself. In the particular case of public health governance, the 1848 Public Health Act 
was a clear attempt to impose a public health central supervision body.455  
 
The act created a sanitary structure that included a set of new local authorities and a 
Central Board of Health under the direction of Edwin Chadwick.  The local boards of 
health were mandated to administer public health in the regions under their 
jurisdiction, and the Central Board of Health was created to regulate them and 
supervise the application of the above-mentioned 1848 Act. Although Chadwick was 
a strong believer in the power of centralisation, the Board was not able to establish 
full control over local authorities. As Robert Gutchen synthesised, ‘Chadwick was 
the centraliser, but the system under the Public Health Act was not one of 
centralisation.’456 
 
As a major collaborator with Chadwick, John Sutherland, the English medical envoy 
to the Conference, had close affinities with his mentor. After all, Sutherland had 
worked closely with Chadwick and both his professional and personal considerations 
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played a crucial role in securing his appointment as English medical delegate.457 
Even if some divergences of opinion may have existed between the two men (in 
particular, the role of doctors and medicine in the improvement of sanitary 
conditions), John Sutherland supported the development of central government 
institutions that could efficiently regulate and inspect local public health initiatives. 
Likewise, Anthony Perrier, the English diplomat, regarded the system proposed by 
the ISC as a positive strategy, accommodating the promotion of central control while 
allowing local interests to be taken into consideration. However, as he eventually 
revealed, his country strategy was marked by a double standard: England only 
intended to reform the organisation of the sanitary institutions of its Mediterranean 
territories. Mainland affairs, it appears, were to remain the exclusive responsibility of 
the national government. No international organisation should aspire to intervene in 
the autonomy, control, and legitimacy of the English state.458 The capacity to 
demarcate territorial boundaries as subject to uneven doses of international 
intervention was not available to all countries. For instance, in contrast with England, 
the geopolitical reality of Austria resulted in the likelihood of the subjugation of 
national health authorities to international decisions. The sacrifice of autonomy 
would be felt in its most tangible territory, not in some rather distant possession that 
already enjoyed a certain level of political autonomy.459 
Foreign consuls 
As mentioned above, the reform of local councils (in which their deliberative powers 
were removed) included the appointment of consuls in charge of representing local 
diplomatic community. From the organisers’ perspective, this measure allowed local 
and international interest to be easily taken into account by opening new 
communication channels. The consul-delegate would be able to offer official 
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documentation that proved the sanitary status of departure ports while directly 
observing and reporting on local initiatives in order to curb epidemic risk. In a 
nutshell, the presence of an international observer would raise trust levels and 
potentially shorten – perhaps even avoid – costly quarantines both locally and 
abroad.  
 
In many ways this measure was not new. France and Sardinia already practiced such 
a system, and both Perrier and David sat in local sanitary councils as consul-
delegates. Even in countries where councils where not open to foreigners, consuls 
were heavily involved in their work. As the Turkish diplomat summarised, consuls 
certified bills of health, facilitated the process of cargo quarantine, and witnessed the 
opening of letters and official correspondence: they were a constant presence.460 The 
novelty of this proposal was its formal character. If accepted, a foreigner would 
legitimately have the right to a permanent presence on the council without depending 
on the good will of its members. 
 
As with the international engineering of sanitary structures, the point of conflict 
resulted from the attempt to formalise a strategy that could directly degrade national 
autonomy and control over territories and issues of sanitary governance. Seven major 
points underpinned the reason of disagreement against this measure.  First, as Ménis 
noted, the inclusion of consuls in an official national body – even if local in its nature 
– was illegal in countries like Austria where ‘the exercise of public functions [was] 
interdicted to foreigners.’461 Secondly, he continued, the presence of foreign citizens 
on these boards would have serious local consequences: introducing foreign elements 
into institutions that, first and foremost, had been designed to protect local interests 
would compromise the trust placed in them by local populations. How could they be 
sure that their interests were properly protected when foreigners often had conflicting 
agendas imposed by the states and merchants they represented?462 Thirdly, because 
local consular communities were to elect a delegate, the measure did not allow 
‘perfect reciprocation.’ For these reasons, a state with powerful diplomatic apparatus 
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could, in theory, secure the election of its consuls all over the Mediterranean while 
those less powerful might fail to secure any seats at all. According to the Sardinian, 
Magetto, this would work against the national dignity of represented states, as it 
potentially reified their inequality.463 Fourthly, Vitallis voiced his concerns that there 
could be a breach of national security if foreigners were allowed to freely survey the 
works of important governmental bodies.464 Fifthly, the Portuguese diplomat pointed 
out that smaller countries, like his own, risked the undermining of their sanitary 
policy by foreigners if they were to have the same power as national authorities.465 
Sixthly, the Roman diplomat contended that many of the affairs under discussion in 
these authorities should not be disclosed to foreigners due to their confidentiality.466 
Finally, as the Sicilian, Carbonaro, put it, political reforms should result from a 
recognisable need for change that was not present in this initiative: resident consuls 
were already called every time that local councils needed them. To reserve a 
mandatory seat for a consul-delegate did not offer sanitary or organisational 
advantages but imposed extra layers of problems.467 
 
The concerns voiced by the opposition were dismissed by Mêlier and Segóvia as out 
of tune with reality. Segóvia reminded his fellow delegates that the ISC had already 
redefined the structure of sanitary authorities. The new model removed the executive 
and deliberative powers of local councils in order to give them a new role as advisors 
to a state-appointed director of health. Thus, these bodies’ lack of power immediately 
restricted the capacity of foreign councils to influence national sanitary policies.468 
Furthermore, in a more idealistic manner, Mêlier argued that foreign consuls would 
not jeopardise national security or interest since they acted on good will: health, a 
matter that concerned everyone, was not susceptible to national interest.469 
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To bypass the controversy, delegates used mechanisms often deployed during the 
Conference.470 While some envoys requested the proposal to be withdrawn, others, 
led by the Portuguese, Mouzinho da Silveira, defended the optionality of the 
measure. Both positions privileged the existing status quo by resisting change. 
Eventually, delegates decided to grant states the ultimate decisive power by agreeing 
to a voluntary application of the measure.  If desired, just as before the Conference, 
states could allow the presence of consuls in local councils. Equally interesting is the 
fact that, like all measures decided by the ISC, the consul-delegate question was 
properly framed in the Draft Sanitary Regulation under article eight.471 However, 
unlike standard Conference proceedings, the introduction of consul-delegates – a 
measure eventually unanimously approved – was never properly regulated in the 
Draft Sanitary Regulation. The fact that this document exhaustively detailed the 
composition and competencies of sanitary authorities – as it detailed all other matters 
decided by the ISC – makes the omission rather evident.472 It is clear that as it 
figured in the Draft Convention, the measure was not withdrawn at all. However, this 
option (to apply the measure voluntarily) openly reduced the prominence of foreign 
consuls as members of local boards of health. Perhaps the choice was made after 
delegates were made aware of growing concerns from the governments they 
represented. Or, alternatively, the attempt to downplay the international opening of 
sanitary institutions may have reflected the fact that there was no concrete change, 
apart, of course, from the formalisation act that allowed foreign consuls to be 
members of local boards of health. In any case, as previous examples demonstrated, 
conference documents were carefully crafted to avoid an escalation of conflict that 
could compromise the ISC’s future and were produced with the intent of opening 
new policy avenues.473 Keeping this in mind, abandoning (to a certain extent) the 
idea of introducing foreign consuls may have been more profitable than trying to 
impose it. 
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The international tribunal 
The progressive escalation of conflict between delegates reached its peak when a 
debate started on the creation of arbitral tribunals composed of foreign consuls with 
jurisdiction over all sanitary disputes. If implemented, this measure would undermine 
the autonomy and legitimacy of national legal systems while jeopardising state 
control over internal judicial affairs. In this sense, the system would produce a 
paralegal institution, outside of national governmental jurisdiction, and with capacity 
of rule over crimes practised in national territory.  
 
In the programme circulated prior to the beginning of the ISC, France succinctly 
requested delegates to consider the creation of an 'Arbitration Tribunal [Tribunal 
Arbitral] in charge of hearing and ruling [sanitary infractions].’474 Unlike with 
previous proposals, the Programme Commission found it necessary to compose a 
three-man sub-commission to assess immediately the viability of the measure. 
Together, A. Perrier, A. Segóvia, and J. Lavison questioned whether the ISC had a 
mandate to debate the creation of an institution composed by foreign consuls with 
potential power to rule in national sovereign territories. If instituted, these tribunals 
could become paralegal bodies capable of ‘decid[ing] upon governmental decisions, 
or at least, to recriminate their actions.’ It was crucial, they concluded, to ascertain 
whether the Conference was authorised to pronounce upon such paramount issues.475 
 
It was clear to the sub-commissioners that all participating states had received the 
pre-circulated programme of the Conference and that this document had been 
instrumental in the decision of sending a delegation team to the Conference. 
Therefore, members of the sub-commission presumed that all delegates were 
authorised to engage in such discussion, since they were each chosen and mandated 
by their respective governments based on information provided in the conference 
program. Moreover, ignoring debate about these matters – as some delegates 
suggested – would contradict the expectations of the organisers and participating 
governments, the sub-commissioners argued.  
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In any case, the sub-commission suggested changing the name of the proposed 
arbitration tribunal to ‘arbitration court’.476 Each major port would hold a seat on a 
court composed of consuls belonging to the high contracting parties and residing 
locally. This court, after considering evidence on sanitary misconduct, would be 
empowered to settle pecuniary compensation. Nevertheless, all parties were allowed 
to appeal to local justice if not satisfied with the verdict of the court. More 
importantly, the court would only have jurisdiction over questions of sanitary 
regulation, since infractions to the international sanitary convention stipulations 
would remain ‘the responsibility of contracting governments.’477  
 
Upon reading the sub-commission’s report, the Programme Commission also 
classified the problem of creating common arbitration institutions ‘as the most 
difficult and delicate’ question to be addressed by the ISC.478 Proportional to its 
difficulty was its importance: as a member put it, it was impossible to prevent 
sanitary infractions in their totality.479 The ISC, therefore, had to develop 
mechanisms that enhanced regulation compliance and punished offenders including 
merchants, crews, individual passengers, and even states themselves. Connecting the 
diversity of potential infractions was the international nature of the crimes. How to 
prosecute them? Where to prosecute them? If central governments were involved, 
should the matter be dealt with through diplomatic channels or in normal foreign 
tribunals? The first option was time-consuming and often inefficient; the second 
option was impractical since no foreign government would sit in a foreign tribunal to 
be judged under foreign law. In fact, as the Commission concluded, only new 
institutions could offer a solution to the problem. The creation of international 
arbitral courts aimed to institute a space where disputes between governments, 
corporations, and individuals could be settled.480 
 
                                                
476 This semantic shift will be further analysed below.  
477 Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol. 1, Rapport Particulier sur la question du tribunal ou jury 
arbitral international, Annex 1 to Rapport de la [Programme] Commission, 2 
478 Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol. 1, Rapport de la [Programme] Commission, annex to 
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The international sanitary court idea was inspired by a similar institution created in 
1815 by the Congress of Vienna. While setting principles for free navigation in the 
Rhine, the Treaty of Vienna created an international institution (the Central 
Commission for the Rhine Navigation) charged to regulate navigation, administer 
and maximise the river’s transportation capacity and to act as a court of appeal for 
cases initially brought before Riparian state navigation courts.481 According to D. 
Collinson, in the case of Rhine navigation, the correct execution of international law 
was crucial in order to guarantee free circulation of cargo and people in the river and 
improve trade and taxation profitability.482 The Central Commission for the Rhine 
Navigation offered a concrete answer to the problem. 
 
Despite being a second instance of appeal, verdicts issued by the Commission for the 
Rhine were not final if involved parties were not satisfied with the result. In these 
cases, new appeals could be launched with superior national courts.483 Likewise, 
verdicts read by the ISC sanitary courts could be subject to appeal. Nevertheless, the 
proposed sanitary courts differed significantly from the Commission for the Rhine in 
three aspects. First, sanitary courts were designed as first instance institutions to 
solve all sanitary disputes. Secondly, instead of one single court, several sanitary 
courts were to operate across Europe. Mandated to settle sanitary disputes committed 
within their jurisdiction, the courts were to be staffed by either five or seven judges 
elected from foreign consuls, and would convene in the residence of an elected 
president under diplomatic protection. Finally, the sanitary court was qualified to 
impose financial compensation for damages derived from sanitary regulation 
infringement.484 
 
As shown above, the ISC concluded that debating the definition and introduction of 
sanitary courts was a legitimate and mandated requirement. However, the 
Programme Commission struggled to anticipate whether participating states would 
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and the Central Commission for Rhine Navigation," Columbia Law Review 72, no. 3 (1972). 
483 Ibid. 
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ever accept the institution of such a measure. The Commission was fully aware that 
the proposed internationalist idea would face ‘problems and perhaps [even] 
aversion.’ But ‘if governments represented in the Conference sincerely wished to 
achieve [international sanitary protection], they should [also] wish for the means. 
They should want [to dispose of the tools that] assured the loyal and complete 
execution of the convention and regulations.’485 
 
The need to create an institution that satisfied participating countries may justify the 
struggle to name and define it. France initially suggested the creation of a singular 
Arbitral Tribunal [Tribunal Arbitral] while the sub-commission recommended the 
foundation of a set of International Arbitral Courts [Jury Arbitral International]. To 
put it simply, the semantic variation differentiated a scenario where an international 
tribunal equalled (and possibly competed with) national state tribunals in terms of 
legitimacy and power from a situation were conflict was mediated by an institution 
recognised as legitimate by the involved parties but did not compete with national 
legal systems.  
 
Delegates reacted to the interventionist agenda of an international court with either 
negativity or reluctance. Opening the debate, David, the ISC president and 
diplomatic envoy of France – the country that first introduced the idea of establishing 
an international sanitary tribunal – reminded delegates that introducing such a 
judicial body could infringe on ‘the letter and spirit of all existing treaties by which 
consuls were limited to exercise judicial authority in foreign countries.’486 In overt 
opposition, Dr Ménis of Austria demanded the immediate revocation of any attempt 
to introduce an international tribunal disguised as a court. In his view, regarding the 
prevention of law infraction, states already possessed legal codes that framed 
methods of prosecution according to national principles.487 National legal systems 
were legitimately autonomous, thus they should maintain the monopoly over 
institutions that legally solved sanitary disputes occurring within their territories. To 
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interfere with national justice matters would offend the dignity of all represented 
governments. 
 
For Magnetto, the Sardinian diplomat, the problem of introducing international 
sanitary courts was not centred on moral grounds but instead on the very impractical 
character of the measure.  The imposition of such courts would not be accepted by 
absolutist states as they feared such intervention would jeopardise their authority and 
control over all national affairs. In these cases, the simple word ‘court [jury] 
produce[d] the same horror as that of Holy Office in France and in England.’488 
Secondly, he thought that the introduction of international sanitary courts carried the 
underlying message that local authorities were incapable of providing justice to their 
citizens and only the work of foreign consuls would suffice. Finally, he doubted that 
states would ever accept an international court judging their actions and those of 
their representatives. For all these reasons, Magnetto announced that he would vote 
against the establishment of ‘a special international tribunal to judge sanitary matter 
infractions.’489 
 
In addition to the presented arguments, the Tuscan and Greek diplomats explored the 
impact of such a measure in the legal landscape of their nations. Cecconi of Tuscany 
argued it had ‘been demonstrated that an international arbitral court [was] 
incompatible with the fundamental laws of most represented states.’ Thus, he 
concluded that the discussion was simply useless. More precisely, Costi of Greece 
pinpointed the legal issues of international courts: first, according to the legislation 
of several represented states, citizens had the right for their legal disputes to be 
solved by their own national judges. Secondly, the introduction of international 
sanitary courts required the creation of new judicial procedures, each directly aligned 
with the national law of the participating country. Facing the multiplicity of legal 
traditions and landscapes, this would be a challenging mission likely to end in illegal 
measures. Thirdly, if sanitary courts were illegal, then, Costi elaborated, the majority 
of verdicts would be subjected to appeal. Finally, in an attempt to guarantee the fair 
outcome of judgments produced by sanitary courts, the Programme Commission 
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ruled that consuls of nations whose citizens or interests were under trial should not 
be part of the judging collective. The good intentions of the Commission created a 
legal loop with no solution. The international courts would likely have to judge 
situations where a vessel was registered in one country, while the captain was the 
citizen of another. The transported cargo could belong to merchants from third and 
fourth countries, while passengers potentially represented the whole spectrum of 
nations present at the ISC. The cosmopolitan nature of sanitary affairs made 
international courts illegal or impracticable: foreign consuls would not be able to 
judge matters, either because it was against national laws or because fair-judgment 
regulations would make them ineligible to judge.490  
 
The Portuguese delegates furthered the point of independency and legitimacy of 
national law facing international institutions, by noting that merchants who opened 
businesses in a foreign country were obliged to follow the law of that country. At the 
same time, ‘when governments ratified the international sanitary convention, [the 
convention would] have the force of law, [delegates could not and should not] 
suppose that each of their countries would not execute promulgated laws.’491 Thus, if 
merchants acted against ISC agreements they would first and foremost commit 
infractions of national law. Facing this, ‘the right to judge infraction of laws [was] a 
liberty that should be allowed to each government. Above all this was a guaranty of 
order and national independency.’492 Moreover, as a diplomat, Silveira did not trust 
other diplomats to judge these matters while proper regulated tribunals existed. He 
appealed to the ISC to ‘respect the liberty of powers: that justice judges, and 
diplomacy develops good international relations and produces good treaties. That 
[diplomacy] doesn’t intervene where it cannot service or it risks failing its noble 
mission.’493 
 
The support for the introduction of international sanitary courts was limited to two 
countries: Spain and England. Responding to the criticisms of delegates, Ségovia of 
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Spain began by recalling that the idea of creating such an institution came directly 
from France, which was now vacillating in providing the required support. As for the 
uselessness of the measure – which had been claimed by Cecconi and other delegates 
– Segóvia noted that ‘the current state of affairs, laws, tribunals, and existing 
penalties [did] not satisfactorily meet proposed aims.’ It had already been proven by 
the ISC, Segóvia claimed, that ‘infractions to sanitary rules resulted in countless 
complaints and endless diplomatic correspondence extremely embarrassing to 
governments. Finally, [sanitary infractions] were rarely judged to the satisfaction of 
parties. In reality, wrongly or rightly, one of the parties always felt injured.’ In order 
to provide a solution to this problem, the ISC proposed the ‘creation of a different 
kind of new tribunal, a tribunal composed of foreign consuls.’494 
 
Segóvia was certainly aware that delegates were hesitant to empower foreigners to 
‘issue an opinion or judgment on infractions committed by compatriots or state 
officials.’ He rooted the distrust in the fact that delegates ‘forgot about the special 
nature of state affairs and had an exaggerated deference to a certain legal 
disposition.’ Regarding the latter, governments had the right and resources to modify 
national laws for the sake of public interests. On the subject of the role of foreigners 
in justice provision, Segóvia traced prejudice against them back to ancient Roman 
civilisation, but noted that those times were long gone. In his view, 1800s Europe 
was a modern and civilised continent where the degree of ‘distrust and antipathy 
against foreigners was inversely [proportional] to the civilisation of the people.’ 
Foreigners were members of states united by a community of interests and uniform 
principles that produced a common justice framework: whatever was ‘unfair to a 
Frenchman, to a Spaniard, or to a Russian, would not be honest or fair to an 
Englishman, a Portuguese, or an Italian.’ Thus, Segóvia concluded it would be 
‘neither monstrous nor absurd to request the opinion of a foreigner.’ After all, 
infractions of sanitary matters violated commonly established laws and regulations 
and were an international affair of interest to all. In this sense, the foreigners that the 
ISC were trying to invest as judges were not governmental envoys that blindly 
protected national interests. On the contrary, the group of consuls that would 
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compose international sanitary courts were mandated to facilitate international 
commerce and relations between nations and peoples. These modern men ‘studied 
the laws and customs of the country’ of residence; they learned the language, 
established families, and worked towards national prosperity. They even mourned 
the victims of public calamities while helping survivors. In the eyes of Segóvia, 
foreign consuls were part of a singular class of humanity that could be reciprocally 
empowered to judge sanitary infractions.495 
 
Despite Segóvia’s passionate speech, the opposition to international courts was 
overpowering. Together, 19 delegates voted against the creation of an institution that 
visibly compromised the autonomy, control and legitimacy of national legal systems. 
In the end, only delegates from Spain and England supported the measure, and in a 
letter to the Foreign Office Perrier and Sutherland concluded that ‘the advantages of 
an Arbitral Tribunal, composed of consuls, was admitted by almost all the members, 
but the dread of foreign influence, and the desire to keep secret their motives for 
imposing quarantine measures, caused a most strenuous opposition from the 
delegates of all the petty states.’ 496 Even France, which introduced the idea of courts 
composed of foreign consuls, ended up voting against the measure. ‘Mr David –’ the 
English delegates informed ‘- joined the opponents and stated his belief that France 
would not admit of any foreigner jurisdiction within Her Territory.’497 
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Intervening in the Ottoman Empire  
 
As the interventionist agenda of the ISC resulted in attempts to engineer and control 
the legal machineries of participating states, the delegates expressed discomfort and 
fear that the ISC would dilapidate their states’ autonomy, control, and legitimacy to 
deal with crimes committed within their sovereign territories. However, although the 
idea of changes to the sanitary and penal organisation of European nations was met 
by protests, it was quite different when delegates focused their attention on Ottoman 
sanitary services.  
 
While organising the ISC, France invited participating countries to consider whether 
Oriental498 arrivals should be granted free pratique in European ports. The French 
government recognised that ‘Egypt and Turkey now had sanitary institutions that 
allowed nations to relax [quarantine practices].’ Although it was only a few years 
since the abolition of quarantines was thought ‘impossible or reckless,’ France 
believed that the recently introduced sanitary policy in the Orient allowed European 
powers to reduce quarantines against the Ottomans. After all, France was already 
granting free pratique to Oriental arrivals providing they had sailed for more than 
eight days, carried a clean bill of health and kept a permanent on-board physician. 
The French wanted to know whether the anti-quarantine policy could be immediately 
expanded throughout Europe in a uniform way, or which conditions – ‘guarantees’, 
as it was framed - European countries would demand in order for free pratique to be 
granted in the future. 499  
 
The French relaxation of quarantines resulted from two major changes. First, in 
1838, the Ottoman Empire started to create sanitary institutions within its territory. 
                                                
498 As Said demonstrated, the concept of the Orient has been particularly prevalent throughout history. 
Its boundaries were constantly negotiated as its meanings diverged in space and time. See Edward 
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Orient mostly as synonymous with the Ottoman Empire, in particular when referring to Turkey and 
Egypt. The term Levant was used in the same fashion.  
499 Baroche to Paiva, 16 April 1851, AHD: Leg./Emb. Paris, Maço 6.  
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Secondly, in 1847, France instituted a network of physicians trusted to survey the 
health conditions in the Orient. In other words, France relied on both Ottoman 
institutions and its own resources placed in the Orient. Together, these measures 
increased French trust in the epidemic safety of the Levant and consequently led to a 
more permissive system of quarantine. 
 
Ottoman institutions with European flavour 
Since the 1830s, European powers had managed to influence Ottoman sanitary 
affairs. By securing either consultative or deliberative powers, European consuls 
were able to conduct surveillance through their direct access to the workings of 
Ottoman boards of health. This was already a step forward from the failed motion of 
introduction of consul-delegates to European local boards of health discussed above. 
Before the ISC opened, European powers had already secured agents with 
intervention capacity within the Ottoman Empire’s governmental apparatus.  
 
With the institution of the Constantinople Superior Board of Health [Conseil 
Supérieur de Santé de Constantinople] in 1838, Turkey created a system of 
quarantine mechanisms and epidemic surveillance. As the central sanitary 
coordination institution, the Constantinople Board aimed to survey public health 
conditions, prevent plague outbreaks, and, in cases where the disease had already 
been introduced to the Empire, to develop measures to prevent its propagation and 
eventually eradicate it.500 Under the symbolic presidency of a Minister of the 
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Sublime Porte,501 the Board was divided equally between government agents and 
delegates from Austria, Belgium, France, England, Greece, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia 
and Tuscany. Like the Ottoman members, these foreign delegates had a deliberative 
voice and shared all other rights that the others enjoyed.502 Surprisingly enough, by 
1851 the Board still had no legal existence as no law had ever proclaimed its creation 
or framed its actions. Nevertheless, the Board controlled 63 local boards of health 
(offices de santé) that ‘surveyed public health conditions […] executed or made 
executable sanitary regulations, and [enforced] any other decision communicated [by 
the Constantinople Board].’503 Despite the lack of legal framework, the Board issued 
a set of regulations that the ISC Commission on the Organisation of the Sanitary 
Service in the Levant thought to be ‘shaped upon the best European models and 
adapted to the particularities of the country.’504  
 
In context, the sanitary innovations instituted in the Ottoman Empire were not an 
isolated policy. In fact, they resulted from a complex number of policies instituted 
since 1826 by the Sultan Muhamad II, which progressively built a modern 
centralised state within the Ottoman territory.505 The need for reform derived from an 
inherent military and economic weakness that was evident to all and had resulted in 
numerous military fiascos, unreliable infrastructures and a lack of an internationally 
                                                                                                                                     
Turkey by Pekarsky, addressed in 1848 to the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Empire; 
Twelve reports regarding the condition and sanitary service of Turkey and specially Syria and Egypt 
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by R Fauvel - address in July 1851 to the Minister of Commerce and Agriculture; Two memoranda by 
Pezzoni, delegate of the Russian government to the Constantinople Board of Health addressed to Dr 
Rosenberger in July 1851; Note on the Egyptian Sanitary Service sent to Cerrati, Sardinian general 
consul by Henricy, adjunct to the president of the Alexandria Intendancy in 6 October 1851; Lists of 
consuls residing in the Orient.  
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502 The presence of foreigners as full board members is further discussed below. 
503 Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol. 2, Rapport sur l’organisation du service sanitaire dans 
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competitive industry.506 The political reform gathered momentum, with new 
legislation issued in 1839 (the Tanzimat reforms) that transferred the power once 
monopolised by the Sultan into the hands of bureaucrats and, among other things, 
reorganised the financial system, abolished slavery, and instituted a legal code for 
commerce and trade. The new ruling elite, with close European contacts, saw the 
establishment of Western institutions as the only viable strategy for avoiding the 
decline of the Empire.507  
 
Although an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt had grown progressively 
autonomous from Constantinople during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Under the ruling of Muhammad Ali, styled Viceroy of Egypt, the country went 
through radical reforms.  Muhammad Ali refashioned the armed forces, reorganised 
the administration and installed a centralised bureaucracy, changed the patterns of 
landholding and agricultural production, introduced heavy industry, and conquered 
an empire that by the 1830s included northern Sudan, the western coast of Arabia, all 
of Greater Syria, and parts of southwestern Anatolia.508 By doing so, he secured 
autonomy from the Ottoman Empire while establishing close commercial and 
diplomatic contacts with European powers.  
 
From a sanitary perspective, in 1831 the Egyptian government allowed the creation 
of a Board of Health in Alexandria. The Board was exclusively composed of foreign 
consuls who, on the eve of its constitution, declared that ‘quarantine service [and all 
future sanitary establishments] should be controlled, directed and manned by 
Europeans, since this was the only way to achieve the success desired.’509 The 
European-dominated board soon became a venue of intrigue where personal and 
national agendas were protected. More problematically, the Board instituted a 
discriminatory policy that often granted free pratique to European vessels while 
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control in Egypt, 1825-1850" (Dissertation (PhD), The University of Chicago, 1971). p159 
 
 186 
imposing quarantines on Ottoman ships sailing under the exact same circumstances. 
Together, the lack of international agreement and the practice of discriminatory 
policies dictated the end of the Board, which in early 1840 was nationalised and 
locked away from foreigner intervention.510 Eventually, after considerable diplomatic 
influence in Cairo and Constantinople (the head of the Ottoman Empire), foreign 
consuls regained access to the Board. In fact, a new decree of November 1843 
reorganised the body into a Sanitary Administration to which Consuls General of 
Austria, France, England, Greece, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia were invited to send 
delegates with consultative or advisory status.511  
 
French doctors in the Orient 
In addition to sanitary institutions engineered by the Ottoman governments, France 
also developed its surveillance capacities within the Empire. In 1847, a network of 
French physicians was established. These doctors –expected to facilitate the work of 
their consuls by assessing health conditions – had permanent residence in 
Constantinople, Smyrna,512 Beirut, Alexandria, Cairo and Damascus. As part of their 
mission, the French physicians in the Levant were mandated to ‘meticulously report 
on the health conditions of the countries; to issue, for the convenience of French 
consuls, [medical] certificates [that underpinned] dispatching bills of health; to 
observe the health conditions of passengers, crews, and vessels departing to France; 
and to study, in general, the country regarding its climate, [and] diseases.’513 
 
While France established a network of sanitary physicians, Austria also developed 
medical institutions in the Ottoman Empire.514 With the help of the Austrian 
government, the Ottomans established a Western-style medical school in the late 
1830s and Metternich’s personal physician was entrusted to procure Austrian 
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teachers (and directors) for the new Constantinople school. The increasing presence 
of Austrian physicians as medical professors and the development of close ties 
between Austrian doctors and the Sultan led to public health initiatives marked by a 
distinctive Austrian flavour.515 The efforts developed by France and Austria to 
improve Ottoman health conditions and impose epidemic surveillance mechanisms 
were part of larger national quarantine projects. Through the intervention in the 
Ottoman Empire, both countries – like those with seats on the Constantinople 
Superior Board of Health – tried to transfer Europe’s first line of defence against 
plague to the Orient so that quarantines at their homeports could be safely reduced.516 
 
The Commission’s assessment  
European powers were increasingly infiltrating Ottoman sanitary affairs and already 
controlled important surveillance resources in the Orient. Presided over by the 
Sardinian consul, Magnetto, the ISC Commission for the Organisation of Levant’s 
Sanitary Service presented its report on 11 November 1851.517 In a total of 35 pages 
plus two attachments, the Commissioners considered existing sanitary conditions and 
institutions and designed a set of measures to be implemented in order to secure 
permanent free pratique with the Ottoman Empire. 
 
In general, the Commission was happy with the outcomes of the sanitary reforms 
instituted in Turkey and Egypt. In their eyes, by including foreign consuls with 
deliberative powers, the Constantinople Superior Board of Health had developed 
services in a progressive and regular way. More importantly, it was capable of 
detecting and correcting sanitary errors committed by local authorities. The results 
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were telling: for a period of five years, the Council had managed to make ‘the 
scourge disappear throughout the extent of the Empire.’518 
 
As for Egypt, its 1843 sanitary reforms inspired less confidence from the 
Commission. Certainly, the reforms introduced included the institution of a central 
sanitary administration in Alexandria responsible for designing and overseeing 
quarantine, hygienic and medical policies in the region. However, commissioners 
frowned upon two organisational details. First, the Commission disapproved of the 
consultative nature of foreign consuls in the sanitary administration of Egypt. 
Secondly, the Egyptian autonomy within the Ottoman Empire resulted in the 
Alexandrian sanitary authority being outwith the control of Constantinople. The two 
factors enhanced the self-governance of Egypt and created a scenario where Europe 
had no ‘direct action on the development of [Egyptian sanitary] affairs.’519   
 
Nevertheless, the Commission recognised that the Egyptian authorities had 
developed important epidemic changes. First and foremost, plague had been 
eradicated from Egypt. According to several medical sources consulted by the 
Commission, the last plague outbreak had been registered in 1844. Moreover, Egypt 
had managed to impose an active hygienic surveillance of its territory; quarantine 
service worked, with some exceptions, without problems, and the causes of death 
were correctly established through systematic post-mortem observations. Finally, it 
concluded that ‘the capacity of Egypt’s sanitary service men, their zeal and 
courageous perseverance added [further] guaranties that Europe [needed] to relax its 
rigorous [quarantine practices] against this country.’520 
 
Despite the general optimism, the Commission was not yet ready to grant free 
pratique to the Ottoman Empire. Before that could happen, Turkey, Egypt, and the 
European powers would have to introduce new measures that curbed sanitary risks 
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and instituted ultimate guaranties for European public health. The Commission 
required the Sultan himself to issue a law that maintained the current organisation of 
the Superior Health Council of Constantinople, where ‘interested European powers 
continued to be represented […] by delegates in equal number to Ottoman officials, 
all with deliberative voice.’521 In both its interior and littoral territory, Turkey was 
expected to appoint more doctors and institute local sanitary boards. The government 
was also invited to finish the construction of four quarantine stations and start work 
on two others. In addition, the Commission proposed the creation of new regulations 
inspired by the work of John Sutherland,522 a penal code and a special tribunal to 
deal with sanitary infractions. Finally, the Commissioners wished to elevate the 
Constantinople Superior Board of Health to the de facto top hierarchical sanitary 
institution of the entire Ottoman Empire, Egypt included.523  
 
Regarding Egypt, the presented measures were no less interventionist. The 
Alexandria sanitary authority was to be replaced by a new Board of Health organised 
like the Superior Health Council of Constantinople. Foreign consuls were expected 
not only to hold seats, but to possess deliberative powers in all Egyptian sanitary 
matters. In addition, inspectors and doctors working for the sanitary services would 
need to hold a degree conferred by a European university.524  
 
One thing was certain in the Commission’s view: by itself, the Orient was unable to 
offer the necessary guaranties to institute free pratique, and so European powers 
should be involved beyond the Ottoman institutional coordination. The ancient 
network of consuls already established in the Orient issued bills of health used by 
European port authorities as epidemic surveillance tools. While these documents had 
initially been based on consuls’ private consideration, more recently, the 
                                                
521 Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol. 2, Rapport sur l’organisation du service sanitaire dans le 
Levant, Annex 1 to Proc. 29, p1 
522 A list of hygienic measures to be instituted in the Orient, authored by John Sutherland, was also 
attached to the Commission’s report. See Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol. 2, Indication des 
mesures hygiéniques proposées pour le Levant comme complément de son système de quarantine, 
Annex 1 to Rapport sur l’organisation du service sanitaire dans le Levant, , Annex 1 to Proc. 29 
523 Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol. 2, Rapport sur l’organisation du service sanitaire dans le 
Levant, Annex 1 to Proc. 29, p3 
524 Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol. 2, Rapport sur l’organisation du service sanitaire dans le 
Levant, Annex 1 to Proc. 29, p3 
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establishment of sanitary authorities and European doctors in the Ottoman Empire 
offered concrete epidemic evidence that consuls were issuing bills. In the case of 
France, consuls had already been instructed to base their bills on medical certificates 
produced by French physicians in the Orient. According to the Commission, these 
doctors also contributed towards the improvement of local health conditions by 
providing enlightened advice to local authorities and improving sanitary institutions. 
In sum, overseas doctors provided ‘incontestable services not only to their countries 
of residence but to all Europe’ and their number should be expanded.525 In total, the 
Commission suggested the institution of 26 doctors: six in Egypt, four in Syria, and 
16 more spread throughout the remaining Ottoman territory. These sanitary doctors 
would be required to survey the health conditions in the area under their jurisdiction. 
Although this could potentially profit all ISC participants, the autonomy and freedom 
of doctors was crucial. On the one hand, Ottoman authorities should not try to 
condition the judgments of physicians; on the other hand, participating nations 
should understand that foreign doctors were only accountable to their respective 
national governments. 
  
If all interventionist measures were enforced by the Ottoman Empire and 
participating European nations, the Commission proposed to ‘allow free pratique to 
the whole Levant, without establishing a difference between Turkey, Syria and 
Egypt.’526 While the only cost to Europe was the salary of its doctors posted in the 
Orient, the Ottoman governments would compromise their autonomy, legitimacy and 
control over sanitary affairs within its territories.  
 
The debate  
When delegates started discussing the Commission’s report, their opinions ranged 
from the immediate establishment of free pratique to the internal postponement of 
the measure. While delegates like the Sardinian, Dr Bo, wished to revoke quarantines 
immediately as a sign of appreciation of Ottoman efforts to improve health 
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conditions and epidemic surveillance,527 more pessimist delegates like the Austrian 
envoys stressed the imperfection of the Ottoman sanitary system, which did not offer 
guarantees for the introduction of free pratique.528 Slowly, delegates agreed that it 
was crucial to the epidemic safety of Europe that the Ottoman Empire introduce 
measures like the constitution of a legal framework for the Constantinople Superior 
Board of Health. However, since approved measures needed to figure in the final 
Draft Sanitary Convention, caution was required. Often, international convention 
involved reciprocal exchange of rights and Europe did not wish to see Ottoman 
officials in its central sanitary authorities, enjoying deliberative powers.  
 
Details were indeed important. The Commission requested the Ottoman government 
to provide a legal framework for the Constantinople Board of Health and at the same 
time demanded that its present structure, where foreign consuls were allowed to 
deliberate on Ottoman sanitary affairs, was preserved. The aim was that all interested 
European powers would be represented. However, as Segóvia of Spain noted, the 
present organisation of the Board did not include consuls from all ISC countries. 
Spain, Sardinia, Portugal, the Roman States and the Two Sicilies were interested in 
securing a seat on the Board and wished to have their claim recognised in the future 
treaty. Although the ISC found itself fully legitimised to engineer local sanitary 
organisations in Europe, its President now feared that the Conference had no 
capacity to dictate the number of consuls that would hold seats on the Constantinople 
Board of Health. This, he stated, was a problem ‘of convenience that should be left to 
the decision of interested governments and the Sublime Porte’.529  
 
The introduction of a penal code and a special tribunal for sanitary infractions was 
well received by delegates. Anthony Perrier of England noted that the creation of 
sanitary tribunals had already been suggested by the French and hoped that delegates 
would vote for their establishment in Turkey. However, the Austrian doctor believed 
that the Commission’s suggestion ‘exceeded […] the limits of respect due to the 
                                                
527 Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol. 2, 25 November 1851, p14 (Bo) 
528 Conférence sanitaire internationale, vol. 2, 27 November 1851, p7 (Ménis) 
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Sublime Ottoman Porte.’530A proposal such as the one under debate would have a 
character of obligation and an international conference had no power to make such 
requests of a sovereign nation. In line with the Commission and the English 
diplomat, Dr Rosenberger of Russia emphasised the mandatory character of the 
proposal. The Constantinople Board of Health itself had already requested the Sultan 
to introduce these measures and the ISC was ready to support this stance.  
 
This chapter began with the claim that state sovereignty is not static but constantly 
negotiated. The argument has been made that states strike sovereignty bargains that 
allow them to enhance, or protect, certain elements of their autonomy, control, and 
legitimacy for the sake of others. This begs a crucial question: what did the Ottoman 
Empire gain by allowing European states to shape and even control important 
Ottoman public health mechanisms? At a first glance, the issue of free pratique was 
only in the interest of European powers. After all, it was their merchants who 
profited from the economic advantages of quicker sailing times within the 
Mediterranean. Not only did they manage to transport people and cargo faster but, 
from a logistics perspective, the eradication of quarantines improved the turnaround 
time for vessels to start new trips and potentially increased the volume of transported 
cargo and passengers. Finally, the end of quarantines implied the end of quarantine 
fees charged in lazarettos and contributed to the lowering of commercial costs. 
Certainly, if ISC measures were to be enforced, Europeans would increase 
transportation speed while enhancing epidemic surveillance and safety. In addition, 
they would secure a voice in the administration of Ottoman public health while 
decreasing the costs of sailing and trade.  
 
As with Europeans, Ottoman merchants would also profit from the eradication of 
quarantines. Although their fleets were smaller, the gains derived from faster 
transportation speed were obvious. Furthermore, for the price of losing some 
autonomy and control over national sanitary affairs, the Ottoman Empire gained 
many other advantages. First, merchants were able to turn their vessels around 
quicker, which had potential positive effects on the Ottoman treasury: if vessels 
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increased the annual volume of transported cargo, it was likely that they would pay 
more import/export taxes to the Empire. Secondly, these gains in productivity made 
the Mediterranean trade route even more competitive compared to the time-
consuming Atlantic route between India and Europe. Thirdly, by allowing the 
infiltration of European consuls and physicians into Ottoman sanitary bodies, the 
Ottoman Empire profited from the circulation of scientific and organisational 
knowledge. Finally, by allowing foreign doctors to survey its territory, the Ottoman 
Empire benefited from a network of highly trained professionals without having to 
pay for them. All in all, the Ottoman Empire fostered its economy while making 
Turkey and Egypt safer epidemic places.  
 
In summary, the ISC developed efforts to engineer the sanitary organisation of the 
Levant, while also imposing a network of foreign doctors within the Ottoman 
territory, in order to control Oriental sanitary policies and survey its epidemic 
conditions. The contrast with the measures imposed on European sanitary 
organisations was striking. First, although the ISC tried to organise sanitary 
administration structures both in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire, most European 
powers held similar views to England, which informed the Conference that it would 
only adopt changes within its Mediterranean possessions. Its mainland was 
autonomous and control over its sanitary policies should remain under the exclusive 
competence of Her Majesty’s Government. Secondly, the introduction of consuls 
with deliberative power in Turkish and Egyptian boards of health was established 
without issue. However, when delegates tried to secure the presence of a foreign 
consul-delegate as a consultative member of the (also consultative) local boards of 
health, the majority voted against the measure. Finally, the ISC secured the creation 
of a special tribunal for sanitary affairs in the Ottoman Empire, but failed to institute 




CONCLUSIONS. Or, the end of a conference and the beginning of 
an international public health movement: some concluding remarks 
 
I come to announce that you have gloriously accomplished your mission. You have 
overcome adversity, triumphed over entrenched prejudice, and - under the light of science - 
you have restored trade’s freedom, which for years has languished in vain obstacles.  
 
Gentlemen, I thank you from the bottom of my heart in name of commerce that you have 
freed; and in name of humanity that your wisdom has contribute[d] to facilitate 
international exchanges without scarifying measures necessary to protect public health.531  
 
On 19 January 1852, delegates convened for one last meeting. Received by the 
Marquis Turgot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Noël Lefebvre-Duruflé, Minister of 
Agriculture and Trade, delegates arrived to bid their farewells and to prepare, slowly, 
for their journey home. After six months of work, the European envoys finalised a 
Draft Sanitary Convention and a Draft International Sanitary Regulation. The two 
documents not only synthesised the ISC as an event aiming to regulate international 
public health but also sowed the roots of a movement that would increasingly 
internationalise public health practices and discourses. This final chapter details the 
end of the ISC and positions the Conference within a larger post-1851 movement of 
public health internationalisation. Via this analysis, concluding remarks will be 
drawn that illustrate the consequences of this internationalisation of public health 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Optimism closes the Conference 
In the midst of the applause that interrupted his passionate speech, Lefebvre-Duruflé 
summarised the main achievements of the ISC. In his view, delegates had managed 
to discard all political and scientific questions in favour of more practical matters. As 
a result of their work, the participant states had decided that public health should 
result from common agreements and that any future sanitary measure should be duly 
uniformed within all participant countries. More specifically, delegates to the ISC 
had introduced regulations that limited sanitary measures to three exclusive diseases 
– plague, yellow fever, and cholera – and relaxed the use of quarantines. In future, 
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arrivals from the Orient carrying clean bills of health were to receive free pratique in 
European ports as soon as certain conditions had been met. In order to further 
Europe’s capacity for epidemic surveillance, a network of physicians was to be 
established in the Orient, while the presence of a doctor was to be required onboard 
steamers. In order to simplify proceedings and standardise practices, delegates 
created a common template for bills of health with two exclusive classes – clean and 
foul. Likewise, cargo was reclassified by delegates based on its epidemic risk, in 
order to unify the heterogeneous classification systems practiced in Europe.532 More 
importantly, the Conference reduced ‘the duration of quarantines henceforth 
proportional to the period of incubation of diseases,’ and abolished, in principle, all 
taxes applied to sanitary measures.533 Finally, delegates agreed to place sanitary 
authorities under the direct control of central governments. 
 
In light of this elaborate list of achievements, Lefebvre-Duruflé congratulated 
delegates: ‘everything that humanity and represented nations [had] expected from 
[the Conference, they saw it] accomplished.’ To further celebrate, a banquet was 
organised for delegates and ambassadors while Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte awarded 
the National Order of the Legion of Honour to each delegate.534 A last farewell 
dinner, organised by the envoys, also took place in Paris, and according to an article 
published in 1860 by the Spanish medical delegate Pedro Monlau, the event was 
highly enjoyable.  The meal was followed by ‘toasts, speeches, verses and cheers’ ‘to 
the health and prosperity of represented monarchs and nations, to the noble 
hospitality of France, and to the perpetual peace and harmony among world 
countries.’535 To perpetuate the memory of the Conference, delegates decided to 
have a medal minted and to collect money for donation to the poorest child born on 
the last day of the Conference in the district where the meetings took place. Eduardo 
Mitriquiris – the ‘legitimate and natural son of Andrés Mistriquiris, coachman and 
                                                
532 Although it was an important aspect of the ISC, this dissertation does not look at classification of 
cargo due to space limitations. For further details on classification of cargo see Barnes, Lazaretto, 
epidemics, politics, and quarantine in a nineteenth-century city. 
533 Procés-verbaux de la conférence sanitaire internationale, ouverte à Paris le 27 Juillet 1851, vol. 2, 
19 January 1852, p. 7 (French Minister of Agriculture and Trade, Lefebvre-Duruflé). 
534 Procés-verbaux de la conférence sanitaire internationale, ouverte à Paris le 27 Juillet 1851, vol. 2, 
19 January 1852, p. 4 (French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marquis Turgot). 
535 Pedro Felipe Monlau, "Congresso Sanitario de Paris en 1851-52," El Monitor de la Salud de las 
Familias y de la Salubridad de los Pueblos 3, no. 1 (1860). 
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Paulina Ripaud, washerwoman’536 – was selected and named the adopted son of the 
ISC. The Conference would gain life outside its walls and Eduardo could expect to 
receive his funds on the day he turned 18 years old.  
 
The festive mood and the sense of triumph perhaps overshadowed the less optimistic 
words that were delivered by the French ministers in the above-mentioned speeches 
just prior to the final celebrations. The Minister of Foreign Affairs opined that 
delegates had a mission beyond the ISC. With the end of the Conference, they were 
to be the ‘apostles of the doctrine [they] produced and each of [them], armed with the 
arguments of all (…) would know how to overcome misconceptions and make 
[sanitarian] truth triumph.’537 Enemies would certainly emerge and try to defeat the 
progress made in Paris, and for that reason, the Minister of Agriculture and Trade 
reminded delegates that their efforts should still ‘be submitted through diplomatic 
channels to ratification. Perhaps – he continued – [the process of ratification] would 
find adversaries among men to which [delegates’] work was unknown! Conceivably 
serious apprehension would emerge against the new [sanitary] code.’538 Passed from 
generation to generation, prejudice against modern sanitary conceptions was rooted 
in fear and in old traditions. Listing perils and strategies to guarantee the successful 
ratification of the drafted Convention and Regulation, the Minister of Agriculture 
and Trade declared his utter belief that all states would eventually adhere to their 
delegates’ decisions. 
 
When delegates left Paris, the success of the Draft Sanitary Convention and 
Regulation was promissory. Back in their own states, national bureaucratic 
machineries initiated a process to assess their delegates’ work and formalise the 
ratification of the international treaty.  Despite initial positive reactions, however, the 
majority of participants – including England – never ratified the Draft Convention 
and Regulation. Optimism and support gave way to apprehension and 
discontentment.  
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The next section focuses on the particular process that the English state developed in 
order to finalise its ratification position, as it gives an insight into the reasons that 
certain states eventually decided against the Drafts and the ways that international 
public health was thoroughly dependent upon national states. The wealth of available 
sources for the English decision allows the reconstruction of a complex process that 
involved the coordination of several governmental bodies and colonial authorities 
while maintaining communication with other potential contracting parties. 
 
Problems with protocol 
In England, the Foreign Office sent copies of the Draft Convention and Regulation to 
the Privy Council, the Board of Health, and the Board of Trade, and requested their 
opinion regarding the quality and implications of the international sanitary project.539 
By mid-February the first replies started to arrive. Despite their consideration that 
there were minor issues with particular points, the Board of Health stated their 
unconditional support for the adoption of all provisions contained in the Draft 
Convention.540 Likewise, the Board of Trade found no objections and communicated 
its satisfaction with the proposed changes that promised to discard the 
inconveniences and disadvantages that injured international commerce.541  
 
Supported by the Boards of Health and Trade, the Foreign Office was prepared to 
sign the Convention. France – as host – was also ready to organise the final 
ceremony where contracting parties could proceed with the signature of the 
documents.542 In a letter to the Foreign Office, Count Walewski, the French 
Ambassador to London, informed them that Sardinia and several other states had 
already nominated Plenipotentiaries to sign the Convention and invited England to 
do the same. Count Walewski also mentioned that his government had introduced 
                                                
539 Memorandum relative to the Negotiation respecting the System of Quarantine in the 
Mediterranean (confidential), 11 April 1853, The National Archives of the UK TNA: PRO FO97/215 
540 Minute of the General Board of Health on the Convention proposed by the Sanitary Conference at 
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of State for Foreign Affairs, 20 February 1852, TNA: PRO FO97/213 
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two changes to the Convention in order to expedite the ratification process: 
unilaterally, a new article had been added that obliged parties to accept the 
Convention and Regulation as a single document. In addition, the terms of 
ratification had been altered. Instead of obliging contracting parties to ratify the 
Convention within three months of the conclusion of the Conference, Paris now 
encouraged powers to exchange ratifications ‘in the shortest time possible’ but 
without a set temporal limit.543  
 
A few weeks after receiving Count Walewski’s invitation, news arrived at the 
Foreign Office through Anthony Perrier. According to the former delegate to the 
Conference, further modifications had been made to terms previously agreed in the 
ISC. In this sense, the Drafts of Convention and Regulation would not be subject to 
additional negotiation or changes. They were final documents ready to be 
transformed into an international treaty through the process of signature and 
exchange of ratification. However, this process would not be conducted according to 
traditional diplomatic praxis: France had decided that, instead of organising a single 
ceremony where all contracting parties would come together to sign and ratify the 
agreement, a standard copy would be made available to Plenipotentiaries to sign 
whenever ordered by their governments to do so.544 This process was clearly at odds 
with the proceedings described by Charles de Martens in his Guide Diplomatique.545 
According to the Guide, the act of ratification consisted of a document, signed and 
sealed by a sovereign, through which he or she approved the contents of the treaty 
made in his or her name and promised to execute the agreed points in good faith.546 
With these documents, ambassadors from all parties would convene to exchange 
ratifications and would conjunctly sign the Convention in their sovereign’s name. 
Accordingly, the ratification ceremony obliged each ambassador per party to sign a 
copy of the Convention and keep another copy, signed by all participants, to return to 
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his government. In opposition to this practice, Perrier complained, Paris had arranged 
it so that ‘each Plenipotentiary retain[ed], in order to send to his Court, a copy signed 
only by himself and the French Plenipotentiary, while the only copy signed by all 
Parties would be that to be kept at Paris.’547  
 
On 6 April 1852, the Earl of Malmesbury, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
wrote to his Ambassador to Paris expressing his discontent with the French 
resolutions. Not only did he find no reason to deviate from the normal diplomatic 
course, but he also disagreed with the introduction of articles that denied the 
possibility of negotiating the Convention and Regulation before its signature. Despite 
complaints, Paris refused to compromise, leaving Malmesbury with no other 
alternative than to instruct his ambassador to collect signatures from all contracting 
parties for his copy of the agreement.548  
 
English diplomatic history and its particular traditions introduced protocol 
difficulties that required close consideration. From a formal perspective, an 
international treaty was first and foremost a contract between sovereigns as persons 
and only secondly an agreement between sovereigns as states. The Sanitary 
Convention was thus a treaty to be established between Queen Victoria and other 
heads of state, including the Pope (styled as His Holiness, the Pope). Following 
centuries without official contact, diplomatic relations between England and the 
Roman States had been reestablished and regulated by the 1848 11 & 12 Vict., c. 108 
Act.549 This legislation carried an important caveat that only allowed diplomatic 
affairs with the Pope as the sovereign of the Roman States, never as the head of the 
Catholic Church.550 Seeking to avoid an invalidation of the treaty on legal bases, the 
Foreign Office requested the Law Officers’ opinion. In order to avoid potential 
problems, the Law Officers suggested that the Pope should receive no other title than 
that of ‘Sovereign of the Roman States’ in any document signed by the two 
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powers.551 Additional modifications to the Draft Convention and Regulation were 
thus required.   
 
England was not alone in taking issue with the French protocol decisions. Austria 
and Tuscany also protested against the introduction of these unorthodox practices.552 
In addition, Austria, Russia, Sicily, Spain, Turkey, and Tuscany requested changes to 
be made; however, the French position, states were informed, was final.553 No 
alterations were to be allowed, due to the fact that shortly after introducing protocol 
changes to the Convention, France, Sardinia, and Portugal had signed the 
international treaty, precluding changes to the text. In addition, Paris considered the 
Draft Convention final because it had been produced by delegates representing 
governments.554 While the first argument surprised the protesting states – London, 
for example, was unaware that states had already started signing the Convention – 
the second argument generated clear opposition. England disputed the final character 
of the work of its delegates since they had been appointed ‘to discuss, for the 
information of their respective Governments, the ameliorations which it might be 
possible to introduce in the system of quarantine in the Mediterranean’ – not to make 
a treaty.555 London expected an opportunity to fine-tune the work of its delegates and 
to introduce any changes deemed necessary. The Foreign Office argued that its 
position was supported by the Preamble of the Convention, which stated that the 
contracting parties ‘have resolved to negotiate and conclude a special Convention, 
followed by a Regulation, and have for that purpose named Plenipotentiaries,’ but 
the French Government was acting as if the Convention had already been negotiated 
by Plenipotentiaries, rather than by mere delegates who were not invested with full 
powers.556 The Convention, England claimed, existed only as a draft, and while Paris 
insisted that the Drafts must be accepted or rejected without alteration, the French 
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554 Memorandum, 11 April 1853, TNA: PRO FO97/215 
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Government had been the first to act upon a contrary principle by unilaterally adding 
an article after the Drafts had been settled by the delegates.557 
 
Problems with content 
In addition to growing protocol complaints, the very content of the Convention and 
Regulation was also a matter of increasing concern. The English Board of Health and 
Board of Trade, requested to consider the Draft Convention and Regulation in 
January 1852, concluded that the Foreign Office should proceed with the signature 
and ratification of the treaty. The Board of Health noted that public health protection 
was still over-centred on quarantine practices that could be further liberalised. The 
Board also regretted that the ISC had failed to institute juries of consuls to solve 
quarantine disputes, but considered these two issues minor when considering the 
advantages derived from ratifying the International Sanitary Convention and 
Regulation.558  
 
English criticisms of the ISC emerged with a letter from the Privy Council to the 
Foreign Office on 5 February. The Council objected to the plan to appoint European 
medical officers in the Levant and to make the expansion of such a network a main 
condition of free pratique for arrivals from the Orient. According to the ISC, French 
doctors in the Levant had contributed towards the extinction of plague. The 
Conference expected that additional European physicians would help to improve 
epidemic conditions in the Orient. However, arguing that plague had been extinct in 
Egypt nearly three years before the French arrival, the Council dismissed the over- 
ambitious safety claims of the Conferece. 559   
 
More importantly, since 1845, England had granted free pratique to all arrivals from 
the Orient carrying a clean bill of health. Proposed by the Privy Council, this 
measure had proved considerably advantageous to trade, but would be put to an end 
if the Regulation was signed. The ISC had decided to grant free pratique to Oriental 
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arrivals, providing, among other conditions, that the network of European physicians 
was fully established in the Levant. Until then, England was required to reimpose 
quarantines on these arrivals in order to comply with international sanitary 
regulations.560  
 
Despite initial support, the Board of Trade reconsidered its position of support 
without reservations a month after issuing its first report. On 6 April, the Board 
forwarded a letter by William Pym, the Superintendent General of Quarantine, to the 
Foreign Office, and recommended a careful appreciation of the impact of new fees to 
be introduced with the Regulations.561 According to Pym, the Convention’s article 
seven declared that new charges would be levied in all Mediterranean ports upon 
vessels, people, and cargo, and allowed each government to determine the final 
charges providing that they raised sufficient money to cover the sanitary expenses. 
Pym and the Board of Trade recommended that the final charges should be made 
known to the British Government before ratification took place, in order to avoid 
adding unpredictable costs to trade. 562  
 
In a letter dated 5 May, the Secretary of State for the Colonies communicated to the 
Foreign Office that, regarding Gibraltar, Malta, and the Ionian Islands, the Colonial 
Department supported the signature of the Draft Convention and Regulation. 
However, as in the case of the Board of Trade, the Department dispatched a new 
letter a few weeks later expressing its concerns.563 Forwarding a letter from the 
Governor of Malta, the Secretary alerted the Foreign Office to the malign 
consequences that the Convention and Regulation would inflict upon the island’s 
trade.564 Governor Sir William Reid claimed that the Regulation stipulated a period 
(inclusive of voyage and quarantine) of 8 to 10 days as a condition for pratique to 
arrivals from the Levant. The period was clearly longer than the three days required 
of vessels arriving from Egypt, let alone the short 24 hours imposed on arrivals from 
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Turkey. Vessels facing lengthy quarantines, the Governor feared, would avoid 
stopping in Malta. Instead, they would opt for Trieste and other distant ports so as to 
make the voyage long enough to fulfil the ISC-stipulated period without finding 
themselves subject to additional quarantines.565 
 
Facing growing anxieties about the Draft Convention and Regulation contents, the 
Foreign Office reexamined the documents. Doubts emerged regarding the power of 
the executive government to carry out the stringent hygienic measures necessary to 
enjoy the advantage of the new sanitary system. In particular, it was questioned 
whether the Parliament would grant the necessary authority to implement the 
sanitary reforms proposed by the Conference.566 A new wave of apprehension 
emerged at the end of May, when the new international Bill of Health was finally 
received in London.567 According to Section II (Departure Measures) of the Draft 
Regulations, bills of health were to be issued after careful inspection of vessels, crew 
(including clothes and bedding), passengers, and food and water provisions. 
Conducted by local boards of health, the inspection had to be carried out within the 
48 hours before departure.568 For these new documents, the Foreign Office once 
again requested the opinion of the Board of Trade, the Board of Health, and the Privy 
Council. Was the international bill of health aligned with English interests, asked the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs?569  
 
A week later, the Board of Health communicated its satisfaction with the proposed 
Bill of Health.570 However, the Privy Council argued against its adoption. In their 
opinion, the existing bill of health in England was simpler and required less 
information than the one under consideration, while still sufficient to establish the 
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sanitary state of a departing vessel and its epidemic risk.571 In addition, the Privy 
Council pointed out logistic issues that required the attention of the government if 
the new bill of health was adopted. A report by the Board of Customs, annexed by 
the Privy Council, stated that English local boards of health did not conform to the 
sanitary regulations produced by the Conference. Thus, extensive reform was 
required in order to institute local boards of health in each port from which vessels 
departed to the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the Board of Custom claimed that the 
model of vessel inspections proposed by the ISC was too meticulous and would 
generate considerable inconvenience and annoyance to all involved parties. 
Merchants, in particular, were expected to complain and resist the new measures. 
Facing inevitable domestic problems, the Board of Trade, like the Board of Customs, 
concluded that the proposed bill of health and adjacent sanitary regulations should 
not be adopted. To do so would be impracticable and unwise.572 
 
The unconditional support from the Board of Health clearly contrasted with the 
positions of the Privy Council, the Board of Trade, the Board of Customs, and the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. As a pet project of the Board of Health, the ISC, 
as seen in chapter two, was a unique opportunity to implement a particular sanitary 
project. The Board, under the guidance of Chadwick, had secured the appointment of 
a medical delegate that embodied its agenda. With a few concessions, John 
Sutherland was capable of regulating and reducing quarantines in the Mediterranean 
region. The consequences of a possible lack of support for the Convention and 
Regulation by the Board were greater than simply failing to back up one of its key 
members of staff. Due to its close involvement with the ISC, a refusal to sign the 
Convention and Regulation would both undermine the Board’s national and 
international sanitary authority and challenge its future capacity for influencing the 
regulation of sanitary affairs.  
 
The contradictory domestic opinions on the Draft Convention and Regulation meant 
that the Foreign Office’s task of issuing orders regarding the signature and 
                                                
571 Privy Council to Foreign Office, 12 June 1852, TNA: PRO/FO87/214 
572 Custom House to Privy Council, 9 June 1852 attached dispatch to Privy Council to Foreign Office, 
12 June 1852, TNA: PRO/FO87/214 
 
 205 
ratification of the documents was arduous and often incoherent. Between January 
and May, the Foreign Office instructed its Ambassador to Paris to negotiate and sign 
the Convention (February); to sign and exchange ratifications without negotiation but 
with the caveat that a complaint had to be formally made regarding the protocol 
imposed by France (April); and to sign the Convention without annexing the 
Regulation to it as a unified treaty (May). According to a memorandum produced by 
the Foreign Office, ‘much embarrassment [had been] felt as to the proper mode of 
dealing with the [process].’573  
 
However, a final report by the Board of Trade, sent on 23 January 1853 (a year after 
the conclusion of the ISC), made the British position final. The Board took the 
opportunity to analyse documents produced during the ISC as well as the vast 
correspondence exchanged between the Foreign Office and other national and 
international authorities. The Board concurred with the critical opinions previously 
expressed by the Privy Council and other state agencies: if England were 
unsuccessful in obtaining reasonable modifications of the Draft documents, the 
stipulations would cause considerable damage to national commercial interests.574 
The Board was aware of the consequences of such a rupture. If Britain did not ratify 
the Convention, vessels sailing under its flag would suffer harsh quarantines and 
sanitary measures; parties that distanced themselves from the arrangements could 
hardly expect favourable treatment from those who had joined it, the Board argued. 
However, the International Sanitary Convention and Regulation contained ‘measures 
so pregnant with palpable evil’ that its adoption would cause even worse 
hardships.575 To the Foreign Office, it was clear that the signature of the treaty was 
conditional on changes to the Convention and Regulation.  
 
England was not alone in its quest to introduce alterations to the two documents. In 
April 1852, the English ambassador to Paris informed London that out of the twelve 
parties involved in the Conference, it was expected that seven, namely England, 
France, Sardinia, Turkey, Greece, Portugal, and Tuscany, would accept the 
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Convention as it stood; of the other five, Austria and Russia were uncertain, and 
Naples, Rome, and Spain were not expected to concur.576  Three months later, 
Anthony Perrier communicated further details. Portugal and Sardinia had already 
ratified the Convention, but five other states had serious reservations that impeded 
them from accepting the proposed international treaty. Spain rejected the proposed 
quarantines against cholera; Sicily refused to ratify the Convention as the 
Government opposed the requirement to construct a quarantine station; and Austria 
and Tuscany took issue with several measures as their implementation required 
considerable inconvenience and injury to trade, and also objected to the French 
model of signature and ratification. In addition, the Russian Government disagreed 
with certain resolutions since they were at odds with official positions that Perrier 
saw as contrary ‘to the enlightened views of England and France.577 Greece and the 
Ottoman Empire, Perrier claimed, were ready to ratify but had decided to wait until 
the Great Powers had agreed to the Convention before doing so.578  
 
Spain claimed that its extensive coastline and its climate’s susceptibility to certain 
diseases required coercive measures that the ISC aimed to outlaw. The Spanish 
government requested modification of the documents regarding quarantines against 
yellow fever and cholera. In their opinion, the maximum term of seven days of 
quarantine in cases of yellow fever, a disease that had prevailed in Spain for 20 
years, was insufficient. Likewise, Madrid wanted to secure tougher measures against 
cholera, which had been kept out of Spain for some time by quarantine but had 
broken out once those measures had been relaxed.579 
 
Austria voiced its discontent with the Draft Convention and Regulation via a detailed 
list of 17 points that required alteration before Vienna would adhere to the treaty. For 
instance, they wanted to continue practicing contemporary sanitary policies (contrary 
to the ISC) for all arrivals from Oriental ports. In addition, it was requested that 
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when in foreign ports, Austrian vessels would only be subject to hygienic measures if 
Austrian consular services explicitly invited local authorities to carry out these tasks. 
Another demand was that steamers belonging to companies legally recognised by the 
Austrian government must be treated as war vessels and therefore enjoy exemption 
from all quarantine practices.580  
 
Russia, meanwhile, requested the introduction of a five-year grace period during 
which the Draft Sanitary Regulation would be implemented on a voluntary basis. In 
addition, the Russian Government requested the organisation of a new meeting 
where delegates could finalise details regarding the Draft Convention and 
Regulation. Saint Petersburg was especially keen to retain the right to develop 




Despite several formal and informal requests, France never allowed alterations to be made to 
the documents. During the first half of the nineteenth century, states had invested extensive 
resources in organising the Conference, appointing delegates, and guiding their envoys 
through complex and long negotiations. Moreover, complex domestic processes had been 
used to scrutinise closely the impacts of the ISC on domestic trade and epidemic capacity. 
National official positions resulted from laborious inquiry and coordination efforts. 
Nevertheless, out of 12 participants, only four states signed the International Sanitary 
Convention or Regulation: France, Portugal, Sardinia, and Turkey. The others gradually 
allowed the 1851 ISC to die.  
 
Howard-Jones, in The Scientific Background of the International Sanitary 
Conferences, claimed that ‘ignorance of the causes of the epidemic diseases under 
discussion proved an insuperable barrier to international agreement.’582 Moreover, he 
concluded that ‘from the point of view of practical results, the first International 
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Sanitary Conference was a fiasco. Everyone went on doing in their own way what 
they had done before.’583 But is ‘fiasco’ the right word? Underpinned by the 
principle that judgments, as discourses, are temporally and geographically located 
and constrained, this dissertation has shown that following repeated attempts to 
regulate public health internationally, the ISC successfully managed to bring together 
12 states that created a common sanitary system for the international community. 
The arrival of yellow fever and cholera in Europe during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, as well as the growing international circulation of vessels, cargo, 
and people, resulted in the realisation that public health needed to be regulated 
internationally in order to keep diseases at bay and maintain the flow of trade.  
 
This dissertation has detailed the process through which public health regulation was 
transformed into an international affair. In this sense, it is not a comparative history 
of public approaches but instead an analysis of the very process of 
internationalisation: a process where antagonistic political and scientific agendas 
came together. By following complex negotiations between medical and diplomatic 
delegates, the dissertation has shown how European governments built a particular 
model of public health requiring the standardisation of aetiological concepts, 
prophylactic practices, and administrative institutions.  
 
Inspired by the Edinburgh Strong Programme, four thematic chapters showed how 
science, diplomacy, and state bureaucracy were closely interwoven during the 
negotiation process. In fact, in the quest for legitimacy in the adoption of 
controversial solutions, science, diplomacy, and state bureaucracy worked together to 
justify choices. Nevertheless, as was shown in the first chapter, the early days of 
international public health were not monopolised by doctors, diplomats and state 
administrators. These professional groups certainly played an important part; doctors 
collected epidemic data and theorised upon the nature and causes of epidemic 
diseases. Armed with aetiological definitions, they created prophylactic guidelines 
that individuals, cities, and states could enforce in the hope of avoiding future 
outbreaks. Diplomats, on the other hand, were the true embodiment of epidemic 
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surveillance machinery. Based in the world’s most important political, commercial, 
and economic cities, ambassadors, consuls and other diplomatic staff composed and 
circulated regular epidemic reports on the areas under their jurisdiction. Moreover, 
they were responsible for issuing bills of health that certified the condition of vessels 
departing from their ports, and also had the resources to operate bureaucratic 
machineries and allow states to function through the institution of practices and 
routines.  
 
Merchants, ship owners, governmental administrators, and passengers also played an 
important role in the initial process of making public health international. These 
groups lobbied governments and published books, pamphlets, articles, and diaries 
that contributed towards the shaping of agendas and the crystallisation of axis of 
debate. Experiencing first hand the inconveniences and costs of quarantine policies, 
they successfully voiced their discontentment. However, without the capacity to 
organise representation and gain access to the corridors of policy-making, their role 
eventually faded away. The process of internationalising public health relied on 
expertise, political networking, and enough resources to maintain and materialise a 
coherent project like the ISC. Doctors, physicians and state administrators secured 
the gatekeeper position of the international public health movement by playing their 
different expertises to their advantage. Slowly, they eliminated competing social 
groups from the policy-making process. For this reason, merchants, ship owners, 
governmental administrators, and passengers played little or no part in either the ISC 
itself or the consecutive ratification process. 
 
Organised by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the International Sanitary 
Conference hosted a total of 24 diplomatic and medical delegates. Chapter two 
showed that these envoys were carefully selected to ensure that their diplomatic and 
medical agendas were aligned with those of the states they represented. This was an 
important affair, since diplomats and doctors came in all shapes and sizes regarding 




In the case of physicians, their position was based around two operative axes: 
contagionist/anti-contagionist; and pro-quarantine/anti-quarantine. Pure contagionists 
believed that disease-causing matter could travel and was transmitted through the 
communication of people and objects, while anti-contagionists believed that 
atmospheric and physical environments – miasmas – caused diseases when inhaled 
by humans. In this sense, contagionists believed in the power of quarantine to 
establish a barrier between contaminated and healthy bodies, while anti-contagionists 
argued that only the improvement of atmospheric and physical environment could 
prevent the emergence of diseases. Scholars have long argued that in reality these 
concepts were fluid and that physicians positioned themselves at various points along 
the two axes. Delegates to the ISC not only embodied the fluidity of categories, but 
also showed the extensiveness of this argument by their ability to compromise their 
aetiological and prophylactic stands. The International Sanitary Convention and 
Regulation were not underpinned by pure contagionist or anti-contagionist 
arguments but by that which resulted from the negotiations between actors diversely 
positioned along these axes.  
 
As a pioneer event that opened the diplomatic world to another professional group, 
the ISC struggled to establish a protocol. Despite their aim to create a common 
sanitary system in the Mediterranean, organisers and delegates alike argued that the 
ISC was not a space for scientific and political discussion. Instead, the works of the 
Conference were to be commanded by a practical sense, allowing delegates to create 
a rational quarantine system that both prevented public health threats and enabled the 
speedy circulation of vessels, people, and cargo. In many ways, the boundary work, 
that was developed to separate the ISC from scientific debate, was carried out in 
order to confer credibility to the Conference. By declaring the ISC as a space outwith 
scientific production, organisers aimed to distance themselves from numerous 
scientific establishments (such as medical academies and societies) that struggled to 
secure aetiological and prophylactic consensus when embarking in ad nauseam 
missions to accumulate anecdotical epidemic evidence. The ISC was not meant to be 
a place of research but instead a place for circulation of practical knowledge. In 
addition, the ISC was not concerned with individual subjects of epidemic diseases: 
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the programmes did not address such issues, and delegates did not acknowledge the 
existence of individuals searching for medical relief in cases of disease. 
 
The ISC, its delegates and the participating states constructed international public 
health as a world of international regulation. This is clear from looking at the 
expected products of the Conference: an international sanitary convention that would 
institute international policy guidelines and an international sanitary regulation that 
would detail the internationalisation of public health in the Mediterranean region. 
Expectations regarding the role of delegates in this process were less clear. Were 
doctors to be subordinate to diplomats, since the ISC ultimately aimed to produce an 
international treaty, or should diplomats hold an inferior position due to the medical 
expertise of physicians? The answer to this question once again encapsulated an 
important problem: was international public health a medical or diplomatic affair? 
The voting system adopted by the Conference sheds light on this problem. Delegates 
to the ISC decided that instead of voting by country, each delegate would have a 
vote. Thus, doctors and diplomats held equal representation power. However, 
delegates operated under national instructors, and were also part of professional 
groups interested in influencing the international public health agenda. As such, 
delegates were governed by different – and sometimes conflicting – loyalties. They 
owed loyalty to their sovereigns, governments, and foreign offices; to their 
professional institutions; and, at the same time – as legitimate professionals – to their 
own convictions. Aware of these conflicting loyalties, states devised ways of 
coercing delegates to protect their specific agendas. 
 
The practical dimension of the ISC was further highlighted in chapter three, where 
the thin boundaries between politics and science were exposed. Most delegates 
arrived at the ISC with clear aetiological models, but for the sake of common 
agreement, these beliefs were subjected to extensive negotiations. Rather than 
defining the nature of diseases, it was considered more important for delegates to 
focus their efforts on establishing the value of quarantine in the context of an 
international public health system. This effort, the chapter showed, resulted from the 
capacity of states to assert their power while delegates were mobilising scientific and 
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political arguments in the debate in order to substantiate their choices. Based on 
these efforts, the ISC declared that only three diseases – plague, yellow fever, and 
cholera – should be classified as subject to quarantine. This decision narrowed the 
scope of international public health, since its actions were limited to quarantining the 
above diseases. In this sense, international public health was not designed to create 
better urban settings, educate people, or provide clean water and construct efficient 
sewage systems, as anti-contagionists would have preferred. Instead, it was imagined 
as a set of mechanisms created to prevent three diseases from reaching European 
territory. However, the Conference products were not rooted in contagionist concerns 
alone. Delegates planned detailed inspections of vessels, crew, passengers, and cargo 
in order to certify that no nuisances were present to initiate the development of 
diseases. 
 
The last chapter looked at the struggle between national and international interests. 
For the sake of European public health, delegates developed careful administrative 
proceedings and reorganised sanitary institutions in accordance with a unified model. 
As an internationalist movement, the ISC found that self-legitimacy interfered with 
the governance of national affairs for the sake of the common good. Actions such as 
the introduction of standard sanitary administrations were controversial, but allowed 
states to strike bargains and put forward their agendas. By allowing the ISC to 
regulate their private businesses, states secured additional advantages in return. This 
may have been symbolic of the belief that the changes would contribute to a safer 
world, but it could also allow for claims-making in spheres other than public health. 
 
As in all aspects of social life, negotiation power was not equally shared among 
participants. In fact, though European states only agreed to a network of local boards 
of health placed under the direct control of central states, in the case of the Levant, 
the ISC imposed a powerful interventionist strategy that included – in many regards 
– the legitimate colonisation of Oriental public health institutions. In many ways, this 
decision was made with the aim of building a protective ring around Europe that 
would block the circulation of epidemic diseases. Participants believed that with the 
establishment of such a protective ring, quarantine would be eliminated in Europe 
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and vessels, trade, people, and cargo would be able to circulate without disruptions. 
This promoted the stereotype of the Orient as a black hole of disease and death that 
permanently threatened Europe. International public health, as constructed by the 
ISC, was a complex phenomenon that involved sentiments of superiority and 
civilisation, both of which justified direct interventions.  
 
Ultimately, the model of international public health designed by the ISC was never 
implemented. States found that the advantages of the model were not great enough to 
consider compromising their autonomy and control over sanitary policies. However, 
the legacy of the ISC reached far beyond the printed proceedings of the Conference. 
In 1859, a new ISC was convened in Paris, and prior to 1938, eleven further 
International Sanitary Conferences were organised in cities such as Constantinople, 
Vienna, Rome, and Washington. Not only did the topics under analysis change over 
the years, but also the type of expectations, rules, and outcomes. However, as the 
first ISC, the 1851 meeting served as a foundation for the international public health 
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